

THE REVALUATION OF THE NATIONAL LANGUAGE
IN A POST-NATIONAL ERA:
LANGUAGE POLICY AND THE GOVERNANCE OF MIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP

JEFFREY DARREN MILLAR

A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES IN
PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR
OF PHILOSOPHY

GRADUATE PROGRAM IN LINGUISTICS & APPLIED LINGUISTICS
YORK UNIVERSITY, TORONTO, ONTARIO

AUGUST 2014

© Jeffrey Darren Millar, 2014

ABSTRACT

This dissertation examines the influence of neo-liberal discourses and strategies of governance on a revaluation of the national language, in the form of formalized requirements and testing of language proficiency, within immigration, integration, naturalization, and citizenship policy in Canada and the United Kingdom. Employing an interdiscursive language policy analysis (da Silva & Heller, 2009), the dissertation combines textual analysis of policy documents, informed by the principles of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), with an ethnographic understanding of the policy process gathered through interviews with policy actors. It applies the key CDA analytical categories of emergence, selection, operationalization, and materialization of discourses within domains of social action, and recontextualization of discourses across domains (Fairclough, 2009; Wodak & Fairclough, 2010) to a comparative case study of the policy processes surrounding language, immigration, and citizenship in Canada and the UK.

The analysis of the cases reveals how neo-liberal discourses of the *knowledge-based economy* and communitarian discourses of *cohesion* and *active citizenship* have been recontextualized within the domains of immigration and citizenship policy, ultimately constituting a similar hegemonic discourse on the importance of language skills in a common, national language for immigrant integration. Further, the operationalization and materialization of this discourse is interpreted, drawing on the field of governmentality studies, as instantiating an *advanced liberal political rationality* (Rose, 1996, 1999), with formal language requirements and tests serving as political technologies for the subjectivation of prospective citizens. It is also revealed, however, that contestation over, and contradictions within this neo-liberal strategy of

governance have shaped the particular policies regarding language, immigration, and citizenship in each case.

The dissertation contributes to the literature on language testing practices for immigration and citizenship by identifying the motivation for such practices in the political economy of contemporary globalization and neo-liberal state strategies for the governance of immigration, integration, and citizenship. It also contributes to the field of Language Policy and Planning (LPP) by suggesting a theoretical and methodological framework for the study of state language policies in a neo-liberal, post-national era.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to acknowledge my supervisor, Eve Haque, and dissertation committee members, Brian Morgan and Ian Martin, and thank them for their valuable guidance, comments, and advice at various stages of conceptualization, research, and drafting of this dissertation.

Special acknowledgment is also due to the Graduate Program Assistant, DLLL, York University, Rose Frezza-Edgecombe, for her assistance with all matters administrative, in particular during the final year of the process.

I also express my appreciation to the twenty policy makers, researchers, and practitioners in Ottawa, Toronto (Canada), London, and Cambridge (UK), who agreed to be interviewed for this dissertation.

Research for the dissertation was supported by a Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council Doctoral Fellowship (2010-2011), an Ontario Graduate Scholarship (2011-2012), as well as a grant from the Fieldwork Costs Fund, Faculty of Graduate Studies, York University (2010).

Finally, I would like to thank Rebecca for her constant love and encouragement.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Abstract	ii
Acknowledgments	iv
Table of Contents	v
List of Tables	x
PART I	
Chapter 1: Introduction	1
Language and Integration in Canada and the United Kingdom:	
A Tale of Two Speeches	3
Good Citizenship: The Duty to Integrate	3
The Duty to Integrate: Shared British Values	6
The Revaluation of the National Language in a Post-national Era	8
Outline of Chapters	11
Chapter 2: The Revaluation of the National Language in Immigration and Citizenship Policy...	18
Testing Regimes: Discourses and Policies of Immigrant Integration	18
Citizenship Language Testing as Gate-Keeping	21
Citizenship Language Testing as Symbolic Domination	22
The Post-national Critique of National Language Regimes	23
Citizenship Testing in the Age of Migration	24
Civic Integration Paradigm	24
Civic Integration as Illiberal Liberalism?	27
Neo-liberal Communitarian Citizenship	29
Language, Citizenship and Governmentality	32
Advanced Liberal Political Rationality	34
Language in Late Capitalism	37
The Skills Discourse of the New Economy: The IALS	38
Summary	42
Chapter 3: Research Design and Methodology	43
Research Design	44
Comparative Case Study	45
Selection of Cases	45
Policy Domains Compared	48
Method of Analysis	49
Interdiscursive Language Policy Analysis	49
Critical Discourse Analysis	50
Recontextualization and Contemporary Social Change	51
Data	52
Policy Documents	53
Selection of Texts	53
Policy Instruments	54
Personal Interviews	55
Summary	57

PART II

Chapter 4: “Language is the Key” in Canadian Immigration Policy	59
A Brief History of Canadian National Language Policy	60
The Revaluation of the National Language in Immigrant Selection	63
Immigration Consultations and Report	64
Strategic Framework for Immigration	66
Immigration Plan 1995-2000	69
Legislative Review of the Immigration Act	69
Building on a Strong Foundation	71
Canada’s Innovation Strategy	72
A National Skills Agenda	73
Knowledge Matters	74
Immigration and the Innovation Strategy	75
Operationalization of the Skills Discourse in Immigration	76
IRPA Selection Grid	76
Canadian Language Benchmarks	78
Contestation of the Skills Discourse	81
Basic Proficiency and Bilingualism	81
“Research Shows that Language is the Key”	82
Modernization of the Immigration System	84
Formalization of Language Assessment in Immigrant Selection	86
Language Requirements in Provincial Nominee Programs	87
Summary	89
Chapter 5: Immigrant Language Training in Canadian Settlement and Integration Policy	92
A Brief History of Immigrant Language Training in Canada	92
Review of Canadian Settlement Programming	97
A Sense of Belonging	98
The Missing LINC	100
Research on Language and Immigrant Incorporation	102
Recontextualization of Research on Immigrant Incorporation	104
Reform of Settlement Language Training Programming	105
Canada-Ontario Immigration Agreement	106
Strategic Plan for Settlement and Language Training	108
Operationalization of Labour Market Language Training	111
ELT and OSLT	111
Settlement Language Training as Human Resource Management	113
Formalization of Language Assessment in Settlement Programming	115
The Rescaling of Settlement Language Services	118
Modernized Approach to Settlement Programming	120
Summary	123
Chapter 6: The Revaluation of the National Language in Canadian Citizenship Policy	124
Reform of Naturalization Law: Revaluing Canadian Citizenship	124
A Broader Vision for Citizenship	128

Attempts to Reform the Citizenship Act.....	129
Updating Canada's Citizenship Laws: It's Time.....	130
Reform of Naturalization Law: Strengthening the Language Requirement	131
Reconsidering Waiving of the Language Requirement	132
Call for Standardized Testing	134
Operationalizing the Revaluation of Canadian Citizenship.....	135
Amendments to the Citizenship Act	135
Improving the Citizenship Test	136
New Citizenship Study Guide	137
Formalization of Language Assessment for Naturalization	140
A Minimum Standard of Language for Citizenship	141
Citizenship Education and Immigrant Language Training.....	145
Citizenship the Canadian Way	147
Summary	147
PART III	
Chapter 7: Language and Managed Migration in British Immigration Policy	149
A Brief History of Language Policy in the UK	150
Immigration Policy Under New Labour: The End of Zero Migration	151
Our Competitive Future: Building the Knowledge Driven Economy.....	153
Expanding Economic Immigration	154
Managed Migration	155
Controlling Our Borders: Making Migration Work for Britain	156
Selective Admission	158
Selecting Wisely	159
Language and Managed Migration	162
The Points Based System	162
Highly Skilled Migrants under the PBS.....	164
Skilled Workers under the PBS	167
Students under the PBS	168
Temporary Workers under the PBS.....	169
Low Skilled Workers under the PBS	170
Language Requirements and Immigration Control	172
Summary	173
Chapter 8: Language Skills and Community Cohesion in British Integration Policy	175
A Brief History of ESOL Policy in the UK	175
ESOL and the National Skills Strategy	177
The Moser Report	177
Breaking the Language Barriers	177
Adult ESOL Core Curriculum.....	179
More Than a Language	181
World Class Skills	182
ESOL and Community Cohesion.....	186
The Concept of Community Cohesion	187

Language and Community Cohesion.....	190
Building Cohesive Communities.....	191
Operationalization of a Community Cohesion Agenda	192
Guidance on Community Cohesion.....	192
End of Parallel Lives?.....	194
Our Shared Future.....	195
Cohesion Delivery Framework.....	198
Loss in Translation	199
Focusing ESOL on Community Cohesion	202
ESOL Consultations	202
Consultations Report.....	203
The New Approach to ESOL	205
Language, Integration and the Nation State	206
Summary	210
Chapter 9: The Revaluation of the National Language in British Citizenship Policy	212
Reform of UK Naturalization Law.....	213
New Labour's Citizenship Agenda: Education for Citizenship.....	214
Recontextualization of the Citizenship Agenda.....	219
The Cantle Report.....	219
Citizenship and Naturalization	221
The New and the Old	224
Naturalization Language Test	229
Educative and Integrative.....	233
Operationalization of Knowledge of Life in the UK.....	235
ESOL Materials for Citizenship	236
Life in the UK: The Journey to Citizenship	239
Active Citizenship	239
Alignment of Naturalization and Immigration Policy	242
Extension of Language Testing	242
Our Common Bond.....	243
Path to Citizenship	245
Summary	247
PART IV	
Chapter 10: Neo-liberal Governance of Immigration:	
Language Skills for the New Economy	249
Extending a Model of Economic Rationality to the Immigration Domain	249
Language as Political Technology	252
Language, Migration, and the KBE	255
Summary	259
Chapter 11: Neo-liberal Governance of Integration:	
Language, Social Inclusion, and Cohesion.....	261
Immigrant Language Training and Employability.....	261
Language, Integration, and Social Inclusion	264

From Linguistic Assimilation to Language Governmentality	266
Summary	268
Chapter 12: Neo-liberal Governance of Citizenship:	
Language, Active Citizenship, and Community	270
Responsibilization of Citizens	270
Governing through Community	273
Language and the Neo-liberal Citizen	274
Summary	277
PART V	
Chapter 13: Conclusion and Implications	279
The Recent Past as Postscript	279
Developments in Language, Migration, and Citizenship in Canada	279
Developments in Language, Migration, and Citizenship in the UK	281
Implications for the Study of Language Policies in a Post-national Era	283
Citizenship Language Testing	283
Language Policy and Planning	284
From Post-national Critique to Critique of Neo-liberalism	286
Summary	289
References	290
Appendices	321
Appendix A: List of Acronyms	321
Appendix B: List of Terms	323
Appendix C: List of Documents Analyzed	325

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1: Language Requirements in the Points-Based System	164
Table 2: Summary of Findings from the Case Studies	260

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

It is a common place within writing on language in contemporary global society that economic, social, and cultural processes denoted by the umbrella term *globalization* have posed a serious challenge to the nation-state, the idea of a “national language,” and the hitherto close association between them. The paradigm of “one language, one nation, one state,” with its modern origins in 19th century German Romantic philosophy of language, had been the basis, for the last two centuries, of nation-building projects and nationalist discourses whose common goal was the consolidation of monolingual societies within the borders of a singular political community (Bauman & Briggs, 2003; Blommaert, 2006; Gal, 2012; Wright, 2012). The emergence of global markets, transnational cultural flows, and globalizing identities, however, has problematized this modernist national language regime (Pujolar, 2007; Heller, 2010; Heller & Duchêne, 2012). In carrying out its functions of economic and social regulation, the nation-state can no longer rely on monolingual ideologies and norms of language use in the face of multilingual realities of the global economy and of an increasingly diverse domestic population. Likewise, for the increasing number of individual citizens with multilingual repertoires, the national language is no longer a prime site of identification with an exclusive national identity. These developments have led to the claim, both normative and descriptive, that in our *post-national* era (Soysal, 1994) the national language has been shorn of any privileged status as a locus of social identity formation or index of membership in a political community (e.g., Wright, 2004, p. 162; Shohamy, 2009, p. 54; Extra, Spotti & Van Avermaet, 2009, p. 8).

Since large-scale migration is often considered the quintessential phenomenon of globalization, one area where we would expect to find a shift to a post-national language regime

would be in the area of immigration and naturalization policy. However, rather than dissociating proficiency in a particular national language from the status of full membership in the political community, a number of Western, liberal nation-states have undertaken a revaluation of the national language within their citizenship policies, in an attempt to reassert knowledge of a common, standard language as the basis for societal cohesion within increasingly diverse and globalized national societies (see, e.g., Extra, Spotti & Van Avermaet, 2009). This attempt has taken the form of strengthened and formalized language requirements within naturalization laws and an increasing importance placed on issues of language ability within policies of immigrant integration and immigration control measures. All of this is legitimized by a “discourse of integration” (Hogan-Brun, Mar-Molinero, & Stevenson, 2009), which places a premium on linguistic acculturation, if not outright assimilation, of new immigrant and ethnic minority communities.

How is one to explain this paradoxical phenomenon of the revaluation of the idea of a national language in a post-national era? To answer that question, this dissertation undertakes a comparative case study analysis of the revaluation of the idea of a national language in two nation-states, namely Canada and the United Kingdom. The former is a classic country of immigration where large-scale immigration has been a feature of nation-building for much of the country’s history (Reitz, 2004). The latter, while historically associated more with emigration, has, in the last 15 years, gone from being a country of “zero migration” for much of the last quarter of the 20th century to one open to increased levels of economic immigration (Hansen, 2000; Layton-Henry, 2004). Despite these differences, both have in the current context instituted language policies in regard to immigration and citizenship that are similar in terms of the

measures adopted as well as the discourses by which their adoption is legitimated. As evidence of this point, and to introduce the cases, the following section presents excerpts of two speeches that figured prominently in the revaluation of language within immigration and citizenship policy in Canada and the UK.

Language and Integration in Canada and the United Kingdom: A Tale of Two Speeches

Good Citizenship: The Duty to Integrate

On March 18, 2009, the Canadian Minister of Citizenship, Immigration and Multiculturalism, Jason Kenney, delivered a speech at the University of Western Ontario, entitled “Good Citizenship: The Duty to Integrate.”¹ In the speech, the Minister recounted the following anecdote:

Six weeks ago I was in India on an official visit. I sat in our New Delhi High Commission on a couple of immigration interviews with people who had applied for permanent residency. I met a woman there, a Canadian citizen, a resident in this country for 15 years who had been a Canadian citizen for, I think, 12 years. In her mid-30s, living in Surrey, British Columbia, she was there to make an application to sponsor her spouse to come to Canada. This Canadian woman of Punjabi Indian origin could not conduct the immigration interview in English or French but had to conduct it through a Punjabi translator. (Citizenship and Immigration Canada [CIC], 2009, March 18, n.p.)

The significance of this story, and which is a cause of concern for the Minister, is the revelation that a long-term resident and naturalized Canadian citizen could lack knowledge of either of Canada’s official languages. Remarking on this fact, the Minister asks rhetorically:

We have to ask ourselves, is that an isolated example? Regrettably, not isolated enough, regrettably too typical of our failure to properly give people an opportunity at integration. How can that woman really open the doors to economic opportunity, to broader social integration, if she is locked out by limited linguistic ability? (CIC, 2009, March 18, n.p.)

¹ The Minister delivered essentially the same speech two days later (March 20, 2009) at the 11th National Metropolis Conference, in Calgary, Alberta.

Concern over “limited linguistic ability” on the part of newcomers had already lead the government to “[triple] settlement funding for newcomers by about 1.5 billion a year over three years” including the provision of “more language training than ever before.” It was also to prevent such situations in the future that the Minister would announce, later in the speech, the intention to conduct a

top-to-bottom review of the citizenship program, to review the educational materials, to review and improve significantly the test that’s required of new citizens, *to look at improving the language requirement as well*. (CIC, 2009, March 18, n.p.; emphasis added).

This intention ultimately led, in September 2012, to the formalization of the citizenship language requirement. Henceforth, objective proof of language proficiency, such as formal test results, would be demanded of all applicants for naturalization as demonstration of meeting the requirement, under the Citizenship Act, of ability in one of Canada’s official languages (CIC, 2012, September 28).

This perspective on the formalization of the language requirement for citizenship and increased funding for provision of language training for newcomers was part of the Minister’s vision for the immigration, citizenship and multiculturalism program set forth in the speech. The most pressing issue facing these programs is how to meet the challenges posed by the increasing diversity attendant on large-scale migration:

How can a country that maintains such a high level of immigration while embracing the diversity that it brings maintain a sense of social cohesion, a common purpose and a national identity? What more can we do to strengthen the ties that bind us together as Canadians? (CIC, 2009, March 18)

How this aim of achieving greater societal cohesion is to be accomplished by the three federal

government programs concerned with the incorporation of newcomers to Canada is outlined by the Minister:

[O]ur immigration program, our citizenship program, our multiculturalism program must increasingly focus on integration, on the successful and rapid integration of newcomers to Canadian society, and on a deepening understanding of the values, symbols and institutions that are rooted in our history. (CIC, 2009, March 18)

In the promotion of integration, language plays a central role in terms of

making sure that people who arrive in Canada are able as quickly as possible to have competency in one of our two official languages as a pathway to economic and social integration. (CIC, 2009, March 18)²

The discourse that emerges from these excerpts about the importance of ability in an official national language to the successful integration, both economic and social, of immigrants into a cohesive society bound together by a common set of values is not unique to Canadian political discourse. Indeed, the title of Minister Kenney's speech is an intertextual reference to a speech given two-and-a-half years earlier by the then Prime Minister of Britain, Tony Blair, which was similarly entitled "The Duty to Integrate." In addition, the theme of increasing demands on new immigrants, such as demonstrating ability in an official national language, in

² In the version of the speech delivered at the Metropolis National Conference, the minister expands on the importance of language for immigrants' economic integration:

I believe that one area in which we can ask both immigrants and the country to make a greater effort is that of language. Language gives people the tools they need to further their skills and find their place in the world. The ability to effectively communicate in either English or French is crucial to success in Canada. This need for language skills is one way to explain that while both male and female immigrants are more likely to have university degrees compared to native born Canadians they earn significantly less than native born counterparts. ... [T]his month a new report from Statistics Canada confirmed the importance of having ability in English or French in the success that immigrants experience in our labour markets. (CIC, 2009, March 20)

As will be shown below, this economic, instrumentalist discourse, rather than a symbolic, identity-based discourse, is the dominant discourse legitimating the revaluation of the national language in Canadian immigration and citizenship policy.

order to achieve an integrated and cohesive society is legitimated through another intertextual reference to the Prime Minister's speech:

To paraphrase former British Prime Minister Tony Blair, everyone who comes to Canada has a right to be different but a duty to integrate. Yes, we have a public responsibility to make it easier for people to integrate into our society, but people need to make an effort as well. (CIC, 2009, March 18)

It is no surprise then, turning to the speech from which these themes are here recontextualized, to find that the British PM's notion of the "duty to integrate" also includes demonstrating ability in the national language.

The Duty to Integrate: Shared British Values

On December 8, 2006, the British Prime Minister Tony Blair delivered a speech on the topic of "Our Nation's Future" entitled "The Duty to Integrate: Shared British Values" (Blair, 2006, December 8). The dominant theme of the speech is the need to "assert the duty to integrate" on the part of new immigrants and settled minority ethnic communities. The PM outlines six elements of policy to achieve this, one of which is specifically related to language:³

[W]e should share a common language. Equal opportunity for all groups requires that they be conversant in that common language. It is a matter both of cohesion and of justice that we should set the use of English as a condition of citizenship. In addition, for those who wish to take up residence permanently in the UK, we will include a requirement to pass an English test before such permanent residency is granted. (Blair, 2006, December 8)

The Labour government had already, in 2005, implemented a formal test of knowledge of language and life in the UK for applicants seeking British citizenship. Blair's announcement that

³ Another explicit mention of language is made in the speech in relation to a specific concern over visiting preachers in Britain. After expressing a preference that British preachers originate from within settled communities in Britain rather than from abroad, Blair states: "where they are recruited internationally, we will require entrants to have a proper command of English" (Blair, 2006).

applicants for permanent residency would in future also have to pass the test marked the beginning of a process of extending the knowledge of language and society testing regime from the procedure for naturalization to the granting of *indefinite leave to remain* (ILR⁴) and ultimately even for permission to enter for spouses of British citizens seeking admission to the United Kingdom.

As with the Kenney speech announcing the formalization of the Canadian citizenship language requirement, the extension of the UK citizenship language-testing regime was legitimated in Blair's speech by an integration discourse. Blair's speech does not contain a personal anecdote contextualizing the discussion of language and immigrant integration. However, the wider context of Blair's speech was the "7/7" bombings in London, which had occurred 17 months earlier in July 2005. These attacks had been carried out by British born Muslims who were in many ways perfectly integrated into British society. However, Blair's duty to integrate concerns a different sense of integration:

Integration, in this context, is not about culture or lifestyle. It is about values. It is about integrating at the point of shared, common unifying British values. It isn't about what defines us as people, but as citizens, the rights and duties that go along with being a member of our society. (Blair, 2006, December 8)

While this notion of integration claims not to be about cultural difference or similarity, it does entail an implicit critique, but not a rejection, of a notion of multiculturalism:

[W]e need ... to re-assert also the duty to integrate to stress what we hold in common and to say these are the shared boundaries within which we all are obliged to live, precisely in order to preserve our right to our own different faiths, races and creeds. We must in other words respect both our right to differ and the duty to express any difference in a way fully consistent with the shared values that bind us together. (Blair, 2006, December 8)

⁴ For a complete list of acronyms used in this dissertation see Appendix A below.

These two speeches illustrate the discursive context in which a common, national language has been revalued in relation to immigration and citizenship policy in Canada⁵ and the UK.

The Revaluation of the National Language in a Post-national Era

What can be identified at the most fundamental level underlying these discourses and policies regarding language, immigration, and citizenship is a phenomenon that I call the *revaluation of the national language*, that is, a renewed emphasis on a common, standard language as the basis for societal integration and cohesion within individual [nation-]states. While this definition is intended to be self-explanatory, what exactly is meant by the concept, and in particular the use of the term *national language*, does require further discussion.

Within the field of Language Policy and Planning (LPP), the term “national language” can be used in two ways, a neutral one, referring to the language most widely used in a particular territory, and an emotional or symbolic one, implying a language’s role as symbol of national identity (Spolsky, 2004, p. 26). In its first, neutral use, the term is often contrasted with the more technical term of *official language*, that is a language whose status has been gained by the formal recognition of a government (p. 26). However, the two terms are often used interchangeably with national language equivalent to de facto official language in cases where there is no de jure official language policy.⁶ Even within de jure language policies, e.g., in constitutions, both terms are often employed, with the meaning of both terms locally determined (p. 26). A common

⁵ While English is normally referred to as the “official language” (along with French) in Canadian language policy discourse, a rationalization for characterizing it as the “national language” in the present study is provided in Chapter 4 below.

⁶ Cf. Hornberger’s (2006) framework for LPP in which both “officialization” and “nationalization” are listed as activities within the status-policy dimension of language planning.

pattern is found in the constitutions of states formed through the process of decolonization, which often recognize an ex-colonial language as official language while also recognizing a local vernacular as a national language for purposes of wider communication and identity formation within the new post-colonial state.

The second use of the term national language as a symbol of national identity is common within writing on language policy that draws on theories of nationalism and analyzes the role of language in the history of nation-building, past and present (e.g., Wright, 2004, 2012). This sense of national language is also part of the critique, described above, of the ongoing ideological motivations and effects of states' monolingual language policies in our current post-national era.

In the present dissertation, I use the term national language to refer to a/the dominant language in a given state territory, whether the *de jure* or *de facto* official language. However, in the notion of the *revaluation* of the national language that I develop below, the significance of the national language in states' language policies extends beyond the issue of language use in government institutions, which is the primary concern of language *officialization*, to capture a more diffuse role of language within broader state strategies of governance. Similarly, the use of national language follows the usage of much of the literature on immigration and citizenship language testing, which adopts a transnational or post-national critique of these practices. However, in contrast to this critique, the “revaluation of the national language” that will be traced below does not constitute a simple return to 19th century nationalist discourses and practices of nation-building, but rather draws on a globalizing nationalist discourse based on the instrumental rather than identity value of language in the new global economy.

How, then, can one explain the revaluation of the national language within contemporary immigration and citizenship policy in Canada and the United Kingdom? More interestingly, how can one reconcile this phenomenon with pronouncements about the obsolescence of all things national, be they states, identities, citizenships or languages, in our post-national era? One way is to see these types of policies as a reaction to, and rejection of processes of globalization on the part of states intent on reasserting their autonomous sovereignty in the face of transnational and post-national tendencies associated with globalization. Since processes of globalization are often equated with increasing cultural and linguistic diversity, and neo-liberalism as valuing multilingual linguistic resources, these processes are seen as inherently promoting monolingualism and cultural homogeneity. This imputed reactionary character leads to the dismissal of these practices as anachronistic and out of touch with contemporary multilingual and cultural pluralist realities and norms. Likewise, the discourses by which they are legitimized are often interpreted as mere rhetorical rationalization of discriminatory, xenophobic, and illiberal policies under the guise of a liberal sounding discourse (e.g., Piller, 2001; Stevenson, 2006; Shohamy, 2009; Shohamy & MacNamara, 2009).

Another approach, which is adopted in this dissertation, is to see these practices as reflecting and shaped by processes of neo-liberal globalization. The revaluation of a national language in contemporary immigration and citizenship policy is not a straightforward reassertion of the “one language, one nation, one state” model of 19th century nation-building and 20th century nationalist assimilation. Rather, it is an adaptation of a *national language regime* to conditions of late capitalist globalization (cf. Pujolar, 2007). What allows the idea of a national language to serve as the basis of societal cohesion and integration in a trans- or post-national and

culturally diverse global society is not the identity value of a national language as marker of ethnicity and hence membership in an ethno-linguistically defined national community, as it was in the Herderian formula above, but rather the instrumental value of language as a resource in the new economy. While increasing the value of multilingual language resources, the processes of globalization have also increased the value of *literacy* and *language skills*, which in the context of the nation-state means skills in the dominant standard, national language (Heller, 2010; Heller & Duchêne, 2012). In this way, and on the basis of the case studies, it will be argued that the revaluation of the national language is a reflection of political economic processes which have transformed language under late capitalism making it a central stake in nation-states' strategies of economic and social regulation under conditions of late modernity, in particular with respect to the implementation of a neo-liberal or advanced liberal political rationality and techniques of government for migration and citizenship.

Outline of Chapters

The final section of this chapter provides an outline of the contents of the remaining chapters of the dissertation. Chapter Two presents a survey of the existing literature that has addressed the phenomenon that I am calling the revaluation of the national language in the domain of immigration and citizenship policy. This includes the large body of literature that has emerged over the last few years on citizenship language testing and the discourses of integration by which these testing regimes are legitimated. I then survey the citizenship and migration studies literature, which has documented a revaluation of citizenship within an emergent “civic integration” policy paradigm, in order to contextualize the practices of citizenship language testing within broader transformations in contemporary citizenship in an age of global migration.

The approach to language and citizenship within both of these bodies of literature can be characterized as focusing largely on the identity value of the national language which leads these authors to explain the revaluation of the national language as a response to growing cultural and linguistic diversity and a reactionary attempt to reassert a monolingual and monocultural national identity. I then outline the theoretical framework that will be used to provide an alternative explanation of the revaluation of the national language. To do so I draw on a different literature on language and globalization, which, in contrast, has documented the importance of the instrumental value of language under conditions of late capitalism in the form of a commodification of language in the new economy. In this way, the revaluation of the national language is made possible by the transformation of language under conditions of late modernity and legitimated by post-national and globalizing discourses and strategies. Finally, to supplement the micro economic focus of the language in the new economy literature, I draw on Foucault's framework of governmentality, especially its development by subsequent researchers in terms of an advanced liberal political rationality of governance, in order to provide a macro perspective on economic and social policies of which the revaluation of the national language is a part.

Chapter Three, the final chapter in Part I, provides a description of the research design and methodology of the present study. It begins by justifying the choice of a comparative case study of national policies of citizenship language testing. It then explains the selection of cases, namely Canada and the United Kingdom, due to the similarities between the cases and which provide an alternative explanation for the revaluation of national language in question. It also justifies the comparison of the cases across the three policy domains of immigration, integration, and citizenship. It then goes on to describe the method of analysis, namely an interdiscursive

language policy analysis combining critical discourse analysis of policy documents and an ethnographic understanding of the policy process, and explains how this method is suited to the research topic, aims, and theoretical framework described in Chapter Two. It then presents the key analytical categories for the analysis, namely recontextualization and operationalization of discourses within and across fields of action and policy domains as mechanisms of social change. Finally, it describes the various kinds of data that provide the basis of the analysis, namely a variety of policy documents, policy instruments, as well as personal interviews with policy makers, and shows how their selection was justified in relation to the chosen method of analysis.

Part II presents the analysis of the Canadian case study, divided into three chapters dealing with policies and discourses within the domains of immigration, settlement, and citizenship. Chapter Four examines the process of reform of the Canadian immigration regime during the late 1990s and which lead to the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act of 2001. It identifies the emergence of a particular policy discourse of language and immigration during this process which recontextualized a neo-liberal discourse of skills for the new economy from macro-economic policy strategies aimed at increasing Canada's competitiveness and creating a *Knowledge-Based Economy* (KBE). It then discusses how this discourse was operationalized in the form of a modified point system for economic class immigrants wherein language was given prominence as a "key" criterion for the selection of highly skilled migrants, as well as the implementation of formalized procedures for assessing immigrants' language ability. Finally, it discusses ongoing tensions within this "human capital" approach and their impact on immigration language policy measures, in terms of subsequent modifications to the points

system, as well as the extension of language requirements to programs for the recruitment of less skilled migrants. Chapter Five examines the expansion, during the middle of the first decade of the new millennium, of the Canadian federal government's immigrant language training programs as the key plank in Canadian immigrant settlement and integration policy. It traces how this development arose out of evaluations of the flagship program of immigrant language training, the Language Instruction for Newcomers to Canada (LINC) program which identified a need for higher levels and occupation specific forms of language training, and how it was legitimated by the recontextualization of an academic research discourse on the importance of language ability for the successful labour market integration of new immigrants. The chapter then describes the operationalization of this strategy through the development of enhanced and occupation specific language training programs as well as the formalization of language assessment within settlement programming. Finally, the chapter discusses some tensions inherent in this human resource management approach to settlement policy and their impact on the provision of immigrant language training in Canada. Chapter Six examines the revaluation of the national language within Canadian citizenship policy. It traces the emergence of a discourse of strengthening the value, and emphasizing the responsibilities of citizenship during the process of reform of the Citizenship Act. It then describes the operationalization of the discourse in the formalization of the language requirement for naturalization and the redesign of the citizenship test. It then examines the content of the new citizenship test study guide, identifying the origin of the increased significance of language for citizenship in a discourse of "active citizenship" and "community," and relates this to a neo-liberal transformation of the Canadian citizenship regime.

Part III presents the analysis of the UK case study, again divided into three chapters dealing with the domains of immigration, integration, and citizenship. Chapter Seven describes the role of language within the UK's system of managed migration. It traces the origin of this system to the recontextualization of a discourse of competitiveness and the Knowledge-Based Economy within immigration policy as a way to legitimize the New Labour government's transformation of the UK immigration regime by opening the doors to increased numbers of economic immigrants. It presents the operationalization of a system for managed migration, focusing on the differential set of language requirements within the UK's new points-based system. It concludes by discussing the nature of the role of language within measures for immigration control under New Labour. Chapter Eight examines the increased focus on English language ability within UK immigrant integration and community cohesion policy. It traces the recontextualization and operationalization of the skills discourse of the UK's macro-economic strategy in the expansion of English for speakers of other languages (ESOL) provision in the UK at the turn of the millennium as part of the *Skills for Life* Strategy. It then presents the subsequent development of ESOL policy, as it also became a site for the recontextualization and operationalization of a community cohesion agenda, revealing the role of ESOL provision and language ability as indicators and policy measures within New Labour policies for fighting social exclusion. Chapter Nine examines the revaluation of national language in UK citizenship policy by tracing the recontextualization of a citizenship education and civil renewal agenda within naturalization policy. It then explores the operationalization of this agenda in the form of a citizenship and language testing regime and analyses the contents of the "Life in the UK" study guide and ESOL for citizenship materials, revealing how they reflect a neo-liberalization of the

notion of citizenship in their focus on *active participation* and *community*. Finally, it discusses the alignment of the requirements for naturalization with those of entry and permanent residency within the UK immigration regime.

Part IV presents the conclusions arising out of the comparison of the case studies, with one chapter focusing on each of the three policy domains of immigration, integration, and citizenship. Chapter Ten identifies the common role of language within the Canadian and British immigration control regimes as a criterion for the selection of economically valuable immigrants. It then relates this function to the technologization of language within neo-liberal macro-economic strategies of increasing national competitiveness and creating a KBE. Finally, it accounts for specific differences between the cases as well as ongoing tensions surrounding their respective point systems by identifying a special significance of the criterion of language within a supply-side, human capital approach to immigrant selection. Chapter Eleven identifies a common function of immigrant ESL/ESOL provision in both cases as a form of active labour market policy to increase employability within policy agendas for achieving social inclusion based on an economic notion of integration. It further reveals how language is one part of a broader *governmental approach* to the successful incorporation of immigrant populations and the creation of cohesive communities. Chapter Twelve identifies a discourse of active citizenship as the common motivation for the revaluation of national language in Canadian and British citizenship policy. It explains the operationalization of this discourse, through policy measures such as language testing, as aimed at the *responsibilization* of citizens and associated with a *governmentalization of community* within a neo-liberal conception of citizenship.

Finally, Chapter Thirteen concludes the dissertation with a discussion of subsequent developments in Canadian and UK language, migration, and citizenship policy as further support for the findings of the present analysis. It shows how, in the case of Canada, the recent revision of the immigration points system confirms the continued central importance of language as a selection criterion, while in the case of the UK, the adoption of more overtly restrictive measures of immigration control by the Liberal-Democrat-Conservative coalition government serves as negative evidence of the expansive rather than restrictive nature of New Labour's reforms to the immigration regime, including the language testing aspects. The chapter then draws out implications of the analysis of the revaluation of the national language as related to the technologization of language within neo-liberal modes of governance, both for an understanding of practices of citizenship language testing as well as for the study of language policy in a neo-liberal, post-national era.

CHAPTER 2: THE REVALUATION OF NATIONAL LANGUAGE IN IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP POLICY

Given the historical links between language, nation, and state, it is natural to begin an examination of the revaluation of the national language by reviewing the large body of literature that has been produced over the last dozen years on citizenship language testing. Much of this literature has focused on the European context, particularly North-Western Europe, where there has been a proliferation since the late 1990s and early 2000s of increasingly formalized language tests and requirements within the naturalization regimes of nation-states such as Germany, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom (see Extra, Spotti, & van Avermaet, 2009; Hogan-Brun, Mar-Molinero, & Stevenson, 2009). A similar trend can also be observed, to a lesser degree and in different ways, in the classic countries of immigration of Canada, the USA, and Australia.

Testing Regimes: Discourses and Policies of Immigrant Integration

The analysis of these practices sees them as restrictive in intent, based in exclusionary ideologies of language and national belonging. This framework for analysis of immigrant language testing practices was established in Piller's (2001) seminal article on German citizenship language testing. Piller's analysis was based on examining the role of language requirements in the reform of the German citizenship law, which came into effect on January 1, 2000. While this reform marked an alteration in the basis of German citizenship from *jus sanguinis* to the more inclusive principle of *jus soli*, Piller illustrates how the implementation of a German language requirement was used to reverse the otherwise progressive aspects of the reforms, resulting in the exclusion of large numbers of resident foreigners of Turkish origin. Piller's critique of these practices has both a practical as well as an ideological aspect. On the

practical issue of the implementation of the testing practices, she shows how the subjective and arbitrary application of the testing procedure was what allowed it to play an exclusionary role. Subsequent language testing regimes have obviated these objections by adopting objective testing procedures that are often made mandatory for all applicants across the board, thus removing the subjective and arbitrary aspect of the practices. However, even these more objective practices do not escape the second part of Piller's critique, the ideology of "one language, one nation," which provides an exclusionary notion of national belonging underlying citizenship language testing practices. The isomorphism of language, nation, and state was a central tenet of German Romantic philosophy of language as well as 19th century nationalist movements, which aimed at the unification of the political, national, and linguistic community (Gellner, 1983; cf. Hobsbawm, 1990). This monolingual national language regime has been the basis, since the 19th century, of the imagined communities of the modern nation-state (cf. Anderson, 1981), and which is being reasserted in the Germany government's practices of citizenship language testing.

Since the German citizenship reforms, there has been a proliferation of language testing measures across countries of Western Europe, which place "increasing and increasingly complex formal demands on knowledge of a/the national language" upon prospective immigrants (Extra, Spotti, & Van Avermaet, 2009, p. 18-19). In many cases, these demands are part of stricter conditions being imposed for the granting of residency rights, naturalization, and citizenship (Hogan-Brun, Mar-Molinero, & Stevenson 2009, p 3; cf. Wright, 2008; Shohamy & McNamara, 2009). Following Piller's analysis of German practices, the broader phenomenon of the proliferation of these practices has likewise been explained as a reassertion of exclusionary

notions of language and national identity. This literature has also contextualized these practices more broadly as a reaction to challenges posed by globalization, namely greater cultural and linguistic diversity attendant upon increasing levels of migration.

This perspective on citizenship language tests is adopted by Hogan-Brun, Mar-Molinero and Stevenson (2009). In the introduction to their edited volume on the discourses of integration surrounding the implementation of citizenship language testing policies, they argue that political activities around language and citizenship are “inspired by ideological intentions in an attempt to defend the ... ‘nation’ as a stable monolingual norm” (Hogan-Brun, Mar-Molinero & Stevenson, 2009, p. 5). They characterize the language regimes being asserted through citizenship language tests as a “contemporary manifestation of linguistic nationalism [that] operates as a defensive reaction to the 21st century emergence of transnational and cosmopolitan communities” (p. 11).

Extra, Spotti, and Van Avermaet (2009), in their introduction to a collection of studies on integration testing regimes in Europe and beyond, identify the role of language in these integration regimes, explaining how “language ... fulfils [sic] the role of lubricant of the integration machinery and that works as a gate-keeper of the national order” (p. 14). They go on to specify how the meaning of “integration” in the dominant discourse surrounding these regimes reflects an *assimilationist* as opposed to a *multiculturalist* approach to the management of diversity of immigrant minority communities, while the “national order” being preserved is the equation of a language with a nation-state as a core value of the *imagined community* of the nation (p. 6). In summary, they claim these integration regimes

have to be seen as a token of the revival of the nation-state, with its traditional paradigm of one language, one identity, and one uniform set of shared societal norms and cultural values. This is supposed to instil [sic] people with a feeling of national security,

confidence and order. This revival of the nation-state stands in stark contrast to the processes of globalization and the enlargement of the EU on the one hand and on the increasing importance attached to regions, localities, cities and neighbourhoods on the other, referred to as processes of glocalization. (p. 15)

Citizenship Language Testing as Gate-Keeping

Within the literature on citizenship language testing as a reassertion of a national language regime, two focuses can be distinguished. The first is a focus on the gate-keeping role of citizenship language tests, and is based on a *critical language testing* (CLT) perspective (Shohamy, 2001; McNamara & Roever, 2006; McNamara & Shohamy, 2008). An example of this focus is the special issue of the journal *Language Assessment Quarterly* (2009) examining the language testing aspects of citizenship testing regimes. Informed by a critical language testing approach concerned with the political and social contexts of the use of language tests, the introduction by Shohamy & McNamara (2009) as well as the collected papers examine the ethical dimensions of the use of language tests for citizenship in terms of fairness in implementing the tests, the consequences of failure for test takers, and the justice of using language tests as a condition for obtaining entry, residence or citizenship in a country.

Likewise, McNamara & Shohamy (2008) examine citizenship language tests in terms of the power of language tests in implementing social policies. From this perspective, the tightening of language requirements for immigration and citizenship is related to restrictive immigration policies in reaction to growing diversity and perceived security threats associated with increased migration. Specific problematic aspects of citizenship language testing practices in Europe are the wide variation in the level of language proficiency required in different countries, which indicates that the level being demanded is based on political expediency rather than any objective

estimate of the functional requirements of citizenship, as well as the high level of literacy and language proficiency required by the knowledge of society aspect of the citizenship tests.

This gate-keeping critique of citizenship language tests is supported by evidence produced by researchers in the field of immigration and naturalization law. Their findings have documented the exclusionary effects of citizenship language testing in terms of the high failure rates for certain categories of migrants and for particular national origin groups, which raises serious legal concerns with such practices (Van Oers, 2010, Ryan, 2009).

Citizenship Language Testing as Symbolic Domination

The second focus within the literature on citizenship language testing is on the symbolic effects of these practices on those subjected to them. Researchers adopting this focus are concerned with issues of power in multilingual and bilingual contexts. For their analysis, they draw on the linguistic anthropological literature on *language ideologies* as well as Bourdieu's framework of *symbolic domination* (Schieffelin, Woolard, & Kroskrity, 1998; Bourdieu, 1991).

An example of this approach is the work of Blackledge on the UK testing regime (2005, 2009a, 2009b, 2009c). Blackledge (2009a) examines the extension of the English language-testing regime in the UK to spouses of British citizens applying for a marriage visa. Applying a language ideology framework, Blackledge shows how the public discourse surrounding the new policy is based on an ideology of language that associates lack of proficiency in English with a threat to national identity, social cohesion, and democracy. From a Bourdieusian perspective on linguistic domination, this *misrecognition* of the legitimacy of the dominant language reproduces the symbolic domination of speakers of minority languages other than English (Bourdieu, 1991).

For Blackledge (2009b), the tightening of the language requirements for naturalization through formalized language testing, is a restrictive counterpoint to the general liberalizing trend in citizenship policy, evidence of the “illiberal liberalism” of citizenship testing regimes.

Blackledge (2009c) provides a normative critique, that is, one based on a notion of ethical standards of behaviour, of the UK citizenship language-testing regime from a pluralist position on the relation between language and national identity in multilingual contexts. He argues that the development and implementation of the “Life in the UK” testing regime operates in the name of “cultural and linguistic unification” which imposes the dominant language as the legitimate language while “reject[ing] the speakers of all other languages into indignity” (Blackledge, 2009c, p. 84). He also provides a more practical critique, contrasting the relative merits of a coercive language-testing regime versus the provision of accessible English language tuition.

The Post-national Critique of National Language Regimes

Both the gate-keeping and symbolic domination critiques within the literature on citizenship language testing share what can be called a “post-national critique” of the language ideologies and language policy regimes being (re)constituted by contemporary nation-states through their citizenship language testing practices. This critique is based on the claim that we are living in a “post-national period where systems and societal relationships are increasingly configured on a supranational rather than a national scale” (Wright, 2004, p. 162). Rather than persisting in national language regimes, we are moving towards “a global community of communication” (Wright, 2004, p. 162-163). In an era of “globalization, diversity, common markets, transnationalism, multilingualism, striving diasporas and flexible boundaries,” requiring knowledge in one specific language is an anachronism (Shohamy, 2009, p. 49). Moreover, the

idea of the monoglot nation “cannot offer an adequate basis for societal belonging in this age of globalization and migration (Castels, 2005, cited in Extra, Spotti & Van Avermaet, 2009, p. 8). The attempt to reassert the “one language, one nation” paradigm through citizenship language testing is seen as “a defensive reaction to the 21st century emergence of transnational and cosmopolitan communities” (Hogan-Brun, Mar-Molinero & Stevenson, 2009, p. 11), and as a “revival of the nation-state [in opposition to] processes of globalization” (Van Avermaet, 2009, p. 36). Furthermore, these efforts are ideological in nature, being “inspired by ideological intentions in an attempt to defend the myth of the ‘nation’ as a stable monolingual norm which is constantly challenged by multilingual realities” (Hogan-Brun, Mar-Molinero & Stevenson, 2009, p. 5; cf. Stevenson, 2006, p. 148). With these claims, the literature on citizenship language testing is situated within debates over the nature of citizenship and citizenship regimes in an age of global migrations. It is to this citizenship and migration studies literature that we now turn.

Citizenship Testing in the Age of Migration

Civic Integration Paradigm

Formalized language testing for naturalization is part of a larger set of practices that have proliferated across Western Europe over the last 10 or 15 years. The implementation of citizenship tests as well as mandatory “integration courses” has been associated with the emergence of a *civic integration paradigm* within immigrant integration and citizenship policy (Joppke, 2007). The nature and role of these instruments in the contemporary governance of migration and citizenship in liberal, Western nation states has been a topic of much discussion within the field of citizenship and migration studies. While the extent to which this civic integration paradigm represents a convergence of policies around a particular model of

citizenship is still debated, there is a consensus that it does represent a *thickening* of the content, and a *revaluation* of the status of citizenship (Joppke & Morawska, 2003).

Within this literature the civic integration policy paradigm is often taken as evidence against the post-national thesis that claimed that the status of national citizenship was being eclipsed, in a post-national era, by rights claims based on a notion of universal personhood and international human rights norms (Soysal, 1994). Contrary to the implied decoupling of identity from citizenship status, civic integration policies represent a retreat from multiculturalism, a return to assimilation, and a reassertion of national identity (Joppke & Morawska, 2003; Joppke, 2004; Brubaker, 2003; Kofman, 2005).

According to Brubaker (2003), the renewed concern with civic integration does indeed reflect a return of assimilation, but in the sense of a “normative and analytical concern with the nature and extent of emerging similarities in particular domains between populations of immigrant origin and ‘host’ populations” (Brubaker, 2003, p. 43). This new meaning of assimilation represents a subtle but significant conceptual shift from an organic and transitive notion of assimilation, as an act of making immigrants similar or identical to a host population, to an *abstract* and *intransitive* notion of assimilation, as a process through which immigrants become similar to a host population. While the former notion of assimilation implies an end state of complete absorption of the migrant into the host population, with the latter the accent is on the process of change resulting in a greater or lesser degree of similarity (p. 42). In practical policy terms, this shift entails a focus on a *multigenerational population* instead of individual persons, on *heterogeneous* as opposed to homogeneous units, on *socioeconomic* as opposed to cultural

matters, and a *disaggregated* and *multidimensional* as opposed to holistic and monodimensional perspective on immigrant incorporation (p. 51-52).

The civic integration paradigm also represents a shift in the prevailing model of citizenship. The question of the model or models of citizenship to which civic integration measures, including citizenship language tests, conform has also been debated in the literature. For instance, Wallace Goodman (2010) plots the civic integration policies of a number of European nation-states along the axes of thickening and liberalization of the content of and access to citizenship. Rather than seeing a convergence of policies around one model of citizenship, she finds they cluster around four citizenship orientations, which she dubs insular, prohibitive, conditional, and enabling (p. 764). Others have taken a more deductive approach based on the application of political theoretical models of citizenship. For instance, Van Oers (2010) applies the three dominant models of citizenship distinguished within the citizenship studies literature to the citizenship tests in the Netherlands, Germany and the UK. The first model, the liberal model, is based on a “thin” procedural notion of citizenship as legal status, to which long term residents have a right (p. 54). The second model, the republican model, entails a more active notion of citizenship as participation in a political community, access to which is conditional on acquisition of the knowledge required for active participation (p. 56). The third and final model, the communitarian model, is based on a concept of citizenship as membership in a national community, access to which is dependent on possessing the shared values and identity of that community (p. 57). Examining citizenship tests as well as the political discourses surrounding their implementation in the three national contexts above, Van Oers finds that they were implemented in the context of a citizenship discourse centered around themes of active

citizenship, participation, responsibilities of citizenship, common norms and values, community, etc., and thus represent a “shift away from the liberal citizenship concept towards republicanism and communitarianism” (p. 82). This analysis is also supported by others who have identified emerging hybrid or variant forms of citizenship, e.g., liberal communitarian, neo-republican, libertarian liberal, etc. (see, e.g., Etzioni, 2007; Van Oers, 2008, 2009; Michalowski, 2010).

Civic Integration as Illiberal Liberalism?

The literature on citizenship testing has also asked the question, given the shift in the notion of citizenship described above, whether these policies are still compatible with the liberal democratic values upon which the states enacting them are purportedly founded. For example, the contributions by political theorists to the edited collection by Bauböck & Joppke (2010) take a normative stance towards these policies, evaluating the contents of citizenship language tests and other requirements for naturalization against the tenets of liberal political theory, such as liberty (positive and negative), equality, and individual rights. While some argue that only very minimal naturalization requirements, such as residency, are justifiable on liberal grounds, (e.g., Carens, 2010), others argue that requiring some knowledge of society and language on the part of immigrants is defensible according to liberal principles, much like the requirement or mandatory basic education for the domestic population in all liberal democratic states (e.g., Hansen, 2010). Others object to citizenship tests on consequentialist grounds by identifying the exclusionary effects of new testing regimes, for instance on the numbers of naturalizations (absolute as well as rate of naturalization), or differential effects on certain population groups (e.g., Ryan, 2009; Groenendijk & Van Oers, 2010). The majority view from amongst these writers is that, due to its discriminatory nature, the civic integration paradigm of citizenship

testing violates liberal principles and thus serves as an example of “illiberal liberal” practices (see, e.g., Guild, Groenendijk, & Carrera, 2009).

The most prominent dissenting voice from this illiberal liberalism thesis is Christian Joppke, who believes that by and large the requirements of civic integration-type citizenship tests are compatible with liberal principles. He argues that the “illiberal” uses of these tests by certain governments are the exception rather than an example of the notion of *exceptionalism* which is part of a particular critique of liberal thought, namely that there is a tendency to a periodic suspension of liberal principles and resort to arbitrary power inherent in liberalism itself (see Joppke [2007] for discussion and critique of this position). Indeed, Joppke sees along side the civic integration paradigm a general trend towards the liberalization of naturalization policy across Western Europe, for example in the shift to a *jus soli* basis for citizenship, increasing tolerance for dual citizenship, and a shortening of residency periods for naturalization (Joppke, 2010). This liberalization in the status dimension of citizenship is also visible in the identity dimension, where the “national” identity associated with citizenship is expressed in terms of the values and principles of a universal applied political liberalism. However, Joppke does concede that this “paradox of universalism” is potentially problematic if the universal identity is used to exclude certain individuals, making the liberal state only for those with liberal values, which would be the result of the application of an unduly repressive variety of liberalism (Joppke, 2008).

A valuable insight that Joppke provides is the comparison he draws between the kinds of requirements that are part of the civic integration paradigm (such as mandatory integration courses) and certain kinds of neo-liberal social policies which are applied to the domestic, native

born population, and which reflect a more “disciplinary” rather than emancipatory sort of liberalism, thus representing a shift away from classical liberal thought (Joppke, 2007). As Joppke explains:

[T]he contemporary state, hollowed out by economic globalization, is coercing individuals, as well as the ‘communities’ that they constitute, to release their self-producing and self-regulating capacities as an alternative to the redistribution and public welfare that fiscally diminished states can no longer deliver. Civic integration is the equivalent on the part of immigrants to the workfare policies that the general population is subjected to in the context of shrinking welfare states: both use illiberal means to make people self-sufficient and autonomous. (Joppke, 2007, p. 16).

This perspective on the civic integration paradigm as a critique of welfare-state policies has also been noted by observers who have remarked on the parallel decline of multiculturalism and the welfare state (Entzinger, 2003). The integration of an analysis of neo-liberal economic and social policy within consideration of the changing nature of contemporary citizenship is also taken up by proponents of a *neo-liberal communitarian* model of citizenship discussed below, and will be part of the analysis offered in the present dissertation.

Neo-liberal Communitarian Citizenship

One attempt at explaining the contradictions at the bottom of the illiberal liberalism thesis as well as the hybrid nature of contemporary citizenship, combining aspects of republican, liberal and communitarian models of citizenship, has been the proposal of the notion of *neo-liberal communitarianism* (Schinkel and Van Houdt, 2010; Van Houdt, Suvarierol, & Schinkel, 2011). Neo-liberal communitarianism, as its name suggests, combines aspects of neo-liberal governance in the form of “responsibilization” with features of “thick citizenship” in the form of cultural assimilation (Schinkel & Van Houdt, 2010; Van Houdt, Suvarierol, & Schinkel, 2011). The notion of citizenship within this model is a form of active citizenship where, in place of an

entitlement to the rights of social citizenship, citizens are expected to accept more public duties and social responsibilities (Bieling, 2003, p. 65). Equivalent to a “Third Way” perspective in politics, “[t]he overall goal of neo-liberal communitarian citizenship is to ensure that citizens, for the cause of global competitiveness, become less reliant on the state for welfare protection and more ‘employable’ in order to adapt to ‘more flexible labour markets’ and ‘flexible working conditions’” (Hager, 2007, p. 6; cf. Bieling 2003: 65, 67).

The approach to active citizenship involves both a neo-liberal responsabilization of citizenship as well as a moralization of citizenship based on a strong communitarian element of cultural assimilation in terms of the “norms and values” of a national community. This is a double strategy of governing through community and governing through responsibility (Schinkel & Van Houdt, 2010, p. 701). As Schinkel & Van Houdt describe it in relation to the situation in the Netherlands: “Neo-liberal communitarianism combines a communitarian care of a Dutch culturally grounded national community with a neo-liberal emphasis on the individual’s responsibility to achieve membership of that community” (2010, p. 711).

The incorporation of an analysis of a neo-liberal mode of governance in the discussion of the increasingly communitarian aspect of contemporary citizenship is the most significant contribution of the neo-liberal communitarian model. However, by specifying “communitarianism” as cultural assimilation and characterizing language testing requirements as cultural assimilation it fails to extend the analysis in terms of a neo-liberal mode of governance to the role of *language* within the citizenship testing regimes.

As has been seen, one set of literature that does provide a sophisticated analysis of language within citizenship testing is the applied linguistic and sociolinguistic literature on

language testing regimes for purposes of immigration and citizenship. This literature generally agrees with the normative critique of citizenship tests as “illiberal” within the liberal political theoretical citizenship studies literature. It also draws from this literature the notion of a retreat from multiculturalism and a return to assimilation (Joppke & Morawska, 2003; Brubaker, 2003), as well as the post-national critique of the notion of national citizenship itself (e.g., Shohamy, 2009; cf. Soysal, 1994). This applied and sociolinguistic literature adds to the above analyses a language ideology perspective, which identifies the justification for citizenship language testing as based on a monolingual national language ideology dating back to the Herderian formulation of “one nation, one language, one state” which was the basis of the 19th century nationalist movements in Europe (Extra, Spotti, & Van Avermaet, 2009; Hogan-Brun, Mar-Molinero & Stevenson, 2009). Similar to the nation-building literature, this perspective sees the use of these tests as reasserting an ethnic (ethnolinguistic) notion of national identity and national belonging and as part of restrictive immigration policies (Piller, 2001; Kofman, 2005). While this literature makes an important contribution to an understanding of the discourses and politics surrounding policies of citizenship language testing, its focus on ideologies of language as the determining factor in practices of citizenship language testing fails to take into account the influence of neo-liberal discourses and agendas in specifying the way that these policies draw on particular types of knowledge of language and employ particular language policy measures as technologies of government to materialize a particular governmental rationality. Such a perspective can be provided by applying the framework of *governmentality* to state practices of citizenship language-testing (cf. Milani, 2009).

Language, Citizenship, and Governmentality

Our understanding of the role of language testing practices in the regulation of migration can be deepened by applying the notion of governmentality outlined by Michel Foucault in his later lectures at the College de France. This perspective on state practices of government sees the exercise of governmental power as constituting “a mode of action upon the action of others,” or “the conduct of conduct,” aimed at effecting “the right disposition of things” (Foucault, 1982, p. 221). This reconceptualization of state power is premised on their having occurred a transformation of sovereign power whereby statecraft is no longer understood as the exercise of sovereign power over a territory but rather as an “art of government” whose goal is the well being of a population (Foucault, 2009, p. 105). The *political rationality* (the “govern-*mentality*”) underlying this new sovereign power was associated with the elaboration of new forms of knowledge as well as the expansion of governmental apparatuses in the form of various *technologies of government* (Foucault, 1991, p. 96; 1994, p. 322-323). In addition to an overarching concern with population, Foucault’s outline of governmentality identifies “political economy as its major form of knowledge, and apparatuses of security as its essential technical instrument” (Foucault, 2009, p. 108). It is through such technologies of government that those who govern endeavor “to structure the possible field of action of others”, i.e., the governed (Foucault, 1982, p. 221).

This transformation of sovereign power has profound implications for the theorization of the state in modern societies. Rather than seeing the state as the locus from which power is exercised over society, as with, for instance a Marxist-inspired theory of the state, Foucault describes the “governmentalization of the state” in modern societies (Foucault, 1991, p. 102).

According to Foucault, in contemporary societies “power relations have been progressively governmentalized, that is to say, elaborated, rationalized, and centralized in the form of, or under the auspices of, state institutions” (Foucault, 1982, p. 224). However, the new modality of power underlying the *governmental state* does not deny an important role for the state in modern processes of subjectivation.

A significant contribution of a governmentality approach is the way it views the subjects of government, that is, those who are subjected to governmental modes of power. Rather than simply subjecting individuals as objects of a disciplining power, governmental “power is exercised only over free subjects, and only insofar as they are free” (Foucault, 1982, p. 221). Governmentality represents a new modality for the exercise of power, one that presupposes the existence of free agents to whom it is addressed (Gordon, 1991, p. 5). From this perspective, power is conceived of as a set of actions on other actions: power “does not act directly and immediately on others. Instead it acts upon their actions” (Foucault, 1982, p. 220). Thus, issues of *subjectivation*, that is the creation of subjects of government as free agents capable of action, is a key focus of a governmentality perspective.

Foucault elaborated his notion of governmentality as a corrective to his analysis of the micro-physics of power in *Discipline and Punish* which had implied that power had an “absolute capacity to tame and subject individuals” (Gordon, 1991, p. 5). The correction to be made was that “technologies of domination” are only one mechanism through which individuals are governed. Rather, “government...is a ‘contact point’ where techniques of domination – or power – and *techniques of the self* ‘interact’” (Burchell, 1993, p. 268). Indeed, Foucault’s concern is not with the workings of power per se, but rather “the different modes by which...human beings are

made subjects” (Foucault, 1982, p. 208). These modes include systems of inquiry that assume scientific objectivity, the objectivizing of the subject in *dividing practices*, and the various ways human beings turn themselves into subjects (p. 208). Thus the state, its institutions and public policy measures, including those relating to language, immigration, and citizenship, can serve as sites for investigating the materialization of contemporary forms of governmental rationality through the workings of forms of knowledge and technologies of government that enrol the objects of governmental power as active subjects in its enactment.

Advanced Liberal Political Rationality

Attempts to theorize contemporary forms of governmental rationality have had to address the changes that have occurred in the last quarter century under the rubric of globalization, such as the transformation in the structure of the global capitalist system in its post-Fordist phase as well as the reorganization of social relations captured by such concepts as the *network society* and *transnationalism*. The result has been the development of various approaches to global government in terms of advanced liberal or neo-liberal governmentality (Gordon, 1991; Burchell, 1993; Ferguson & Gupta, 2002).

The form of government in contemporary liberal nation-states has been shaped by the economic orthodoxy of neo-liberalism, producing a variant of liberal governmental rationality dubbed *advanced liberal political rationality* by contemporary governmentality theorists, largely from the Anglo-Saxon world (e.g., Rose, 1996, 1999). According to Burchell (1993), a subtle shift has taken place in the rational principle underlying the specific form of government in the contemporary period, and is related to developments in the Post-WWII global capitalist system. Foucault himself had begun to elaborate the origins of a “neo-liberal governmental rationality”

among the post-war German *Ordoliberalen*, and later the American Chicago school economists, who advocated “the diffus[ion] of the enterprise-form throughout the social fabric as its generalized principle of functioning” (Gordon, 1991, p. 42). Advanced liberal political rationality is a critique of both classical liberalism and the welfare state as a mode of government, and thus shares the premises of neo-liberalism. This entails neo-liberal economic policies (flexibilization, activation labour market policies) as well as neo-liberal social policy, the aim of which is the extension of “a model of rational-economic conduct” from the economy to all domains of society (Burchell, 1993, p. 274).

This in turn entails a new form of the state, namely the “enabling state” and also a new social actor, namely the active, “enterprising subject” (Rose, 1999, p. 142). Towards this aim, the role of governments is the establishment of the legal, institutional, and cultural conditions that promote “the free, *entrepreneurial* and *competitive* conduct of economic-rational individuals” (Burchell, 1993, p. 271, emphasis in original). This involves an “*autonomization* of society through the invention and proliferation of new quasi-economic models of action” for the governance of independent conduct at the societal level as well as the level of individual subjects (p. 274). However, the essential feature for the functioning of the neo-liberal mode of governmentality is the promotion of an “enterprise culture” which “encourage[s] the governed to adopt a certain entrepreneurial form of practical relationship to themselves” (p. 275). A key aspect of this new modality of government is the *responsibilization* of the subject through the “devolution of risk” onto the individual as the entrepreneur of one’s own self (Ferguson & Gupta, 2002, p. 989). Similarly, the responsibilization of subjects through policies of active

citizenship is the most fundamental aspect of a neo-liberal rationality for the government of contemporary citizenship (Rose, 1996, p. 60).

From the description above, the contribution of a governmentality framework to our understanding of the use of language policy measures, such as formal language testing, in relation to immigration and citizenship policy becomes evident. Rather than simply constituting an ideologically-driven exercise of power to defend the borders of a sovereign territory (by restricting immigration), the power of the state being expressed through citizenship language-testing practices can be analyzed as the result of a “complex assemblage of diverse forces ... techniques ... devices ... that promise to regulate decisions and actions of individuals, groups, organizations in relation to authoritative criteria” (Rose, 1996, p. 42). Moreover, this operation of governmental power is to be understood not so much as the implementation of a program, but rather as the translation across policy domains of various forms of knowledge, discourses, agendas and strategies to achieve broad governmental objectives (Rose, 1996, 43).

The central argument of the present analysis is that the revaluation of the national language with the implementation of formal language testing practices for immigration and citizenship is the result of the translation into the domain of immigration and naturalization law of neo-liberal economic discourses and strategies which instantiate an advanced liberal governmental rationality. As we shall see in the next section, it is the discourses of language and language practices associated with the commodification, technologization, skillification of language in the new economy, that has allowed it to play a privileged role as form of knowledge and technology of government in the materialization of this advanced liberal political rationality within the citizenship and immigration policy domain.

Language in Late Capitalism

The impact of economic processes of globalization on language has resulted in a greater emphasis on communication skills within the new economy than in the old (Heller, 2007, p. 15). This phenomenon has been associated with a number of features of the political economy of Late Capitalism, the current phase of the capitalist global economy: saturation of markets; expansion of markets; distinction (or added value); tertiarization; and flexibilization (Heller & Duchêne, 2012, p. 8-9). These material changes have been accompanied by the emergence, since the 1990s, of “discursive elements that treat language...primarily in economic terms” (Heller & Duchêne, 2012, p. 3). The increased emphasis on communication in the new economy has led to the *commodification* of language as a valuable resource (Heller, 2003; Cameron, 2005). This transformation of language into a commodity is part of “a general commodification of knowledge and semiosis” in late capitalism (Heller, 2010, p. 352; cf. Fairclough, 2002, 2006).

The commodification of language is most evident in service sector workplaces in the new economy, such as call centres, where there is a *skillification* of language (Cameron, 2000). As “communication skills,” language practices become aspects of human resources that can be regulated, taught and developed (Cameron, 2002). This is similar to the *technologization* of discourse in late capitalism, which involves the standardization of context free discourse techniques, such as interviewing and counseling, and the policing of discourse practices according to external criteria or benchmarks and with the help of expert discourse technologists (Fairclough, 1996). This is associated with Post-Fordist economic restructuring and part of the management of a flexible, enterprising and self-disciplining workforce. In this way

“communication skills” training, assessment, etc., become an important technology of government in relation to neo-liberal economic strategies.

Through the workings of a hegemonic *skills discourse*, forms of language use “have become conceptualized as ‘things’ that can be acquired and measured and that possess an inherent capacity to bring about desired outcomes, outcomes that can be measured in dollars” (Urciuoli, 2008, p. 212). At the macro level, communication is one of the key skills within the neo-liberal imaginary of contemporary capitalism, which has been labeled the “knowledge-based economy” (KBE) (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development [OECD], 1996; Jessop, 2000, 2002, 2004). This particular discursive construal of the global economy, which puts a premium on skills and knowledge, including language, as a factor in production in the new economy, provides the hegemonic rationale for neo-liberal economic policies (Jessop, 2002, p. 97). While much of the literature on the commodification of language has looked at how it functions in specific workplaces, its effects can also be seen in orientations taken by governments to issues of language in relation to their macro economic strategies. An example is the survey of adult literacy among the countries of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) examined in the next section.

The Skills Discourse of the New Economy: The IALS

The effects of a neo-liberal communication skills discourse and the commodification of language can be seen in the concern over language, in the form of literacy, in the macro economic policy of the advanced capitalists countries since the 1990s. This concern can be traced through the reports of the findings of the International Adult Literacy Survey (IALS) during the last decade of the 20th century. This multi-country, longitudinal survey was conducted

in three phases (1994, 1996, 1998) in a total of 21 countries of the OECD. Carried out by Statistics Canada and the Educational Testing Service (ETS), the results of the survey were published in a series of three reports (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development [OECD], 1995, 1997, 2000). In the survey's final report, published in 2000, the IALS is heralded as "provid[ing] the world's first reliable and comparable estimates of the levels and distributions of literacy skills in the adult population" (OECD, 2000, p. iii).

The central feature of the IALS is its redefinition of literacy. According to the IALS' definition, literacy is not a discrete ability, which one either does or does not possess. Rather literacy is conceived of as existing along a continuum of proficiency levels (OECD, 2000). Thus rather than measuring the number of literate versus illiterate, the IALS aims to determine the various levels of literacy within and across different population groups. In this way, the IALS reflects the commodification of language in rendering literacy quantifiable and itself measurable (rather than literate or illiterate *individuals*), and thus constituting it as a "skill" (Heller, 2003; Urciuoli, 2008). The IALS defines literacy as "the ability to understand and employ printed information in daily activities at home, at work and in the community – to achieve one's goals, and to develop one's knowledge and potential" (OECD, 2000, p. x). Literacy is further divided into three levels, with IALS level 3 defined as "roughly the skill level required for successful secondary school completion and college entry" (p. xi). This is presented as the minimum level of functional literacy for "coping with the demands of everyday life and work in a complex, advanced society" (p. xi).

Further, literacy in advanced industrial societies, according to the IALS, is constituted by a "multiplicity of skills" (OECD, 2000, p. x). Thus the simple ability to read and write is no

longer adequate for meeting the challenges of the modern economy. This is brought out in the final report's opening chapter, entitled "Skills for the twenty-first century," which explains how structural changes associated with globalization demand the upgrading of the domestic workforces' skills to meet the need for higher levels of knowledge and skills in the emerging "knowledge-based economy."

While legitimizing a focus on literacy within a discourse of the knowledge-based economy, the reports of the IALS findings also established a link between literacy levels and improved economic outcomes. Specifically, the IALS results found that "[l]iteracy is strongly associated with economic life chances and well-being...affect[ing], *inter alia*, employment stability, the incidence of unemployment and income" (OECD, 1997, p. 17). In relation to income, "[l]iteracy plays an important role in the determination of wages," in particular in "economies that are more flexible and open" (p. 18). Furthermore, this effect is more pronounced for higher levels of literacy. For instance, in certain countries, including Canada and the UK, "[t]here is a large 'wage premium'...for those whose literacy proficiency is at the highest level" (p. 17).

The IALS findings on literacy have informed economic and social policies in OECD countries. For instance, the IALS finding that "[l]iteracy...makes a labour force more productive and employable over the long run.... suggest[s] that effective strategies to raise workforce literacy should be included in the mix of policies required to counter unemployment" (OECD, 1997, p. 50). Indeed the benefits of literacy for modern societies, according to the IALS, extend beyond the narrow issue of employment policy:

All societies consider high levels of literacy desirable for all of their citizens as a means of sustaining widespread participation in economic and social life. Literacy is important for communication, and is an element in making informed decisions. It is a necessary ingredient for citizenship and community participation. Yet the ‘quiet’ contributions that literacy makes to the economy are not as fully appreciated. These can take the form of higher worker productivity, income and government revenues; a better quality of life in terms of reduced poverty, unemployment, crime and public assistance.... The net payoffs to investments in raising literacy, whether private or social, are probably beyond calculation, but they are clearly substantial and manifold. (OECD, 1997, p. 57)

Given these benefits of literacy, the results of the IALS were a shock to many governments, revealing as they did a serious “literacy problem” or “literacy skills deficit” across most OECD countries:

[L]ow skills are found...among significant proportions of the adult populations in all countries surveyed. Hence, even the most economically advanced societies have a literacy skills deficit. Between one-quarter and three-quarters of adults fail to attain literacy Level 3, considered by experts as a suitable minimum skill level for coping with the demands of modern life and work. (OECD, 2000, p. xiii)

While the IALS has been critiqued within academic and educational circles for theoretical and methodological weaknesses (see for instance Street, 1996; Blum, Goldstein, & Guerin-Pace, 2001), its findings have played a key role in legitimizing and shaping a focus on issues of literacy within macro economic and social policy in the advanced industrial countries of the OECD. Indeed, government discourse on language and literacy echoes the language of the IALS report about “the role of knowledge and skills...in enhancing productivity growth and innovation and in improving social cohesion” and in “the effective functioning of labour markets and for the economic success and social advancement of both individuals and societies” (OECD, 2000, p. iii). The origin of the revaluation of the national language within immigration and citizenship policy in Canada and the UK can also be traced back to the reception of the IALS

results in those countries and the development of policy agendas to tackle their respective “literacy skills deficits.”

Summary

In this era of post-nationalism, it has become a truism that the forces of globalization have rendered the maintenance of a monolingual national speech community a difficult task. It is claimed that the existence of a globalized economy “erodes the capacity of nation-states to control public linguistic practices, define their conditions of social legitimacy and, as a result, to maintain the procedures for the enactment and reproduction of the national speech community” (Pujolar, 2007, p. 75). From this perspective, efforts at shoring up the national language and a monolingual nation-state, through citizenship language testing, have been understood as reactionary, both in terms of being out of line with contemporary developments and in wishing to go back to a 19th century state of affairs when the maxim “one language, one nation, one state” was the basis of the political community. However, while the developments associated with globalization can challenge the stable national language regimes of the past, legitimated through a discourse of *pride*, the importance of communication within the globalized new economy makes issues of language more salient in relation to modes of social and economic regulation, allowing for the revaluation of national language legitimated through a discourse of *profit* (Heller & Duchene, 2012; Heller, 2010). As will be illustrated in the pages that follow, the revaluation of the national language within immigration and citizenship policy in Canada and the UK reflects a neo-liberal governmental strategy for economic and social regulation, legitimated through a post-national, globalizing discourse of language, the economy, and the national community.

CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

The previous chapter introduced the topic of the present dissertation, namely the increasing use of language policy measures by nation-states in their immigrant integration and citizenship policies, and reviewed the associated literature from a variety of disciplinary fields, namely the applied linguistic and sociolinguistic literature on citizenship language testing and discourses of language and immigrant integration, as well as the citizenship studies literature on the use of citizenship testing within an emerging civic integration paradigm of naturalization policy. Building on this existing scholarship, I proposed a more general term to capture the phenomenon of the topic, namely the revaluation of the national language, and proceeded to develop a theoretical framework for the investigation of the phenomenon that incorporated insights from additional literatures on neo-liberal governmentality and the technologization of language under Late Capitalism.

In this chapter, I describe the methodology, including research design, selection of cases, data, and method of analysis, used in the dissertation to investigate the research questions and hypotheses arising from the preceding literature review and theoretical framework. Specifically, I outline the research design of a comparative case study analysis, justifying the selection of cases, Canada and the UK, as well as the parameters of comparison, policy discourses and practices in the domains of immigration, integration, and citizenship. I then present the method of analysis, which I characterize as an interdiscursive language policy analysis, combining qualitative discourse analysis of policy texts with an “ethnographically-informed understanding of the policy process” (da Silva, & Heller, 2009). The approach to discourse analysis is based on the theory and methods of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) while the ethnographic aspect is

provided by personal interviews with policy makers as well as an expanded notion of the context in which the discursive and material practices of the policy process unfold, drawing on insights from interdisciplinary approaches to CDA for the analysis of contemporary social change (e.g., Wodak & Faircough, 2010). Finally I describe the data analyzed, justifying the selection of policy texts, their representativeness, and the treatment of additional sources of data in relation to the chosen method of analysis.

Research Design

The research design for the present study was inspired by the two speeches discussed in the opening chapter. In particular, the direct intertextual links between them raised the question of why the Minister for Immigration of the country with the largest per capita mass immigration program in the world is taking advice on the integration of immigrants from the Prime Minister of a country which has for the past 40 years pursued a policy of zero migration? How can one explain the similar policy outcomes they reflect, in the case of two countries with very different histories of immigration? Put another way, how can one explain the adoption, in the context of an expansive immigration policy such as Canada's, of the same discourse of integration and similar policies of formalized language testing as has been observed in the supposedly exclusionary and restrictive immigration regimes of Western Europe? This initial question led to the idea of a comparative case study to investigate the policy processes in Canada and the UK that resulted in the revaluation of language within their respective immigration and citizenship regimes.

Comparative Case Study

The literature on language testing for immigration and citizenship has largely taken the form of case studies of individual countries but presented in edited collections in order to permit comparison of cases. To address the call for more direct comparisons of cases to further illuminate the phenomenon in question the present study adopted a comparative case study research design. In particular the choice of Canada and the United Kingdom was intended to provide a cross-national perspective and to take into account the international dimensions of the phenomenon of citizenship and immigration language-testing, specifically by comparing developments in the European context with those in countries with long traditions of migration, such as the US, Australia or Canada (Hogan Brun et al., 2009, p. 4; cf. Extra et al., 2009).

Selection of Cases

As was mentioned above, the cases of Canada and the UK were chosen because of their different histories of immigration. Canada, in the terminology of the migration studies literature, is a classic country of immigration, with mass immigration a part of nation-building strategies throughout the country's history (Reitz, 2007). The UK on the other hand, in relation to the last quarter of the 20th century, has been characterized as a country of "zero migration" (Hansen, 2000).

The origin of Canada's current statutory regime for immigration dates to the 1960s, when the practice of race-based quotas, the legacy of a previous era of the colonial-settler project, was abandoned and replaced with a point system for the selection of individual immigrants with economically desirable skills. The more diverse in-flows of migration that followed gave content to the newly proclaimed policy of official multiculturalism and contributed to the country's

imagination as a nation of immigrants. It was also aligned with the economic priorities of the modern Canadian economy, with immigration meeting the demand for more skilled forms of labour. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, levels of immigration were pegged to the economic cycle, with the “tap” being turned off during periods of economic decline. However, since the late 1980s and early 1990s, maintaining high levels of immigration (~1% of the population), even during periods of recession, has been a part of successive Canadian governments’ long-term policies for macro-economic growth right up to the present.

In contrast, post-war Britain’s experience of immigration has gone in the opposite direction. During the period of the British Empire, the UK was more associated with emigration, that is the out-migration of the surplus population to the colonies, than with immigration, while the status of British subject did not distinguish between nationals of the UK and those of Britain’s colonies. However, the post-war period saw the gradual extension of immigration control measures to commonwealth citizens⁷. This began with the 1948 British Nationality Act, which first established the status of UK citizen as distinct from that of British subject, and culminated in the 1971 Immigration Act, which effectively shut the door to immigration (United Kingdom, 2008). Despite the presence of significant black and minority ethnic (BME⁸) populations, a legacy of Britain’s colonial past, and continuous inflows of immigrants through channels for family reunification, the UK has experienced negative net migration flows throughout the post-war period right up until the middle of the 1990s (ONS, 2013).

⁷ Immigration control measures were first instituted in Britain with the 1905 Aliens Act, which was intended to restrict the entry of Eastern European Jews to the UK.

⁸ The collocation ‘black and minority ethnic’ (BME) is used in UK race relations policy discourse to refer to settled communities of immigrant origin from the Caribbean and South Asia.

While the Canadian and UK immigration regimes have thus differed during the last quarter of the 20th century, one being expansive and the other restrictive, during the period examined in the present analysis this difference has become minimized as the UK embarked on an expansion of economic immigration. It has even gone so far as to implement a points-based system similar to the Canadian one, with the goal of increasing Britain's global competitiveness by maximize the economic benefits seen to accrue from increased immigration⁹. Meanwhile, Canada has also recently modified its immigration system on the basis of the same macro-economic goals of increased competitiveness and implementation of a knowledge-based economy. In addition, the countries have shown convergence in terms of the discourse of social cohesion underlying a renewed approach to integration, civic engagement, and the promotion of active citizenship. On this basis, the comparison of these two most like cases is intended to provide an alternative account of the adoption of a discourse of integration and formalized language testing for citizenship and immigration, namely a common neo-liberalization of the immigration regime in both of the cases.

Furthermore, while the present study aims to identify a motivation for the revaluation of language in immigration and citizenship regimes in Canada and the UK as lying in the recontextualization and operationalization of neo-liberal economic and social discourses and the materialization of an advanced liberal political rationality, it is also expected that the comparison of the cases will reveal differences in the specifics of the policies adopted in each country. These

⁹ Another source of expanded migration to the UK, but which is beyond the control of UK immigration policy, is Britain's membership in the EU, which gives nationals of EU member states the right to live and work in the UK. The influx of increasing numbers of EU migrant workers, especially following the EU's eastern expansion in 2004, has had an impact on the three domains to be discussed in the case study, especially in regard to immigrant selection and integration policy.

differences will be accounted for by relating them to the respective countries' patterns and degree of insertion into global and regional economic and political spaces, as well as to the tensions and contradictions inherent in the neo-liberal governmental strategies of the KBE and the discourse of skills themselves.

Policy Domains Compared

One consequence of the selection of cases and the research aim of identifying an alternate account of citizenship language testing measures has been the expansion of policy domains for comparison beyond simply that of citizenship and naturalization policy. In addition to the domain of naturalization and policies related to citizenship language testing, the cases were also compared across the domains of immigration control and integration, including policies related to language requirements for entry and settlement as a permanent resident, as well as the provision of language training to new immigrants as part of settlement and integration policies. The comparison of all of these policy domains is justified on theoretical as well as empirical grounds. It was presumed that if the revaluation of language in citizenship policy was motivated by the neo-liberalization of the immigration regime, then the effects should be observable in the domains of immigrant selection, settlement and integration just as they are in the domain of naturalization. In addition, consideration of these three domains together has revealed a process of alignment of naturalization, control, and integration policy measures within the immigration regimes under investigation and which is closely associated with the general phenomenon of the revaluation of the national language.

Method of Analysis

Interdiscursive Language Policy Analysis

The revaluation of national language in relation to immigration and citizenship is a discursive as well as material process, with the adoption of specific policies such as citizenship language testing embedded within discourses of integration. Accordingly, the current analysis adopts a discourse analytic approach based on the key role of discursive practices and events (i.e., policy discourses and policy texts) have played in changes to immigration and citizenship policy, including the revaluation of the national language, for example, through practices of citizenship language testing.

Language policy, including nation-states' policies regarding language and immigration, is concerned with "organizing, managing and manipulating language behaviours" by means of "decisions made about languages and their use in society" (Shohamy, 2006, p. 45). Following Shohamy (2006), this dissertation seeks to gain an appreciation of language policy's role as a manipulative tool by going beyond examining declared policy statements (i.e., policy documents) to examining the specific language policy mechanisms and devices through which policies have their effects on language practices (Shohamy, 2006, p. 46). Furthermore, this dissertation adopts the perspective that language policy is a process, and that this process is constituted discursively (Da Silva & Heller, 2009, p. 113). Accordingly, the particular method of analysis adopted can be characterized as *interdiscursive language policy analysis* (Da Silva & Heller, 2009). Combining qualitative discourse analysis of policy texts with an ethnographically informed understanding of the policy process, this approach aims to grasp the nature of policies through tracing links between practices of discursive production involving multiple stakeholders

and across diverse spaces (Da Silva & Heller, 2009, p. 112). The goal of the present analysis is to account for policy practices surrounding citizenship language testing by tracing the interdiscursive processes through which they are constituted (cf. Millar, 2013).

Critical Discourse Analysis

The specific method of analysis followed in this dissertation is taken from the field of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), which is based on a theory of discourse as a form of social action that is mutually constitutive of social practices. That is to say, discourse, or language in use, is a form of social practice that is both conditioned by, but also constitutes its context of use (Fairclough & Wodak, 1997; Wodak & Meyer, 2009). The consequence of this theory of discourse for the present context, among others, is that social change, such as changes in social practices, is mediated by discursive change, that is changes in discourse practices (Fairclough, 2009). The combination of the discursive aspects of different social practices in new and hybrid configurations results in new forms of social practice. These discursive aspects take the form of discourses, or representations of the world, genres and styles that characterize specific texts and discourse practices.

The notion of *interdiscursivity* is key to understanding how discourse functions as a form of social practice, and how discursive change is related to social change (Fairclough, 1992). Specifically, the interdiscursive context of a text or texts is the site of *recontextualization* of other texts and discourses, resulting in discourse *hybridization* and the mixing of discursive practices and genres (Fairclough, 1992, 2003; Wodak & Fairclough, 2010). Interdiscursive phenomena contribute to the transformation of social practices through merging their discursive aspects, thereby creating new forms of social practice (Fairclough, 2003). The role of discourse

and discursive practice in processes of social change can be analyzed by focusing on the emergence and constitution of discourses, their dissemination and recontextualization, and their operationalization, enactment and materialization (Fairclough, 2005, p. 7). This analytical framework provides a way of relating changes in discursive practices to broader processes of social change.

Recontextualization and Contemporary Social Change

The present analysis follows a particular operationalization of CDA that has been used within a broad interdisciplinary research agenda on discourse and contemporary social change, for instance the process of transition in Eastern Europe and the impact of the implementation of the Knowledge-Based Economy on higher education in Europe (Fairclough, 2005; Fairclough & Wodak, 2008; Wodak & Fairclough, 2010). As described by Wodak and Fairclough (2010), this methodology combines the discourse historical (DHA) and the dialectical-relational (DRA) approach to critical discourse analysis. From the DRA, it takes a focus on the analytical category of *recontextualization* within a “dialectics of discourse” that traces the *emergence*, *contestation*, *recontextualization*, and *operationalization* of discourse(s) within and across fields of social practice (Wodak & Fairclough, 2010, p. 23; cf. Fairclough, 2009). To this approach to textual analysis it adds a “four-level context model,” taken from the DHA. This model relates specific texts and their immediate co-text to their intertextual and interdiscursive context, to the extra-linguistic social and institutional frames of their specific “context of situation,” and finally to their broader socio-political and historical context (Wodak & Fairclough, 2010, p. 25; cf. Reisigl & Wodak, 2009).

In the present analysis this approach will be used to similarly account for changes in social practices related to language and immigration, integration, and citizenship policy. The intertextual analysis of relevant policy documents will identify the patterned recurrence of certain discourse elements as evidence of interdiscursive links between texts and practices. Employing the analytical categories of recontextualization and operationalization of discourses, the analysis will reveal how shifts in discourse through the recontextualization of discourse elements such as *skills*, *Knowledge-Based Economy*, *responsibilities of citizenship*, and *community* have resulted in the constitution of new discourses and practices in relation to language, immigration, integration, and citizenship. Moreover, through the analytical category of the operationalization and materialization of discourses the analysis is able to link the specific policy practices examined to the broader socio-historical context as explicated in theories of the transformation of language under Late Capitalism as well as of the transformation of social and economic governance in terms of advanced liberal governmentality. In this way, the interdiscursive analysis will provide the evidence for an account of the revaluation of the nation language within Canadian and UK immigration and citizenship as being related to the role of language as a political technology within neo-liberal strategies for the governance of migration and citizenship.

Data

The data for the present analysis are drawn from three sources, namely policy documents, policy instruments, and personal interviews. The three types of data were selected on the basis of the theoretical framework informing the research design as well as the specific method of analysis adopted.

Policy Documents

Policy documents provide the main source of data for the analysis, being analyzed according to the methods of Critical Discourse Analysis described above. The policy documents are taken from across the time period covered in the case study analyses. For Canada, the documents are taken from the period of reform of the immigration regime, beginning in the mid 1990s and culminating in the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act 2000, and subsequent developments in integration and citizenship policy under the Liberal government and subsequent minority and majority Conservative governments, up until 2012. For the UK, the documents cover the period of transformation of the immigration and citizenship regimes over the course of the three New Labour governments between 1997 and 2010.

The documents analyzed take the form of various kinds of texts including: consultation documents and policy reviews (internal and external); government strategic plans and White Papers; legislation and associated regulations; intergovernmental agreements; parliamentary committee reports and government responses; speeches by (Prime) Ministers; and press releases and backgrounders. These texts, all associated with the language and immigration policy process, come from a variety of “fields of political action,” including: lawmaking procedure, formation of public attitudes, political control, and executive and administration (Reisigl & Wodak, 2009, p. 91). A list of the main policy documents analyzed is provided in Appendix B.

Selection of Texts

The selection of documents for analysis was based on the aim of reconstituting the chain of discourse that was the discursive aspect of the policy processes being examined. As such, the collection of data did not take the form of the selection of singular texts but rather of “chains of

texts,” that is groups of texts directly connected to each other and thus co-constitutive of the policy process itself, for example consultation reports incorporated into subsequent strategic policy plans, parliamentary committee reports and government responses, or White Papers leading to new legislation. This method of selection of texts obviates potential concerns over the representativeness of individual texts, as the selection has not been based on the singular significance of particular texts. The selection of chains of texts is closely associated with the focus within the method of analysis on the intertextual and interdiscursive aspects of the texts. These aspects are evidence of the emergence, contestation, recontextualization, and operationalization of discourses that constitutes the policy process.

Policy Instruments

In addition to policy texts, data for the analysis was also provided by documents and other materials related to the various language policy instruments used in immigrant selection, settlement, and naturalization procedures. These include regulations detailing the selection grid for the point system in Canada and the Statements of Intent detailing the language requirements for the various tiers of the points-based system in the UK; the frameworks for benchmarking language proficiency, such as the Canadian Language Benchmarks (CLB) and the Common European Framework (CEFR); English for speakers of other languages (ESOL) curricula and immigrant language training program documents; and study guides and testing materials for citizenship tests. These policy instruments serve as data for analysis of the operationalization and materialization of policy discourses into new practices and material objects.

Personal interviews

A final source of data was personal interviews with policy makers and other participants and stakeholders in the language and immigration and citizenship policy process. In total, 20 individuals were interviewed, ten in Canada and ten in the UK. In Canada, the interviews were carried out in April and August of 2011, and included: the two Directors of the Integration and Immigration Branches, and two Policy Analysts from the language policy team, at the National Headquarters of Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC) in Ottawa; a senior director of the Metropolis Project in Ottawa; and five Program Advisors and Policy Analysts at the Settlement and Intergovernmental Affairs Directorate of the Regional Headquarters of CIC, Ontario Region, in Toronto. In the UK, the interviews were carried out in August and September 2010, and included: 2 of the 3 members of the ESOL Policy Team, Department of Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS) in London; a Technical Advisor at the Border Agency of the UK Home Office, in London; the ESOL Lead at NIACE, a national development organization for adult continuing education; the Chair of Teacher Training at NATECLA, Britain's largest professional organization for teacher's of ESOL; two academic researchers on ESOL and citizenship from King's College London and the University of Birmingham; the Director of Research and Validation, Cambridge ESOL; and an ESOL instructor and the Head of Teachers at a further education college in east London.

The interviews were semi-structured with open-ended questions designed to elicit extended stretches of discourse about the informants' role as policy actors in the processes of formulation and implementation of the policies being examined. The informants were told that their comments would remain anonymous, which has been followed in this dissertation, where

the interviewees are not identified by name, but only by their job title and initials. The reason for this is that most of them were actively employed civil servants in various Canadian and British government departments. It was also hoped that in commenting anonymously, the informants would provide more personal, non-official, and even counter-hegemonic discourses rather than simply reproducing official policy discourses, as might have been the case if they were to be identified by name and interviewed in an official capacity. One ESOL researcher whose comments are presented in the text, has also been kept anonymous, due the fact that her comments relate to her participation as an actor in the policy processes being examined, rather than in her capacity as a researcher. Although not identified explicitly, this researcher is, however, easily identifiable from contextual information in the text.

As a valuable source of contextual information, evidence for the specific *context of situation*, or the social and institutional frame, of the policy process being examined, the interview data were used to confirm the findings of the textual analysis of the documentary data, according to a “principle of triangulation” (see Reisigl & Wodak, 2009, p. 89). In this way, the interviews constituted an ethnographic aspect of the language policy analysis being presented. While the recent trend of applying more ethnographic methods in language policy research has explored the contestation and re-appropriation of policies in the implementation phase of the policy process (see Hornberger & Johnson, 2007; Johnson, 2009, 2011, 2013), the present study focuses this ethnographic lens at the formulation phase of the policy process in order to reveal the processes of recontextualization and contestation of discourses as well as their operationalization and materialization leading to the creation of the specific policies being examined. In addition, the analysis of the transcribed interview data, which focused on the

interviewees' appropriation of discourse elements from the policy documents, as well as their the explanations and rationalizations for particular policies, provided insights into the agency of policy actors engaged in the process of policy formulation, revealing how their understanding of policy aims and practices reproduces or contests dominant policy discourses and how their engagement with policy discourses gives meaning to their own practices as policy actors. Finally, while not all of the interviews are directly cited in the dissertation, they were a source for the researcher of much background information on the policy processes and issues surrounding language and immigration, integration, and citizenship in Canada and the UK, and which went into the formulation of the research questions and hypotheses that guided the subsequent analysis.

The decision to focus on the formulation phase of the policy process is a limitation of the present study, which provides only a top-down account of the policies and practices under examination. However, an examination of the bottom-up processes of how these policies are appropriated or resisted by policy actors, such as immigrant ESL/ESOL practitioners, was considered beyond the scope of this dissertation. This focus on the formulation as opposed to the implementation of policy was also justified by the aim of the present study of accounting for language testing policies and practices for citizenship and immigration as embedded within broader neo-liberal economic and social policy discourses and agendas, a finding which has implications for the possibility of resistance to such policies from the bottom-up.

Summary

This chapter described the methodology that has been adopted for the comparative case study of the revaluation of national language in the Canadian and British immigration and

citizenship regimes. This method of an interdiscursive language policy analysis, focused on the recontextualization and operationalization of a neo-liberal discourses of skills and the Knowledge-Based Economy, will be added to the theoretical framework, outlined in Chapter 2, of the technologization of language under Late Capitalism and neo-liberal governmentality to investigate how the revaluation of the national language in the immigration and naturalization regimes of Canada and the UK is related to the instantiation of an advanced liberal political rationality in the governance of immigration and citizenship.

Parts II and III of the dissertation present the analysis of the Canadian and UK cases respectively, with presentation of the cases divided into three chapters, one each for immigration policy, integration policy, and citizenship policy. The three chapters of Part IV compare the cases, drawing out the motivation for, and function of language measures in each policy domain in relation to the neo-liberal governance of immigration, integration, and citizenship. The final chapter of Part V concludes the dissertation by discussing implications of the present analysis for the study of language policy in an era of neo-liberal post-nationalism.

CHAPTER 4: “LANGUAGE IS THE KEY” IN CANADIAN IMMIGRATION POLICY

Language is the key / La langue, c'est la clé. This simple four-word phrase appears on the banner of the home page of the Centre for Canadian Language Benchmarks / Centre des Niveaux de compétence linguistiques canadiens (CCLB/CNCLC). The CCLB is the quasi-governmental organization, headquartered in Ottawa, responsible for the development and ongoing support of the Canadian Language Benchmarks / Niveaux de compétence linguistiques canadiens (CLB/NCLC)¹⁰, a framework of “national standards in English and French for describing, measuring and recognizing second language proficiency of adult immigrants and prospective immigrants for living and working in Canada” (www.language.ca). Through its production of the Benchmarks, the primary policy instrument in relation to language and immigration policy, the CCLB has been front and centre in the process of revaluing competency in Canada’s official languages within the current Canadian immigration regime. Indeed, the four-word phrase quoted above could serve as the motto of the Canadian immigration regime itself. That language is “the key,” to maximizing the benefits of immigration, to immigrants’ successful integration, to their full participation as new citizens, and to broader social cohesion, has been a consistent theme of Canadian government discourses and policies surrounding immigration, integration, and citizenship for the last 10 to 15 years.

The following three chapters will trace this (re)valuation of the national language over the last decade and a half within the Canadian government’s immigration and citizenship policy. This phenomenon is reflected in the increased emphasis placed on language ability in relation to

¹⁰ Throughout this dissertation I refer to the Centre for Canadian Language Benchmarks, the quasi-governmental organization, and the Canadian Language Benchmarks, the descriptive framework for proficiency, by their English acronyms, “CCLB” and “CLB,” respectively.

three sets of policies: immigration control, specifically the regulations surrounding language as a selection criterion for economic immigrants; settlement, or integration, policy, which consists mainly of the provision of official language instruction for newcomers to Canada; and, within citizenship policy, the requirement and assessment of language ability as part of the naturalization process.

A Brief History of Canadian National Language Policy

Before tracing the revaluation of the national language within current Canadian immigration policy, it is necessary to explain the application of the term “national language” in relation to Canada’s policy of official bilingualism. The centrepiece of the Canadian federal government’s language policy is the 1969 Official Languages Act, which recognized English and French as Canada’s official languages on the basis of legal equality not only for legislative and judicial purposes but for all purposes of the federal government (McRea, 1998, p. 66). Given “that English and French are the official languages of Canada and have equality of status and equal rights and privileges as to their use in all institutions of the Parliament and government of Canada,” the Act provided “for the full and equal access to Parliament, to the laws of Canada and to courts established by Parliament in both official languages,” and “the right of any member of the public to communicate with, and to receive available services from, any institution of the Parliament or government of Canada in either official language” (*Official Languages Act*, 1985, Preamble). These statutory provisions were subsequently incorporated into the 1982 Canadian Constitution (sections 16 to 20) (McRea, 1998, p. 66-67).

The policy of official bilingualism was a response to the emergent nationalist movement of the majority French-speaking population of the province of Quebec during the 1960s. This

accounts for the concentration on official recognition of the equal status of English and French and on ensuring full access to the federal government in either official language. The Official Languages Act's concentration on providing bilingual federal government services was based on a limited application of the personality principle for the management of bilingualism (McRae, 1998). The Constitutional right to use either official language in communications with departments and agencies of the federal government only applied to head offices and for any other office across the country only when "reasonable" and where "there is significant demand" (McRae, 1998, p. 66-67). Rather than being part of a strategy for achieving societal bilingualism, this institutional bilingualism was premised on obviating the need for individual bilingualism on the part of the Canadian population (Morris, 2010, p. 8). Indeed, the low levels of personal bilingualism across the country as well as the federalism of Canada's political structure have constrained the spread of the policy of official bilingualism beyond the federal government (McRae, 1998). While the updated Official Languages Act of 1988 added a focus on the promotion of the use of both English and French in Canadian society, the effects of the official bilingualism policy on language use has mainly been confined to the federal public service (Mackey, 2010, p. 49; McRae, 1998, p. 80).

Beyond the *institutional bilingualism* of the federal government, language policy in Canada has largely followed a *territoriality principle*, with individual provinces enacting monolingual language regimes (with the exception of New Brunswick, the only officially bilingual province) (Morris, 2010, p. 9). The prime example of this territorial approach to Canadian bilingualism, in contrast to the federal government's official bilingualism, is Quebec's 1977 Charter of the French Language recognizing French as the sole official language in Quebec

(Morris, 2010, p. 9). Across the country as a whole, the result has been a dual language regime based on the territorial dominance of the “national languages” of each of the two official language communities, French in Quebec and English in the rest of Canada.

The recognition of English and French as Canada’s two official languages reflected Canada’s colonial legacy, these being the national languages of the country’s two settler populations (or in the language of the Royal Commission that led to the official bilingualism policy, Canada’s “two founding peoples” [Mackey, 2010, p. 33]). The framework of official bilingualism, coupled with Canada’s multiculturalism policy, has shaped federal government policies for managing cultural and linguistic diversity and national belonging in such a way that maintains the dominance of the two white settler populations and their national languages. This can be seen specifically in regard to federal government policies towards immigrant integration, where racialized, non-English or French-speaking immigrant groups are to obtain access to full membership in Canadian life by joining one of the two official language communities (Haque, 2010).

The territorial approach to Canadian bilingualism, which dominates the language situation in Canada beyond the federal government’s institutional bilingualism, as described above, combined with the substantial autonomy granted to the Quebec government over immigration to that province, has consequences for the analysis of the revaluation of language within Canadian immigration policy. The policy of official bilingualism has been operationalized within the Canadian immigration regime as the valuation of ability in *one of* Canada’s two official languages for immigrant selection and integration, with which language depending on where a prospective immigrant intends to settle in Canada. In the analysis of Canadian

immigration policy that follows, the focus is on the revaluation of ability in English, as the dominant national language in English Canada, within programs for immigration and settlement in Canada, excluding Quebec (e.g., the Federal Skilled Worker Program, the LINC program, etc). A similar analysis of the revaluation, within the Quebec government's immigration regime, of ability in the other of Canada's official languages, French, as the national language of Quebec, while being equally significant and revealing in itself, is beyond the scope of the present dissertation.

Revaluation of the National Language in Immigrant Selection

The beginnings of an increased focus on language within the Canadian immigration regime can be traced to the immigration policy reform process which was undertaken by the Liberal government during the second half of the 1990s and which culminated in a new legislative framework in the 2001 Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA). This reform process can be divided into two phases, the first beginning with a public consultation process in 1994 followed by the publication of a Strategic Framework and the presentation to parliament of a five year immigration Plan, during which time the broad themes of the reforms were identified; and a second phase beginning with a Legislative Review process in 1997 followed by a government White Paper during which period the details of the new legislation were fleshed out. The analysis of the main documents during this reform process focuses on the emergence of a discourse of language skills that served to legitimate an increased importance accorded to language ability within the procedure for selection of economic immigrants.

Immigration Consultations and Report 1994

In the spring of 1994, the Minister for the newly created department of Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC) launched extensive consultations to develop “a comprehensive, innovative and long-term plan for immigration” (Citizenship and Immigration Canada [CIC], 1994a, p. 1). The parameters for the consultation were established in a planning meeting at which 10 issues were identified to serve as guiding questions for the consultations. These issues included the criteria for immigrant selection, the integration of newcomers, and the economic benefits of immigration (p. 3). Ten working groups were set up to examine each issue in depth, while the consultation process itself involved discussions between federal and provincial officials, public town-hall meetings, study circles, consultations with CIC staff, and a national conference. The findings of the consultations were published in the *Immigration Consultations Report* (CIC, 1994a).

The consultations identified public concerns with the immigration regime, including concerns over numbers and the “quality” of immigrants, the burden they place on social programs and the cost of their integration (CIC, 1994a, p. 79-80). It is in the context of recommendations to address these concerns that language became a focus of increased attention with the representation of language ability as a key factor in immigrants’ successful integration. The report represents the findings of the consultations as constituting a broad consensus around the importance of language proficiency for the successful integration of immigrants: “language is the key to integration. It is either the greatest barrier to integration or the chief means of achieving it” (p. 41). Accordingly, several public submissions expressed the view that “ability in

one of the official languages should be a criterion for the selection of some or all immigrants” (p. 44).

Language as a selection criterion was also endorsed by the working group set up to address the question of how best to maximize the economic benefits of immigration, which stated that this could be done through “better selection criteria” based on “...those attributes which lead to successful adaptation to the Canadian economy and to increased Canadian productivity” (CIC, 1994a, p. 64). These attributes are specified as “education, *language ability*, flexibility, adaptability, age, knowledge of the country and ability to switch from one job to another” (p. 64; emphasis added).

The endorsement of using language ability as a selection criterion for prospective immigrants is tempered by other recommendations in the consultations report. For instance, given the importance of language ability for successful integration and to allow immigrants to fully participate in Canadian society, the reports recommends that “...the federal government confirm its commitment to fund basic language training to those immigrants without skills in one of the official languages” (CIC, 1994a, p. 42). Also, the report argues against using language as a “screening device” for refugees or family class immigrants, as such a practice might constitute discrimination (p. 44-45). For these family and humanitarian class immigrants, ensuring they have the official language ability necessary to integrate into Canadian society is to be achieved through government-funded provision of language training rather than demanding it as a requirement for admission. Thus, the endorsement of the use of language as a selection criterion in the consultations report is limited to the selection of independent, economic class immigrants, that is, precisely those immigrants whose selection is to be based on their economic utility. This

economic perspective on language within the immigration regime is taken up and further elaborated in the government's Strategic Framework for immigration (CIC, 1994b) and five-year Immigration Plan (CIC, 1994c).

Strategic Framework for Immigration

The Liberal government responded to the consultations with a Strategic Framework, *Into the 21st century: A strategy for immigration and citizenship* (CIC, 1994b). The Strategic Framework endorses the consultation report's focus on language ability as a criterion for the selection of immigrants for their economic utility to Canada. Under its priority for action of "supporting economic growth," the framework proposes changes to the immigrant selection system "to improve the skills, flexibility and diversity of the Canadian workforce responding to Canada's new, emerging economy" (p. 28). As has already been seen, the concern over language, in terms of "literacy" and its relation to economic growth and competitiveness, had arisen within countries of the OECD since the mid 1990s, when surveys of adult literacy, such as the IALS, began to identify national "skills deficits." The desire to improve immigrants' language skills is thus analogous to the various 'skills initiatives' undertaken by governments to increase the literacy (and numeracy) of their domestic workforces. Canada's skills initiative, and the influence it had on the role of language within the immigration regime will be examined more closely below.

Within the Framework, the importance of language as selection criterion is related to this goal of the immigration system: "selection criteria will place greater emphasis on abilities which will help an immigrant adjust to changing labour market needs. Knowledge of English or French is critical" (CIC, 1994b, p. x). What is meant by "changing labour market" is explained as

follows: “Economic restructuring has changed the nature of many occupations, requiring individuals to learn new skills and adapt to a more automated environment” (p. 28). As a result, “Canada needs people who are ‘entrepreneurial,’ ‘literate’ and able to adjust to a rapidly-changing [sic] labour market” (p. 27). Neo-liberal economic restructuring requires the flexibilization of labour, which has consequences for the attributes required of individuals’ to succeed in the labour market. Accordingly, among the selection criteria set out in the framework language skills are grouped with “employability and adaptability” as attributes indicative of a person’s “potential for long-term success” (p. 29).

These references in the Framework to skills, flexibility and the changing labour market needs of the new emerging economy situate the focus on knowledge of Canada’s official languages as selection criterion within the context of a particular macro-economic strategy for meeting the challenges posed to Canada by processes of economic globalization:

Canadians are confronting sweeping economic and social change as Canada moves from a resource-based to an information-based economy. The immigration and citizenship program will be managed to provide enhanced and direct support to creating the skills base and the environment necessary to use change as an opportunity for growth and advancement. (CIC, 1994b, p. x)

This broader economic strategy on the part of the then Liberal government is behind the major shift announced in the framework, a shift away from a system of selection based on the criterion of intended occupation to one based on a flexible skills profile to meet the needs of “a changing labour market.”

Immigration Plan 1995-2000

The first step in implementing the directions set forth in the Strategic Framework was taken in the government’s Immigration Plan for 1995-2000, entitled *A Broader Vision* (CIC,

1994c). The Plan expresses the same principles of reform identified in the consultations as well as the Strategic Framework, *Into the 21st Century*, namely ensuring that newcomers contribute to Canada without adding to the burden on social programs (CIC, 1994c, p. 7). It announces a revision of the selection criteria, to be implemented through regulatory changes in 1995, which will “emphasize an applicant’s potential for long-term success, with a focus on education, experience, language skills, age and employability” (p. 14). The plan also incorporates the same focus on the economic aspect of immigration as the Strategic Framework, articulating a new vision and approach to immigration centered on initiatives to increase both the proportion of economic class immigrants as well as the level of skills with which they arrive (p. 9). As indicated in the Framework, the balance of economic versus family class immigrants was to be modified in order to maximize the economic benefits of immigration. In the Plan, the proportion of economic class immigrants was to increase from 43% to 53%, while the proportion of family class immigrants was to decrease from 51% to 44% (p. 69). In relation to skills levels, the Plan would also focus on immigrants who “have good language skills,” which it justified on the basis of the need “to adjust to a rapidly-changing labour market” (p. 14).

Thus in the first phase of reforms to the immigration regime during the mid-1990s, a new orientation for the immigration system was put into practice, one which focused on maximizing the economic benefits of immigration by increasing the proportion of independent economic immigrants, including skilled workers and business immigrants (entrepreneurs and investors) and selecting them for their valuable skills. Among these skills, “language skills” became a central focus, not only as part of the literacy requirements of the new information-based economy, but also in terms of the flexibility needed to succeed in changing labour market conditions. In the

second phase of the reforms, this new orientation was formalized and codified in new statutory regulations, which were ultimately passed into law as a new immigration act, the 2001 Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA). This process is traced in the next section.

Legislative Review of Immigration Act

A legislative review process for revising the immigration act was undertaken in 1996 with the establishment of an external Advisory Group and which resulted in a report entitled *Not Just Numbers: A Framework for Future Immigration to Canada* (Immigration Legislative Review Advisory Group [LRAG], 1997a). This report has been called “the central Canadian policy document of the 1990s” in terms of immigration policy (Walsh, 2011, p. 874). Reflecting the group’s private sector membership, the report proposed a new model for the immigration system that extends the economic orientation of the new immigration plan by applying a more explicit model of economic rationality to the immigration system as a whole.

The Advisory Group report proposed “a selection model for independent immigrants based on generic attributes for success in a dynamic labour market rather than specific occupations” (CIC, 1998, p. 6). This represents a shift from the previous model of selection which was more occupation based and demand-driven. The other aspect of the new model was a focus on those characterized as “self-supporting immigrants,” i.e., those who were employable and destined to enter the labour market upon arrival. The rationale behind this focus was that selecting self-supporting immigrants was a way of “maximize[ing] the long-term potential benefits for Canada while minimizing any short-term costs associated with their establishment in Canada” (LRAG, 1997b, p. 4). Among other things, this explicit cost-benefit approach to

immigration led the group to make very specific recommendations related to the selection criteria for new immigrants, including the criterion of language ability.

In the LRAG report, the issue of language figures prominently. For instance, the report expressed the importance of official language ability for independent immigrants as follows:

Ability in at least one of the official languages is a key determinant of success, in terms of both employment and successful integration. Official language ability is almost a prerequisite for entry to the labour market in Canada, and it mitigates failure if an immigrant with a job offer has to look for another position. ... We therefore propose that no other attribute... be able to substitute for the lack of this ability. (LRAG, 1997a, p. 58)

Accordingly, the report included the recommendation that “[a]ll applicants should have to meet minimum requirements (referred to as core standards) with respect to education, official language ability and self-sufficiency” (LRAG, 1997a, p. 60). The mention of minimum requirements and core standards reflects a more formalized approach to selection criteria. In terms of language ability, the minimum requirement is specified as the level of proficiency required for labour market participation: “The core standard for official language ability should be proficiency in at least one of the two official languages. (By this, we mean that the immigrant should be able to enter the labour market upon arrival with minimal upgrading)” (p. 59).

With its focus on core standards for language ability within the immigration regime, the report goes furthest of all the documents within the reform process in calling for the formalization of assessment of language ability within the immigrant selection system¹¹. In addition to this proposal for mandatory language testing, the report also included several other “radical measures” such as making language a pass/fail criterion rather than one for awarding

¹¹ In fact, it would not be for another 13 years, in 2010, that objective results of a third part language test would be required for demonstrating language proficiency for the purposes of the point system. This is discussed in further detail below.

points and charging fees for family class migrants to contribute to their language tuition. During subsequent consultations on the Advisory Group's report, these recommendations were rejected due to their overly "economic, market-oriented focus" (CIC, 1998, p. 6). However, much of the Report's vision for "modernizing" the selection system for skilled workers was taken up in the government's response to the report, the White Paper *Building on a Strong Foundation for the 21st Century* (CIC, 1998).

Building on a Strong Foundation

The White Paper endorsed the basic principles underlying the Advisory Group report's proposed new model for immigrant selection. It agreed with the perspective on independent class immigrants as an important source for "enriching our human resources" and on the cost-benefit approach for selecting immigrants based on their potential to make a net contribution to the Canadian economy and society. More specifically, the White Paper adopted the Advisory Group report's central analysis of the labour market conditions in the knowledge economy and the need for immigrants to have "flexible skill sets:"

[A]s Canada further develops its knowledge-based economy and society, the skills required to integrate into the labour market are changing. Canada's selection system for independent immigrant applicants needs a sharper focus on flexible and transferable skills" (CIC, 1998, p. 10).

The White Paper critiques the existing points system for making official language skills "a factor, but not an essential one" (CIC, 1998, p. 29). The White Paper's plan for modernizing the selection system includes specific proposals in terms of a revaluation of language. Again, this is legitimized through a neo-liberal discourse, with the statement that "communication is a cornerstone of being able to function in the workplace, especially in a service-oriented and

knowledge-based economy” (p. 30). Accordingly, the White Paper announces that language skills will be valued within a new modified points system. It even extends this requirement for language across all categories of independent class immigrants by proposing a more explicit requirement for language skills for entrepreneurs and investor immigrants.

Despite this rhetorical revaluation of language and the stated intention of strengthening the language factor within the points system, the White Paper did not go to the lengths recommended in the Advisory Group’s report in terms of formalizing the language-based criteria within the points system. For instance, it specifically stated that language would not be made a rigid pass/fail criterion as this would introduce too much rigidity into immigration selection. Similarly, mandatory language testing for the assessment of language ability was rejected, with only a proposal for optional language testing “for applicants wishing to more accurately assess their chances of success for immigration before submitting an application, or to expedite the processing of an application once submitted” (CIC, 1998, p. 30).

The proposals contained in the White Paper served as the basis for the drafting of the new immigration act, passed in 2001 as the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA). However, before looking at the new immigration act in detail, the next section identifies another factor that was to influence the ultimate form of the new immigration selection regime, namely the Liberal government’s macro-economic strategy for competitiveness and growth.

Canada’s Innovation Strategy

During roughly the same period as the new IRPA was being prepared, the federal government was formulating a new macro-economic plan, which would come to be dubbed Canada’s Innovation Strategy. The Plan was announced in two documents, issued by Industry

Canada and Human Resources Development Canada (HRDC). The Innovation Strategy was seen as the continuation and culmination of previous neo-liberal economic policies, such as deficit reduction and cuts to transfer payments for social programs, aimed at creating the right environment for economic growth. In line with the latter aim, the Minister for Human Resources Development announced: “This strategy, in supporting both Canadian economic growth and social development, is essential to ensuring our strength and our continued competitiveness in the global context” (HRDC, 2002, February 12, n.p.). Specifically, the aim of the strategy was to increase productivity through innovation. What was meant by “innovation” was elaborated by the Industry Minister at the time, who stated: “[T]he key to becoming more productive is to be more inventive. To sharpen and broaden our skills. To find new and better ways of doing things. In a word, through innovation” (Industry Canada, 2002, February 12, n.p.). The call to sharpen and broaden Canada’s skills was taken up in a government policy agenda of skills promotion.

A National Skills Agenda

In a speech before the Canadian Chamber of Commerce in 2002, the minister of industry at the time explained how the strategy was needed to help Canada meet “the challenge of the knowledge economy” (Industry Canada, 2002, February 12, n.p.). Within the strategy a particular focus would be placed on knowledge and skills as central to the new economy: “A skilled workforce will be to the knowledge economy what factories were to the industrial revolution. And so, we propose an ambitious new agenda to promote skills and learning” (Industry Canada, 2002, February 12, n.p.).

Concern over the “skills and learning challenges” Canada faces had arisen following the report of the Expert Panel on Skills, presented to the Prime Minister's Advisory Council on

Science and Technology in February 2000. Accordingly, the 2001 Speech From the Throne recognized the need for aggressive investments in the “literacy, skills, and talents of Canadians” (HRDC, n.d.). The key policy project related to the Innovation strategy was to be a national skills agenda.

Knowledge Matters: Skills and Learning for Canadians

The publication *Knowledge Matters* (HRDC, 2002), one of the two documents of the Innovation Strategy, expresses a neo-liberal skills discourse as to the challenges facing the Canadian economy: “the knowledge-based economy means an ever increasing demand for a well-educated and skilled workforce” (HRDC, 2002, p. 11). Also the notion of communication skills, in relation to the KBE, becomes a dominant theme, as “literacy skills” are among the foundational skills, along with numeracy skills, needed for full participation in the new economy (p. 21). Foundational skills are those that “are usually obtained in basic education and are needed in almost any job, providing the base upon which other skills are built. ...They are critical requirements for continuous learning. Workers with solid foundation skills are more adaptable and less likely to be unemployed” (p. 41).

The Canadian government’s skills agenda arose out of the Knowledge Matters report. In this report language features as literacy skills, which are among the “foundation skills” that are required by the “new/changing economy.” The notion of literacy within the Knowledge Matters report follows the usage of the IALS where it is defined in relation to a 5 level framework. The report establishes an equivalency between IALS literacy level 3 and the demands of the new economy:

According to the 1994 International Adult Literacy Survey, one in four high school graduates 16-25 years old have literacy skills that fall below the generally accepted minimum for further learning (level 3 [of the IALS]). This means that many young Canadians leave high school without the literacy skills needed for full participation in the knowledge economy. (HRDC, 2002, p. 17)

The IALS levels, quoted in the report, defines level 3 as “the minimum desirable threshold in many countries. It denotes roughly the skill level that is required for secondary school completion and college entry” (HRDC, 2002, p. 17). Thus, there is an equation of the domains of the “new, knowledge based economy” with that of “post-secondary education,” through the same level of literacy required by both domains. Likewise, the targets established for the skills agenda, for the up-skilling of the Canadian workforce, are given in terms of participation rates in post-secondary education.

Immigration and the Innovation Strategy

The Innovation Strategy’s globalist discourse reflects the government’s macro-economic priorities with which the immigration regime was to be aligned in the IRPA reforms. As then Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, Denis Coderre stated when the new legislation came into effect: “I firmly believe that our new Act provides the tools for Canada to better respond to the global challenges of the 21st century” (CIC, 2002, June 11, n.p.). More specifically, the modifications to the points system were explained as designed to promote the recruitment of skilled worker applicants “with the skills and education needed to drive economic growth and innovation in Canada” (CIC, 2002, n.p.).

Within the Innovation Strategy, the selection of immigrants in the points system was to potentially play an important role. The human and social capital of new immigrants was seen as a “tremendous competitive advantage” which could contribute to the goals of the Innovation

Strategy. As the Minister of Industry at the time stated: “To coordinate our immigration policies with our economic priorities...[w]e will ensure that our immigration policies get us the skilled workers we need” (Industry Canada, 2002, February 12). This macro-economic perspective would have an important influence on the shape of the immigration system, in particular the basis for immigrant selection. The principles of the approach, which would come to be known in Canadian immigration policy discourse as the “human capital approach,” is expressed in the following passage from *Knowledge Matters*: “[M]eeting Canada’s need for a skilled and adaptable workforce, including enough highly-qualified people for key sectors and industries, will require improved efforts to attract and select immigrants with particular skills” (HRDC, 2002, p. 49).

Operationalization of the Skills Discourse in Immigration

The IRPA Selection Grid

The importance of language within the immigration regime came to be framed in reference to its usefulness as a selection criterion within the points system of the Federal Skilled Worker Program, the main entry route for economic class immigrants to Canada. Under the new IRPA, economic immigrants are selected “on the basis of their ability to become economically established in Canada” (IRPA, §12(2)). The IRPA Regulations revamped the points system’s selection grid, reducing the number of factors for the awarding of points (from 9 to 6) and increasing the points awarded for education and language ability. Under the previous selection grid, language was a factor for awarding up to a maximum of 15 points out of a potential total of 105, with a minimum number of points required to qualify for entry, or “pass mark,” of 70 points. In the IPRA regulations, language proficiency was worth up to 24 points out of a total of

100 points, with a pass mark of 75 points. Thus under the IRPA, the weight of the language factor increased from 14% to 24% of the total number of points that could be awarded, and from 21% to 32% of the pass mark. From September 18, 2003, the pass mark became 67 points, reduced from 75, thus making the points for language ability worth up to 36% of the pass mark.

The increased importance of language as a selection criterion can be gauged from the specific procedure for the awarding of points, as described in the IRPA regulations (§ 79(2)).

(2) Assessment points for proficiency in the official languages of Canada shall be awarded up to a maximum of 24 points...as follows:

(a) for the ability to speak, listen, read or write with high proficiency

(i) in the first official language, 4 points for each of those abilities if the skilled worker's proficiency corresponds to a benchmark of 8 or higher, and

(ii) in the second official language, 2 points for each of those abilities if the skilled worker's proficiency corresponds to a benchmark of 8 or higher;

(b) for the ability to speak, listen, read or write with moderate proficiency

(i) in the first official language, 2 points for each of those abilities if the skilled worker's proficiency corresponds to a benchmark of 6 or 7, and

(ii) in the second official language, 2 points for each of those abilities if the skilled worker's proficiency corresponds to a benchmark of 6 or 7; and

(c) for the ability to speak, listen, read or write

(i) with basic proficiency in either official language, 1 point for each of those abilities, up to a maximum of 2 points, if the skilled worker's proficiency corresponds to a benchmark of 4 or 5, and

(ii) with no proficiency in either official language, 0 points if the skilled worker's proficiency corresponds to a benchmark of 3 or lower.

Two points to note about this procedure for the awarding of points is the way it privileges higher levels of language ability without rewarding bilingualism. High proficiency in one official language alone will merit 16 points, while the maximum number of points available for language (24 points) is only attainable for someone with high proficiency in both official languages. The bias in favour of monolingualism as opposed to dual language skills / bilingualism is reflected in the fact that someone who is moderately proficient in both official languages would not be

awarded any more points than someone who is highly proficient in only one official language. Furthermore, the points awarded for high proficiency in one official language are twice that which would be awarded to an applicant with basic proficiency in both official languages (i.e., 16 and 8 points respectively).

The Canadian Language Benchmarks

As has been shown, the increased importance of language as a selection factor within the points system was legitimated by a neo-liberal skills discourse which construed language use, in the form of literacy or communication skills, as valuable foundational skills for success in the global knowledge economy. However, the IRPA's complex selection grid for the awarding of points for the criterion of language ability was also made possible by the existence of a set of standards or benchmarks against which to measure language proficiency. In the IRPA regulations, the levels of language proficiency for awarding points are referenced to the Canadian Language Benchmarks (CLB). As was mentioned above, the CLB, or Benchmarks, is "a descriptive scale of communicative proficiency in English as a Second Language, expressed as benchmarks or reference points" originally developed to serve as national standards for the provision of adult language training for new immigrants (www.language.ca). There are twelve benchmarks describing performance in each of the four skills areas of language, and divided into three stages from basic to intermediate and advanced (Pawlikowska-Smith, 2000).

The theoretical basis of the CLB is the notion of *communicative (language) proficiency* (Pawlikowska-Smith, 2002). The origin of this construct of language use lies in the notion of *communicative competence* as well as models of communicative language ability and communicative language teaching (CLT) pedagogies developed in the fields of applied

linguistics and sociolinguistics. However, the way that the notion of communicative competence is operationalized in the CLB differs from the sociolinguistic applications of the concept. Most significantly, the multifunctionality of language captured by the notion of communicative competence is replaced in the CLB with a monofunctional notion of language, expressed in the proposition that “language is for communication” (Pawlikowska-Smith, 2002, p. 24). This narrowly functional notion of language for communication pervades the final document of the CLB, the *Canadian Language Benchmarks 2000* (Pawlikowska-Smith, 2000). In this document, the benchmarks are elaborated in relation to “four competency areas” which are selected from what are referred to in the document as the “strictly communicative” functions of language, namely social interaction, following and giving instructions, suasion and information (Pawlikowska-Smith, 2000, p. 14).

The elaboration of the notion of communicative proficiency within the CLB framework follows the way that communicative competency has been operationalization in the fields of second language learning and language-testing, through the construct of the “communicative task,” defined as a stand alone communicative act involving the comprehension, manipulation, production or interaction in the target language, with a focus on meaning as opposed to form (Nunan, 1989, cited in Fox & Courchêne, 2005, p. 9). The concept of task is central to the CLB framework (Fox & Courchêne, 2005, p. 8). Each of the CLB descriptors for a particular benchmark describes “a person’s ability to use the English language to accomplish a set of tasks” (Pawlikowska-Smith, 2000, p. ix). These tasks are “directly observable and measurable performance outcomes” which allow individuals’ language performance to be related to the criterion referenced levels of the benchmarks, while the notion of task difficulty and progression

underlies the sequencing of the benchmarks into stages of proficiency (basic, intermediate, and advanced) (Fox & Courchène, 2005, p. 8).

This task-based focus of the CLB facilitates its articulation with a neo-liberal skills discourse, which entails a similar operationalization of language use. When elaborated within a discourse of skills, the notion of communicative *competence* is translated into a focus on *competencies* (Cameron, 2000, p. 180). These competencies, like the notion of “task,” are directly observable outcomes that are measurable, but more significantly are decontextualizable as bits of language use (“communication skills”) that can be learned and acquired through training (Cameron, 2002). It is this process that underlies the phenomenon variously referred to as the skillification or technologization of language in late capitalism (Cameron, 2000; Fairclough, 1996, 2002, 2006).

Within the CLB, the instrumentalization of language as a tool for the completion of specific tasks is embedded within discourses of the knowledge economy and human capital theory (Gibb, 2008). In the language of the CLB documents, the importance of improving one’s communicative proficiency is related to the need to acquire economically valuable skills for the global economy, reflecting the commodification of knowledge within the knowledge economy discourse (Gibb, 2008, p. 324). Likewise, the value of the Benchmarks themselves, as a means for individuals to determine, compare, and demonstrate their level of skills, is linked to the processes of monetization of individuals’ knowledge and skills within the labour market, the central premise of human capital theory (Gibb, 2008, pp. 324-325). It is through this contribution to the operationalization and materialization of discourses of the knowledge economy and human

capital theory that the CLB has become a key policy instrument for the assessment of language proficiency within the immigration regime.

Contestation of the Skills Discourse

Basic Proficiency and Bilingualism

In March 2002, the parliamentary Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration (CIMM) released the report, *Building a Nation: The Regulations under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act* (House of Commons, 2002), in which it recommended a number of revisions to the government's proposed regulations for the IRPA. The report criticized the provisions for allocating points for language ability as putting too much weight on higher levels of language proficiency, as well as providing insufficient recognition of language ability in the second official language. In regards to the first criticism, the committee recommended awarding more points for moderate and basic levels of proficiency. In so doing, the committee was not only adopting a more "liberal" position in regards to language requirements (by "lowering the bar" so to speak), but it was explicitly challenging the dominant discourse of language proficiency within the reform process leading to the IRPA by stating that "[f]luency in an official language is not necessarily the best indicator of potential success in Canada" (House of Commons, 2002, p. 8). Specifically, it argues that some of the skilled workers that Canada needs to attract, for instance those in the skilled trades, do not require language proficiency and would be excluded by overly demanding language requirements. In this way it de-links the stated goal of the IRPA of admitting skilled migrants required by the labour market from the selection criterion of language proficiency.

The committee's other main criticism of the proposed regulations was the large gap between the points awarded for proficiency in the first compared to the second official language. Whereas the proposed regulations would have awarded only a minimal number of points for high proficiency in the second language, the committee recommended increasing that amount and awarding additional points for all levels of proficiency in the second official language.¹² The motivation for this recommendation lies in a national language ideology wherein bilingualism is an important aspect of Canadian identity. As the report states, the minimal recognition of proficiency in the second official language in the original proposals "does not...adequately reflect the importance of bilingualism in Canada" (House of Commons, 2002). The parliamentary standing committee, thus, was an alternate site of discourse production related to language and immigration. The CIMM recommendations regarding the awarding of points for language proficiency represent a counter-discourse to that which dominates the government policy documents related to the IRPA. As was seen in the lead up to the IRPA, the notion of language as the key to new immigrants' success was a core point of consensus among all stakeholders in the consultation process.

"Research Shows that Language is the Key"

The government response to the CIMM report was tabled in parliament by Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, Denis Coderre, in June 2002 (Parliament of Canada, 2002). It partially incorporated some of the CIMM recommendations in that it added a fourth assessment

¹² The report also stated that the maximum number of total points awarded for language ability (20 points) as part of an applicant's overall score was not to be increased, with the committee recommending that any additional points for language over the maximum resulting from the above changes be counted towards the criterion of "adaptability."

level ('basic'), and increased the number of points for second language proficiency; however, the revised regulations retained the focus on higher levels of proficiency and even increased the maximum number of points for language ability (from 20 to 24, out of a total of 75). To justify its position, the government states in its response that "[r]esearch clearly shows that language ability is a key determinant of successful integration in the Canadian labour market, as measured by employment earnings" (Parliament of Canada, 2002, n.p.).

The committee recommendations placed less importance on language in general as a selection criterion. It took a more liberal attitude towards the awarding of points for language, recognizing lower levels of language proficiency as well as immigrants' potential to acquire language once in Canada, rather than demanding higher levels of proficiency before granting them entry. Also, importantly, it rejected the claim that high levels of language proficiency were essential to success even for certain skilled workers Canada was trying to attract. Finally, it expressed the desire to reward and promote, on the part of immigrants, the development of proficiency in Canada's two official languages, which was based on a national language ideology wherein bilingualism is an important aspect of Canadian national identity. The government, in its original proposals and in its response to the committee's recommendations, placed more importance on language in general as a selection criterion as well as selecting for higher levels of language proficiency. This equation of skilled workers and high language proficiency is the result of an ideological commitment to the belief that higher levels of language proficiency are the best indicator of success for new immigrants. Why was this economic discourse of language as resource (i.e., skill) better able to legitimize the government's proposals on language as a selection criterion, rather than the identity discourse of the standing committee, with its argument

based on the importance of bilingualism as an essential feature of national identity? The chain of documents from the IRPA regulations, the CIMM report and the government response constitutes a minor *language ideological debate* during this reform process (Blommaert, 1990), as the different positions of the committee and the government reflect different language ideological perspectives. The fact that the government's "language is the key" discourse was selected and retained over the counter-discourse, based on a national language ideology, of bilingualism as a key feature of Canadian identity and marker of belonging in Canada, is related to its link with an authoritative skills discourse which was a part of the macro-economic policy of the Liberal government's Innovation Strategy and Skills Agenda.

Modernization of the Immigration System

In 2008, the new minority Conservative government announced a new initiative, dubbed the Action Plan for Faster Immigration, which was intended to address the immediate problem of an unwieldy backlog in the processing of applications to the Federal Skilled Worker program, which was hampering the ability of the immigration system to effectively address the needs of the economy. The changes were also characterized as a way to "modernize" the immigration system and make it more responsive to Canada's labour market needs by prioritizing certain skills and occupations (CIC, 2008). They were also aimed at making the application process more "fair, open and transparent" (CIC, 2008, April 8, n.p.). The modernization of the system was conducted through "Ministerial Instructions" which were enabled under Bill C-50, an amendment to the IRPA, and which gave the minister of immigration and citizenship the authority to prioritize the processing of certain categories of economic immigrants.

On one level, the incorporation of an occupation list within the IRPA represents a retreat from the central plank of the human capital approach, going back to the LRA report, *Not Just Numbers*, which was a focus on “generic attributes for success in a dynamic labour market rather than specific occupations” (CIC, 1998, p. 6). The quote below, from a personal interview with HS, the Director of Permanent Residency Policy, Immigration Branch of CIC, shows how the reintroduction of an “occupations list” was officially rationalized as still adhering to the principles of the dominant human capital approach to immigrant selection.

when we introduced ministerial instructions a couple of years ago / where we put in an occupation filter / it was as a backlog reduction measure / it's about keeping numbers down and some people said at the time 'oh you're going back to the occu- old occupation based model' // I don't think that's entirely fair ... uhm / the grid itself / once you get into that / eligibility doesn't look at occupation at all / so I think we're still very much in the world of a / human capital model (HS, Immigration Branch, CIC, personal communication, April 27, 2011)¹³

However, what was first introduced as a one-off backlog reduction measure has subsequently been maintained as a permanent feature of the immigration regime by the Conservative minority and majority governments.

The ministerial instructions also led to the introduction of one of the recommendations that had been made in the LRA report but which had not been adopted in the IRPA. This was the formalization of the assessment of language ability for the purposes of the points system. In the second set of ministerial instructions, issued in 2010, the government implemented formal language testing for the purpose of determining language ability within the immigration regime. What had initially been rejected as introducing too much rigidity into the system was now

¹³ The following transcription conventions are used for presentation of interview data: / indicates a pause, // indicates a longer pause, : indicates a lengthened syllable, - indicates a repair, underlining indicates emphasis, ... indicates a portion left out.

presented as a way of strengthening the human capital model. How policy makers understand the implementation of formalized language testing is expressed by HS, the Director of Permanent Residency Policy, Immigration Branch, CIC in the following quote:

we're very much on that human capital road still and I think we're actually // strengthening it with now mandatory language testing up front so / no more written submissions which were subject to fraud and / terribly subjective to be perfectly honest // and then looking at a strict minimum for language ability (HS, Immigration Branch, CIC, personal communication, April 27, 2011)

The Formalization of Language Assessment

The idea of a mandatory, formal, standardized language test was first proposed in the LRAG report *Not Just Numbers*, which proposed a new model for economic immigration, “one that maximizes the long-term potential and benefits for Canada while at the same time minimizing any short-term costs associated with” economic immigration (LRAG, 1997a, p. 55). In this model, selection criteria should move away from occupation based requirements towards “qualities needed to succeed in Canada over the long term” (p. 57). Importantly, these “key qualities,” which include language competence, “can be demonstrated empirically” (p. 57). Hence the group’s insistence that “[c]ritical to this approach are the development and consistent use of a reliable language test,” and the report’s recommendation that “[t]he Immigration and Citizenship legislation should require formal standardized language testing to determine knowledge of French or English” (p. 35-36).

It wasn’t until the summer of 2010, that CIC announced changes to the application procedure for independent economic immigrants (federal skilled workers) whereby “all new applicants are required to include the results of an English or French language test as part of their application” (CIC, 2010, June 26). In the past, applicants had the option of proving their

language ability through a written submission (i.e., submitting a writing sample to the visa officer). Henceforth, this option was removed so that all applicants' language ability would have to be assessed "by accredited testing agencies" (CIC, 2010, June 26, n.p.). This blanket requirement of a third party test as proof of language ability was justified on the grounds that "[a]n independent language test is the fairest, most transparent, objective, consistent and accurate way to evaluate an applicant's language skills" (n.p.). The use of ostensibly objective procedures is one way of legitimizing what are otherwise arguably exclusionary practices. Indeed, the press release announcing the changes assures us that "[a]ll applicants are evaluated against the same standards, no matter what their language of origin, nationality or ethnicity" (n.p.). However, this change also reflects the discourse of the modernization drive, which is clearly associated with the application to the immigration system of neo-liberal management aims and techniques, such as cost-cutting, privatization, and a focus on accountability, efficiency and rationalization. All of these goals are served by the implementation of objective third party language testing within the immigration regime. Despite making modifications to the human capital approach with the reintroduction of an occupation list, the Conservative government has maintained the central importance of language ability as a central criterion for immigrant selection. This can be seen in debates over language requirements in the more demand-driven programs for the recruitment of migrant labour.

Language Requirements and the Provincial Nominee Programs

The selection of economic class immigrants for admission to Canada has largely been carried out through the Federal Skilled Worker Program (FSWP). Subsequent to the IRPA, however, the federal government has reached agreements with the provincial and territorial

governments to allow them some involvement in immigrant selection¹⁴. Allowing provinces to directly nominate skilled worker immigrants was a recommendation in the legislative review advisory group's report *Not Just Numbers* (LRAG, 1997). The Strategic Framework, *Into the 21st Century*, stated the intention to “provide provinces with opportunity to choose a number of independent immigrants who meet provincial economic objectives” (CIC, 1994, p. 29). This practice ultimately led to the creation in 1998 of the Provincial Nominee Program (PNP). The PNP gives a provincial government the power to directly nominate foreign workers who have received a job offer from an employer in that province. These applications are given priority in processing over those submitted independently through the Federal Skilled Worker Program. Most importantly, these foreign workers are not assessed on the six selection criteria of the points system.

The number of provincial nominees jumped during the period between 2005 and 2009. In absolute numbers, the number of provincial nominees increased from just over 13,000 to almost 38,500, accounting for 20% of all economic class immigration in 2009 (CIC, 2011, September, p. 1, 18). While the PNP has by and large been used by provincial and territorial governments who have not benefited from immigration through the FSWP, even the main immigrant receiving provinces, such as Ontario, began resorting to the PNP, arguing that the federal points system was not responsive enough to meet the short-term labour market needs associated with local and regional economic development. In particular, they claimed that the rigid selection grid, with its emphasis on high level language skills, was a barrier to recruiting the kinds of workers needed to

¹⁴ Autonomy in the selection of immigrants had already been granted to the province of Québec through an intergovernmental accord in the 1970s.

fill specific skills gaps, for instance in the skilled trades, where a high level of language proficiency is not required.¹⁵ As a result, many PNPs have had lower, if any, language requirement, compared to the FSWP program. This situation is clearly in contradiction with the longer-term goals of the points system to develop a skilled and flexible labour force through the recruitment of economic immigrants based on their human capital, including high level language skills. Such debate over the appropriate language requirements for economic immigrants, while reflecting the ongoing tension between demand-driven and supply side approaches within the immigration system, is also the result of the difficulties inherent in attempts to regulate national labour markets in an increasingly globalized economy, in particular due to the regionalization of the Canadian economy and the differential insertion of various sectors of the Canadian economy in the global economy. The issue was raised in a 2011 program evaluation of the PNP which recommended the implementation of a minimum standard of language proficiency of provincial nominees (CIC, 2011, September). The matter was finally resolved in July 2012 when the federal government announced a mandatory language requirement at the minimum standard of CLB 4 in listening, speaking, reading and writing for all applicants to semi- and low-skilled jobs through the Provincial Nominee Program (CIC, 2012, April 11).

Summary

This chapter has traced how the revaluation of the national language, in the form of the increased weight given to official language ability as a selection criterion in the IRPA regulations, was motivated by the increasing alignment of the immigration program with the

¹⁵ This issue was a topic of debate during the Metropolis National Conference in March 2012, at which the Minister for Citizenship, Immigration, and Multiculturalism, Jason Kenney, delivered a keynote address (CIC, 2012, March 1).

needs of the Canadian economy. However, the shape that the immigration program has taken, and the role that language as a selection criterion has played in that system, was the product of the macro-economic orientation of the Canadian government which aimed at increasing Canada's global competitiveness through neo-liberal policy measures. Chief among these was a strategy of skills promotion, a central concern of which was developing amongst the Canadian workforce the literacy and language skills demanded by the new knowledge based economy. Thus, the Canadian government's specific focus on language skills within a human capital model of immigrant selection is informed by this particular neo-liberal construal of the changing economy and labour market.

While the authority of an economic discourse of language as an important skill in the new knowledge economy has become generally accepted within the immigration domain, nevertheless there has been contestation at the level of specific policies regarding language as a selection criterion. The contestation has centred on the tension between a human resource management approach that is demand-driven and addresses short-term labour market needs, and a more long-term, supply-side approach informed by human capital theory and a knowledge economy discourse. A prime example of this contestation is the debate over language requirements within the Provincial Nominee Program, the ultimate resolution of which shows the continued dominance of the human capital discourse in relation to language proficiency within immigrant selection, despite the numerous adjustments being made towards a more demand-driven approach that is responsive to labour market needs. However, the retention of a language requirement along side these demand-driven programs for the recruitment of migrant labour has also been legitimated, in part, by recourse to a discourse of nation-building and the importance of

the role of the federal government as the guardian of a national standard of language, CLB 4, as the minimum required for the successful integration of new immigrants. The issue of immigrant integration, and the revaluation of national language within Canadian integration policy, is the subject of the next chapter.

CHAPTER 5: IMMIGRANT LANGUAGE TRAINING IN CANADIAN SETTLEMENT AND INTEGRATION POLICY

This chapter examines the revaluation of a national language in Canadian immigrant settlement policy, which has taken the form of an increased focus on developing immigrants' language proficiency as a means of ensuring their successful integration. It traces the emergence of a discourse of language and immigrant integration in federal government reviews of settlement and immigrant language training programs during the first decade of the new millennium. It then shows how this focus on language was legitimized through the recontextualization of research findings on declining economic outcomes of new immigrants and the importance of language ability for successful labour market integration. It then examines the operationalization of this discourse of language and integration in the form of a greater focus on language training provision within settlement policy, and an overhaul of immigrant language training programs to focus on higher levels of language and labour market language training. It concludes by tracing the extension of this focus on language and economic integration within the operationalization of a broader notion of social integration through the localization of settlement policy at the level of "the community."

A Brief History of Immigrant Language Training in Canada

Two important factors have shaped the history of immigrant language training programming in Canada. The first is a distinction and recurring shift in emphasis between ESL for settlement and citizenship, and language training for immigrant workers destined for the labour market, often in the form of occupation specific language training at higher levels of proficiency. The second is the division of labour between federal and provincial levels of

government in relation to the design and delivery of adult ESL programming, due to the responsibility for education given to the provincial governments under Canada's constitution. These factors account for recurring issues in regard to coordination between the variety of ESL programs that have existed at various times in Canada, as well as being at the root of persistent concerns over poor quality, lack of standardization or curricula, professionalization of ESL teaching, barriers to accessibility, and under-funding (Burnaby, 1992). The specifics of different immigrant language training programs can be compared in terms of their relative emphasis on settlement versus labour market training, as well as the degree of involvement on the part of the federal government in shaping the content and delivery of immigrant ESL programs.

Government involvement in the provision of adult ESL for immigrants began in 1947 with an agreement between Ottawa and provincial governments to fund provisions of adult ESL by NGOs through local school boards. The goal of the Citizenship Instruction and Language Textbook (CILT) agreement was to prepare immigrants with the knowledge of Canada and language needed to pass the citizenship test (Burnaby, 2002, p. 69; Haque, 2010, p. 292). The federal government's role in the CILT agreement was limited to cost sharing, due to the responsibility for education given to the provinces under the Canadian constitution, with the content and delivery of the programming left in the hands of provincial authorities (Burnaby, 2002, pp. 69-70).

The federal government took a greater interest in immigrant language training in the late 1960s, as a result of the reorientation of the immigration regime to meet the labour needs of Canada's growing economy. As a corollary to the new points system for the selection of economically valuable workers, the federal government implemented, in 1967, the Manpower

Program to manage the country's human resources, and which provided federal funding for a range of occupational and pre-occupational training programs, including immigrant ESL (Burnaby, 2002, p. 70; Haque, 2010, p. 292).

While language training under the Manpower Program was still administered provincially, the federal government was able to exert more control over the content and delivery of the programs by increasing their involvement under the guise of "manpower training" (Burnaby, 2002, p. 70). For example, the Canada Jobs Strategy (CJS), implemented in 1978, provided full time language training at a basic level of proficiency for unemployed adult migrants and native born Canadians. Though the training was delivered through provincially regulated educational institutions (e.g., community colleges), the federal government had control over who was eligible as well as over the choice of provider, from whom the federal government directly purchased seats in particular language training courses (Fleming, 2007, p. 191). In this way, the federal government was able to get around the provinces' constitutional responsibility for education in relation to adult ESL.

The Manpower Program language training initiatives only ever met the ESL needs of a minority of immigrants (Fleming, 2007, p. 191). Eligibility was restricted to heads of households (i.e., men) who were receiving unemployment benefits (p. 192). These programs also reflected a shift from the settlement language training of the CILT to an emphasis on labour market language training, which neglected those immigrants, in particular women, who were not

destined for the labour force¹⁶ (Burnaby, 1992, p. 11). There were also concerns over the poor quality of language training through the Manpower Program which, combined with the issue of lack of coordination in funding and delivery between the Manpower Program, the CJS, and CILT, a persistent issue for immigrant ESL programming in Canada (Burnaby, 2002, p. 72), led to the creation of a new program to replace the above programs.

With the Settlement Language Training Program (SLTP), created in 1986, the emphasis of federal government immigrant ESL programming shifted back to the notion of settlement language training. Replacing the CILT as well as the labour market language programs such as the CJS, the SLTP provided adult ESL instruction for those immigrants not destined for the labour force, and was designed to meet the needs of women in particular, offering childcare provision, reimbursement of transportation costs, as well as daytime instruction (Fleming, 2007, p. 192; Burnaby, 1992, p. 12). The program also implemented a new delivery model, whereby federal funding was given directly to service provider organization (SPOs) for contracts awarded through a competitive bidding process, which further increased the federal government's control over settlement language training services in relation to the provinces (Burnaby, 2002, p. 73). Despite these innovations, the SLTP still suffered from the persistent problems of chronic underfunding, inconsistent curricula, and lack of professional standards and poor training for teachers and staff (Fleming, 2007, p.192). These problems, as well as the growing awareness of a number of broader issues in relation to adult ESL, such as the lack of coordination and consolidation in and between the different mechanisms for funding and delivery, and a lack of coordination

¹⁶ Indeed, a court challenge to the CJS, launched during the 1980s, on the basis that it discriminated against women, provided the impetus for the federal government to introduce the new Settlement Language Training Program, discussed below (Fleming, 2007, p. 192)

between ESL and other settlement services (Burnaby, 1992, p. 5), led to another overhaul of immigrant language training in the early 1990s.

The federal Conservative government's Immigration Plan for 1991-1995 had a twin focus on maximizing the economic benefits of immigration as well as increasing settlements services for landed immigrants (Fleming, 2007, p. 192; Pinet, 2006, p. 8). In this second focus, it "set immigrant language training as a major national priority for the first time" (Fleming, 2007, p. 192). The result was the implementation of a new immigrant ESL program, the Language Instruction for Newcomers to Canada (LINC) program. In its conception, LINC was clearly a settlement language training program, offering basic language training for any landed immigrant for up to 900 hours of study (equivalent to 1 year full-time study or 3 years part-time) (p. 193). The basic communication skills it provided were geared towards the everyday settlement needs of new immigrants (Pinet, 2006, p. 8). In addition, it was also intended to include an aspect of citizenship instruction (Derwing & Thomson, 2005, p. 44-45). This settlement model of LINC was complemented by a second program for higher-level, career-specific language training, the Labour Market Language Training (LMLT) program. However, this program proved short-lived, with LINC becoming the "dominant adult ESL structure in Canada" (Fleming, 2007, p. 193).

The LINC program constituted an improvement on previous adult ESL programming in that it involved a standardization of ESL curricula and assessment. Curriculum guidelines for 5 levels of LINC were produced by 1999, while learners were assessed for placement according to the national benchmarks of the newly developed Canadian Language Benchmarks (CLB) (Pinet, 2006, p. 8; Burnaby, 2002, p. 75). By the late 1990s, however, the basic language-training model of the LINC program began to draw criticism for its "survival skills" approach that denied

immigrants access to the kind of language proficiency required to fully integrate into society. The implementation of the LINC program did result in “a marked reduction in the level of instruction to be provided” to newcomers and offered, at best, a minimal level of English for menial employment (Haque, 2010, p. 292; Fleming, 2007, p. 195). Some critics argued that this “survival level” language, which did not allow for integration into the labour market or facilitate economic or social mobility, was aimed at keeping immigrants “in their place” (Haque & Cray, 2006). While this critique came from the side of progressive researchers and some ESL practitioners, a similar critique of the insufficient level of language offered by LINC came to be voiced within policy circles, expressed, however, in a more neo-liberal discourse which called for higher level language training to provide the workplace language skills needed for the new economy. As will be seen, this neo-liberal perspective was ultimately adopted in the government’s most recent reforms of settlement language training policy.

Review of Settlement Language Training Programming

After the overhaul of the immigrant selection system, with the IRPA regulations, the Canadian government turned its attention to settlement policy. A review of Canadian settlement policy, conducted in 2003 by the parliamentary standing committee on citizenship and immigration (CIMM), identified shortcomings of federal settlement programming, and in particular of the language training provided through the LINC program (House of Commons, 2003). These shortcomings were confirmed a year later in an evaluation of the LINC program itself (CIC, 2004)

A Sense of Belonging

In 2003, the parliamentary standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration (CIMM) carried out a cross-national study of federally funded settlement programs, with the findings presented in the report, *A Sense of Belonging: 'Feeling at Home'* (House of Commons, 2003). The report presents an evaluation of how settlement programming in achieving the government's policy goals of promoting the successful integration of new immigrants. The study identified a number of weaknesses in the current settlement programs, as well as issues in a number of areas that constitute "barriers to successful integration" (House of Commons, 2003, p. 3). Key issues to be addressed included: "the importance of language training, access to employment and the building of welcoming communities" (p. 3).

In regard to the issue of language training, the committee found that the LINC program's current focus on basic language skills was insufficient for achieving successful integration of new immigrants. It noted that the levels of language training available through federally funded programs varied greatly across the country with intermediate and advanced level training not widely available. Accordingly the report made the specific recommendation that higher levels of language instruction should be made available to newcomers across the country (House of Commons, 2003, p. 11). The report also called for the development of national standards to support these advanced levels of language training.

The report also noted that, since LINC provides funding for general language skills, there is a lack of provision of language training for the workplace. The committee therefore recommended that LINC funding be extended to cover language training programs specifically geared towards finding employment (House of Commons, 2003, p. 11). In both of these

recommendations, the report is endorsing a perspective on language and immigrant integration similar to the language skills discourse underlying the human capital model of immigrant selection in the IRPA. Here the importance of language in terms of settlement policy lies in its role in ensuring successful *economic* integration. Hence the call for the provision of language training at more advanced levels and through programs geared at finding employment. Indeed, in justifying the second recommendation, the report states: “finding employment is clearly one of the most fundamental aspects of successful settlement and integration” (House of Commons, 2003, p. 11).

It is interesting to look at the discursive construction of integration within the report. In the section “The Importance of Settlement Services,” the report states:

The provision of settlement services is an important investment. While not all immigrants require assistance upon arrival, many benefit from language and employment training, as well as other services. Canadians in turn benefit from the full participation of newcomers in our society. Settlement services lead to successful citizenship, the ultimate step in the immigration process. (House of Commons, 2003 p. 2)

There are two things of interest to note in the above passage. First is the use of the lexical item ‘investment’ as a predication strategy for settlement services. This term, part of a financial discourse, reflects the theme of “economic-utility,” which is a key feature of public discourse on immigration in Canada. Framing provision of settlement services as an investment for which returns can be calculated, the passage reflects the application in the domain of settlement policy of the cost-benefit analysis that immigration should yield material benefits for Canadian society (Bauder, 2012, p. 120). The second is the hybrid aspect of the passage, with discourse elements from the domain of the economy, such as investment, benefits, and employment, combined with elements such as “full participation in society,” and “successful citizenship,” associated with

non-economic domains of social practice, e.g., the political domain and civil society. This hybridity is an indication of the shift in approach to the notion of integration within settlement policy. The coupling of “language and employment training” as the central plank of settlement and integration policy indicates that while citizenship and “full participation in society” are still the ultimate aim of settlement policy, the most fundamental aspect of integration is finding employment and the key to this is language training.

The Missing LINC

A program evaluation of the LINC program, the keystone of Canada’s immigrant integration policy since its inception in the early 1990s, carried out the following year, reaffirmed the failings of the LINC program that had been identified in the CIMM report. The evaluation identified the key weakness of LINC by pointing out that: “in today’s knowledge economy and for occupation-specific language, newcomers are not getting trained in English/French to a sufficiently high level through LINC” (CIC, 2004, n.p.). Accordingly the evaluation pointed to the “need for language training to higher levels (beyond the Canadian Language Benchmark (CLB) level 7), in order to help newcomers learn occupation-specific terms to gain employment” (n.p.).

While noting the failings of the LINC program, the evaluation legitimizes the emphasis on language training within government settlement policy, and also reaffirms the contribution of the LINC program towards meeting the priorities of the post-IRPA immigration regime. In respect to newcomers’ language needs, the evaluation stated:

CIC representatives find that newcomers need to be able to communicate in English and/or French to meet their needs for social/cultural integration, economic integration and orientation to the Canadian way of life. Knowing the language is key to integration. They

may need language training once they arrive and as they endeavour to integrate into Canada. (CIC, 2004, n.p.)

Several intertextual references in the evaluation situate it within the same broader policy discourses which shaped immigrant selection policy. The evaluation also affirms the role of the LINC program in promoting immigrant integration through intertextual reference to the 2004 Throne Speech's commitment to innovation and skill development, and also to the IRPA's "focus on facilitating economic integration" (CIC, 2004, n.p.). The evaluation's recommendations regarding language instruction provided by LINC reiterate the proposals of the HRSDC document, *Knowledge Matters*, which stated that to ensure successful integration, immigrants' language fluency levels "should be appropriate for the labour market" (HRDC, 2002, p. 52). It further stated that: "[t]he ability to communicate effectively in the workplace is key to successful labour market integration. To this end, higher levels of language training could be offered to immigrants to ensure they are adequately equipped to communicate in the workplace" (p. 54).

Thus the findings of the LINC evaluation, and of the review of settlement policy by the CIMM, all exhibit a conception of language and integration influenced by the government's economic perspective regarding the importance of communication skills for the knowledge based economy. Another source of legitimation for this perspective on the role of language in immigrant's successful integration was provided by a growing body of research on the importance of language ability for immigrants' economic outcomes.

Research on Language and Immigrant Incorporation

A major policy focus addressed by the IRPA was “the declining economic position of newly arriving immigrants” (Reitz, 2004, p. 128). This phenomenon had been documented by a growing body of academic and policy-based research since the mid-1990s, an early statement of the problem being an edited volume entitled *Diminishing Returns* (DeVoretz, 1995). This research documented the declining economic outcomes of more recent cohorts of immigrants to Canada across a number of dimensions including labour market entry effects, lower labour market participation rates, earnings differentials and lower income levels compared to Canadian-born workers (Frenette & Morissette, 2003; Hum & Simpson, 2004; Picot, 2004).

While this decline is well documented, the reasons for it are less apparent. One potential account of the problem was that it was due to changes in general labour market conditions, which had worsened across the board for new labour market entrants (Picot, 2004). Another reason was the decline in returns on education for newer cohorts of immigrants as the level of education of the native-born population caught up to that of the foreign-born (Reitz, 2004). Other potential explanations were related to changes in factors such as age and time of arrival (Picot, 2004). However, the changing characteristics of newer cohorts of immigrants, namely their source countries in South and East Asia, and home languages other than English (or French) were identified as accounting for the declining economic outcomes (Picot, 2004). Most significantly, changes in language skills related to change in source country, as well as education level, has been claimed to account for up to a third of the decline in earnings and increase in low-income employment for recent immigrants (Picot, 2004, p. 37).

One particular interpretation of the quantitative research findings on immigrant incorporation, and specifically the differential economic outcomes of immigrants and native-born workers, was in terms of human capital theory (Fagnan, 1995, p. 176). How human capital theory was used to interpret the persistent immigrant earnings gap is explained by Fagnan (1995) as follows:

The model used to explain earnings differentials between immigrants and native-born Canadian is based on human capital theory. Human capital models examine the earnings of individuals over their lifetime. These models highlight an individual's investment behaviour as the basic cause of heterogeneity in labour outcomes. Investment in formal education or training afforded by work experience leads to enhanced productivity and higher earnings. (p. 176)

Accordingly, lack of investment in such forms of human capital as language and education, can explain the declining economic welfare of new immigrants (Fagnan, 1995, p. 185). In this way, as in regard to immigrant selection criteria, human capital theory will drive the focus on language within settlement policy.

The value of language within a human capital model of settlement is not just related to its own status as a valuable form of human capital, but also one that contributes to the valorization of other forms of human capital. This has been expressed within the research as the notion of the “complementarity” of language and other attributes such as education and work credentials and experience, where these latter attributes have no value in terms of immigrants' economic outcomes in the absence of the necessary language ability for participation in the labour market (Chiswick & Miller, 2003).

This analysis is similar to the notion of “underutilization of skills” (Reitz 2001a, 2001b, 2005) which accounts for the persistence of diminished economic outcomes for recent

immigrants despite the implementation of a human capital model for selection criteria (Picot, 2004). This is due to organizational changes in the labour market that make it difficult for newcomers to access occupations in the knowledge economy even though they have the qualifications and skills (Reitz, 2005, p. 6). Accordingly, Canadian immigration and settlement policy needs to focus on eliminating the “barriers” to newcomers’ labour market participation. Language comes to occupy a central position in these settlement policy innovations, as language proficiency is taken to constitute a “key barrier” to integration in the labour market.

Recontextualization of Research on Immigrant Incorporation

The above research findings on language and immigrant incorporation have been recontextualized within the integration policy process as “expert knowledge” (Boswell, 2009), providing a significant source of legitimation for a focus on language within the settlement domain. An important aspect of this recontextualization is the way that research findings are repeatedly represented within government policy discourse. The research on language and immigrant incorporation in Canada has identified a correlation between immigrants’ language ability and their economic outcomes. However, there is some debate within the literature as to how much of a role language ability has played in the decline in more recent immigrant cohorts’ economic outcomes. While some see changing levels of language ability as the single most important factor in the decline, others note the influence of other factors, such as decline in return on immigrants’ levels of education in comparison to the native born population, adverse conditions for all new labour market entrants, not just new immigrants, and of course racism. There is also disagreement as to how much effect raising immigrants’ language levels would have on improving their economic outcomes given the continued influence of other factors such

as non-recognition of foreign credential, general labour market conditions, and racism (see, e.g., Picot, 2004; Reitz, 2005).

The way this research is represented intertextually in integration policy discourse simplifies the findings on the role of language as a contributing factor in the decline in immigrant economic outcomes. The correlation established in the research between language ability and immigrant economic outcomes, and the influence of multiple other factors besides language, appears as the claim, for example, that “one of the most important factors contributing to an immigrant’s economic success is the ability to speak one of Canada’s official languages” (CIC, 2010, June 26). In addition, while this claim is sometimes represented indirectly with minimal attribution, such as “data points to” or “research has shown,” more often it is simply stated with no attribution and as a non-modalized assertion. In this way, the research findings are recontextualized in the integration discourse as an unmitigated claim about the direct causal effect of language ability in determining immigrant economic outcomes, serving to legitimize the overall policy focus on language within settlement policy.

Reform of Settlement Language Training Programming

The recommendations of the review of settlement policy, and the directions indicated by research on language and immigrant integration, were operationalized by the federal government in a series of reforms to settlement programming. According to the Canadian constitution, immigration is a shared responsibility between the federal government and the provinces. The province of Quebec has long had autonomy in matters of immigration, both in terms of admission and settlement policy, codified in a federal-provincial agreement dating back to the 1970s. From the 1990s and subsequent to IRPA, the federal government in Ottawa has

negotiated bilateral agreements for the coordination and funding of settlement services with most of the other provinces. Language training constitutes the largest proportion of these settlement services. The most recent and largest of these agreements was the one negotiated with the province of Ontario in 2005, the *Canada-Ontario Immigration Agreement* (COIA), and which led to the design and implementation of the *Strategic Plan for Settlement and Language Training* (CIC, 2006b).

Canada-Ontario Immigration Agreement (COIA)

The COIA, signed in November 2005, provided \$920 million in new funding over 5 years for programming to help newcomers successfully integrate into Ontario (CIC, 2005). The COIA recontextualizes the economic orientation of the IRPA immigrant selection regime within settlement policy. In line with the IRPA goal of “support[ing] the development of a strong and prosperous Canadian economy in which the benefits of immigration are shared across all regions of Canada,” the COIA objectives are “to ensure that Canada’s immigration policies and programs respond to Ontario’s social, economic development and labour-market priorities” and “to optimize the economic benefits of immigration through...reducing barriers to the labour-market integration of immigrants in Ontario” (CIC, 2005, Section 3.2).

The COIA reflects an alignment of settlement with economic priorities, similar to the alignment of the immigration regime that was traced in the previous chapter. The result, in terms of settlement policy, is an elision of the economic and non-economic domains of social activity into which immigrants are to be integrated. The notion of integration is most often expressed in relation to a specific economic domain of social activity, namely the labour market. Thus despite references to “social and economic integration” within the COIA (CIC, 2005, Section 6),

settlement programming is viewed as a form of labour market policy. Indeed, the agreement states that the COIA will “be coordinated in conjunction with the implementation of a proposed *Canada-Ontario Labour Market Development Agreement*” (CIC, 2005, Section 3.3).

The COIA intends to promote the successful social and economic integration of immigrants through language training. The “key objective” in this area is “the development of a comprehensive language training system that responds to the full range of immigrant language training needs, and is supported by language assessment and referral,” while the “key priority” is “increased availability of language training” (COIA, 2005). The details are specified in Annex E, the preamble of which legitimizes the plans for implementing a comprehensive language training system by reiterating the importance of language for the integration of new immigrants. It states: “Canada and Ontario recognize that the ability of new immigrants to communicate in either one of Canada’s official languages is key to social and economic integration.” It then identifies “lack of official language proficiency” on the part of immigrants as constituting a “barrier to labour force attachment,” and goes on to state that: “Canada and Ontario have identified the integration of immigrants into the labour market as a key priority for supporting Canada’s and Ontario’s economic development, and recognize that access to appropriate language training is key to addressing this priority” (COIA, 2005).

The twin objectives of the agreement are specified as the establishment of a “comprehensive adult language training system” and the implementation of the Enhanced Language Training (ELT) initiative. The agreement calls for the development of a system of language assessment and language training for CLB levels 1 through 12, including the development of assessment tools and standard curricula. It also aims to address occupation-

specific and higher-level language training needs, through such programs as the ELT initiative, and to better coordinate such programs with other settlement and labour market integration services.

Strategic Plan for Settlement and Language Training

The means for meeting the COIA objectives were developed with the *Strategic Plan for Settlement and Language Training* (CIC, 2006b). Its four key strategies of action included: “Build on existing services to develop and implement a comprehensive language assessment, referral and training system that assists newcomers to become competent in English or French as quickly as possible” (CIC, 2006b, “Strategies for Action”).

In addition to improving accessibility of current language training services, the comprehensive language training system envisioned in the COIA and Strategic Plan takes a particular form. The system is based on higher-level and occupation language training. Higher-level language training is defined as training to attain CLB levels 7-12. This level of proficiency is required to meet the needs of a changed labour-market and the emerging knowledge economy. The “knowledge work” that skilled workers perform requires advanced language skills. Also, new management techniques in the post-industrial economy place a premium on communication skills. To meet these advanced language skills needs, the Strategic Plan proposes expanding the LINC program to level 6/7 (CLB level 10). It also proposes investigating the feasibility of language instruction beyond CLB level 10. Other modifications of the LINC program, such as smaller classes and increased literacy programs, are also proposed to better address immigrants’ advanced language needs.

However the most important aspect of the new comprehensive language training system is the development of a system of occupation-specific language training. “Occupation-specific language training” is defined in the General Provisions of COIA as “instruction geared to the language skills needed to be competent in a specific sector of occupation” (CIC, 2005). The need for “work related language training” was identified in the consultation process that resulted in the Strategic Plan. In support of the COIA, consultations on the settlement language training needs of newcomers were held by the federal and provincial ministries of immigration during 2006 (CIC, 2006a). Focus groups of newcomers recommended that the government “provide better assessment of language skill and organization of classes so that curriculum can be better targeted to specific skill levels and employment needs, [and] provide additional training in employment-related language” (CIC, 2006a, p. 3).

While the Plan does imply the development of job-specific language training content, the focus is clearly on implementation of a system of occupation-specific language training through new partnerships, both with other government agencies and private sector actors (CIC, 2006b, “Strategies for Action: Strategy 2”). The strategic directions and particular actions to undertake for the implementation of the Plan include: “Establish[ing] language in the workplace programs where appropriate” and “[f]und[ing] the language and communication components of MCI’s [provincial Ministry of Citizenship and Immigration] Bridge Training projects (CIC, 2006b, “Strategy 2”). The delivery of the occupation-specific language training will be entrusted to “community colleges, community employment training agencies and other partners” (CIC, 2006b, “Appendix: Strategy 2”).

Under the COIA, “higher-level” language training and “occupation-specific” language training are grouped together under the term “labour-market language training” (CIC, 2005). While this term can be interpreted as referring to a particular kind of language training (i.e., *labour-market modifying language training*), it can also be interpreted as the linking of two types of settlement services, namely language training and labour-market training. This second interpretation reflects another of the key objectives of the COIA and Strategic Plan, namely the coordination of the various settlement and integration services. One of the responsibilities of the Canada-Ontario Language Training Working Group, established under the COIA, was “ensuring that language assessment and training services are coordinated, and linked with settlement and labour-market integration services” (CIC, 2005, Section 4.3.c). Strategy 1 of the Strategic Plan is: “Develop a flexible, coordinated system of settlement services with strong linkages and clear pathways to services newcomers need such as language-training, labour-market integration, and social services (CIC, 2006b, “Strategies for Action”).

The achievement of the government’s goals for language training was dependent on the development of programs and standards of language proficiency to provide training at higher levels and that is occupation specific, as called for in the Strategic Plan. Indeed, in the last decade there has been ongoing innovation in language training programming along these lines. The LINC program, which in the beginning provided instruction at the lower levels, was subsequently expanded, with the development of curriculum materials for LINC levels 5-7, corresponding to CLB levels 5-8. In addition, enhanced language training, occupation specific, and other labour market oriented programs have been developed at the higher CLB levels.

Operationalization of Labour Market Language Training

ELT and OSLT

From its inception, LINC had been intended to provide general language instruction to ensure immigrants' full participation in society. However, with the Strategic Plan for Settlement Language Training and its call for "occupation specific language training," language for the workplace once again became the focus of settlement language training policy. How this focus was put into practice is described in the comment below from an interview with RP, a Policy Analyst with the language policy team at Integration Branch, CIC. A shift, evident in LINC itself, has led to the elaboration of a variety of more explicitly "labour market language training" programs with a focus on language instruction for the workplace:

LINC i:s language training / with a- / a focus on // integration but also some workplace training / the higher- well it's not even necessarily higher / there's an alternate program called / Enhanced Language Training / which generally / starts at the higher LINC levels but actually in some places has- can start at a quite low LINC level / and that's much more focused on / preparing immigrants for / interviews / writing resumées // things like that / so there are different programs / there's LINC / there's ELT / there's Occupation Specific Language Training / so there are quite a few different programs out there ... and since [the LINC evaluation in 2004] LINC has expanded to // a very high level- well LINC 8 (RP, Integration Branch, CIC, personal communication, April 26, 2011)

A prime example of a labour market language-training program is the federal Enhanced Language Training (ELT) Initiative. The ELT initiative began as a federal pilot program in 2003-2004 and arose out of the Internationally Trained Workers' Initiative, co-lead by Human Resources and Skills Development Canada and Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC, 2006b). The goal of this larger initiative is "to facilitate the integration of internationally trained Canadians and immigrants into Canada's labour force" (CIC, 2006b). The key elements of the program are foreign credential recognition, enhanced language training, and bridge to work.

Enhanced language training includes “labour market and job-specific language training and workplace literacy programs” (CIC, 2006b). The bridge-to-work initiatives are intended to “prepare newcomers for the workplace through the use of internships, temporary or permanent work placement opportunities, and mentoring programs” (CIC, 2006b).

Labour-market language training, while ostensibly denoting the content of a particular type of language training, in practice refers to a form of coordinated delivery of language training on the one hand and labour-market training on the other. The delivery projects under the ELT initiative include two components: language training and bridge-to-work. The language training is geared to the attainment of CLB levels 7-10 and also includes “job-specific language training.” The bridge to work component includes “a variety of employment-related activities, with work placements being the preferred option for three quarters of ELT service provider organizations (SPOs). Coordination in the implementation of the ELT was a key objective of the COIA and of the four year Strategic Plan.

Following the ELT program, the elaboration of labour market language training programs “hived off” somewhat from the federal department of CIC, either to CCLB, HSDRC, or to the provinces (RP, Policy Analyst, Integration Branch, CIC, personal communication, April 26, 2011). An example of the latter is the Ontario government’s efforts to expand Occupation Specific Language Training (OSLT) programs in conjunction with Colleges Ontario (Colleges Ontario, 2007). In this way the concern with higher-level and “occupation-specific language training” has remained a focus of policy development, with the notion of labour-market language training becoming the dominant paradigm for immigrant settlement language policy.

Settlement Language Training as Human Resource Management

Another example of the development of labour market oriented settlement language policy is the project carried out by the Centre for Canadian Language Benchmarks (CCLB) and Human Resources Development Canada (HRDC) to align the CLB with the Essential Skills framework in federal human resource development policy. In 1994, at the same time as the CLB was being developed, HRDC launched the Essential Skills Research Project (ESRP) to identify the broad skills necessary for all domains of life. The project identified nine “Essential Skills” (ES) that were “used in virtually all occupations,” namely, reading text, document use, numeracy, writing, oral communication, working with others, continuous learning, thinking skills, and computer use (HRSDC, n.d.a). The ES are defined as “enabling skills” that “facilitate an individual’s ability to perform work functions and to carry out other life tasks” (Centre for Canadian Language Benchmarks [CCLB], 2005, p. 2-3). Rather than job specific skills, the ES “provide the foundation for learning all other skills and enable people to evolve with their jobs and adapt to workplace change” (HRSDC, n.d.a).

The ESRP produced a set of scales to describe “the key abilities that facilitate successful performance in the workplace and in life” (CCLB, 2005, p. 2). The ES scales measure each skill at different levels of complexity, each level reflecting the complexity of tasks performed in, and thus the skills requirement of different occupations, from level 1 (basic tasks) to 4 or 5 (advanced tasks) (HRSDC, n.d.d). The main activity linked to the ES was the development of Essential Skills Profiles (ESP) to describe how the nine Essential Skills figure in specific occupations. An ESP is “a summary that describes, for a particular occupation, the representative essential skills [for] successfully carrying out job tasks” (CCLB, 2005, p. 2). The profiles contain, among other

things, a brief description of the occupation; a list of the most important Essential Skills; and examples of tasks that illustrate how each Essential Skill is applied (www.hrsdc.gc.ca, “Essential Skills Profiles”). The profiles were intended to help prospective workers determine whether or not they have the skills they need to do the jobs they want to do (HRSDC, n.d.b).

In 2002, a project was launched to align the CLB and Essential Skills. Out of this emerged the document *Relating Canadian Language Benchmarks to Essential Skills: A comparative framework* (CCLB, 2005). The purpose of the *Comparative Framework* is to show how the CLB and ES, though based on different conceptual frameworks, nevertheless take a similar approach to skills, both in general and in relation to language skills in particular. The view of ES as enabling skills is similar to the view of language and literacy skills as foundation skills within the Innovation strategy (HRDC, 2002, p. 41). Similarly, the approach to language related skills such as document use and oral communication in the ES, is similar to the approach to communicative proficiency within the CLB: “[b]oth the CLB and the ES take a communicative approach...[E]ach scale is based on the performance of authentic, meaningful, contextualized tasks” (Stewart, Geraci, & Nagy, 2004, p. 5). The alignment of the CLB with the ES framework is thus the logical outcome of the skills discourse applied to language within settlement policy as well as the increased importance accorded to language skills within human resources and labour market policy (cf. Gibb, 2008).

The main policy application of the alignment of ES with CLB was “to support the creation of Occupational Language Analyses” or OLAs (CCLB, 2005). An occupational analysis “defines the Canadian Language Benchmarks levels required to perform tasks related to specific jobs as defined in the Essential Skills Profiles” (www.language.ca, “OLAs”). Similar to an

Essential Skills Profile, each OLA “outlines, in a standardized format, speaking, listening, reading, and writing competencies and related sample tasks for a given occupation” (CCLB, 2005, October 13). The creation of OLAs was intended to play a role in the further development of labour market and occupation specific language training as a resource for ESL instructors to develop curriculum, course materials, or assessment tools (CCLB, 2005, October 13). Indeed, in the final report of the CCLB’s national consultations on the CLB the “occupational analysis of language requirements” was prioritized among future applications of the CLB (Smit & Turcot, 2010, p. 50).

The project to align the CLB and the ES, along with the specific policy instruments that emerged from it, such as the OLAs, is particularly revealing of the broader significance of the labour market oriented focus of recent Canadian language training policy. The texts in this project, including the Common Framework, are hybrid genres combining the genre of job description, which is associated with social practices of human resource management, and scales of language competency that are associated with pedagogical practices e.g., syllabus design. These interdiscursive practices of genre mixing and creation of new genres (Fairclough, 2003), reflect the merger of language pedagogy and human resource management practices, as the discursive aspect of the constitution of a new neo-liberal form of settlement language training.

Formalization of Language Assessment in Settlement Policy

The expansion of language training at the higher CLB levels was accompanied during this period by the development of instruments for language assessment linked to the CLB. When it was originally devised, the CLB framework did include a placement test, the Canada Language Benchmarks Assessment (CLBA), for assigning learners to the appropriate level course.

However, the growing demands for accountability within the federal government's modernization of the immigration system, especially the need for assessment of language training outcomes rather than for placement purposes, led to the development of two new language assessment instruments: the Portfolio Based Language Assessment (PBLA) for formative assessment within the LINC program; and the Milestones test, a formal outcomes test for use both within the LINC program and for purposes of language assessment within the broader immigration and settlement domain.

In the interviews with RP and GB, two Policy Analysts with the Language Policy Team at Integration Branch, CIC, it was explained how the development of the PBLA and the Milestones test came in response to the need for an outcomes based test aligned with the CLB for the purpose of assessing program outcomes and impact, which was identified in the LINC evaluations of 2004 and 2009. As GB, the Senior Policy Analyst, explained:

both times / the finding was that / better tools to assess how well people are progressing and when they come out the back end of / the program where are they at / so we kind of took those findings and said OK there's // there was a belief that what we need is an exit test ... there's actually two kind of / prongs here /there's standardizing the way teachers do the in-class assessment / as people move through the levels and transition / sort of / graduate into LINC 4 / into LINC 5 / how do you know when someone is done or they've achieved / competencies of CLB level 5 ... so we wanted to standardize that so that's / the ... Portfolio Based Language Assessment or PBLA so that's really // I think of it as kind of like an exit test / that happens / over the course of the entire semester ... so that's / that's what the PBLA is meant to do so it gives us kind of that exit test we needed and then there's the Milestones ... and the Milestones ... is a stand alone / formal // high stakes test / that's delivered under controlled conditions much like an IELTS or a TOEFL / that is to say / it's to say- it answers the question / just what benchmark has this person achieved / regardless of whether they took LINC / or a provincial program or / however they may have learned their English (GB, Integration Branch, CIC, personal communication, April 27, 2011)

While the PBLA is intended for use in ongoing assessment within the LINC program, the Milestones is intended for use both inside the LINC program as well as outside by replacing the use of IELTS or TOEFL for purposes of language assessment within the immigration regime, or any other situation where a newcomer might require a language qualification for work or study purposes. In replacing these “foreign” assessment tools, the Milestones test was to provide a “Canadian made test to test Canadian immigrants” (RP, Policy Analyst, Integration Branch, CIC, personal communication, April 26, 2011).

The Milestones test was specifically developed and designed to assess two key levels of language ability that were considered especially salient for the purposes of settlement policy. How these two levels were decided on and the rationalization for them is explained by the two Policy Analysts with the Language Policy Team, Integration Branch, CIC:

1.
the Milestones test will...test everything from [CLB] 4 to [CLB] 9 / because we found that / CLB 4 is // well it's the end of- / it's the beginning of the intermediate cycle / it's really where / an immigrant can start to speak and perhaps get a / job it could be a job like a / warehouse job / or a corner store job or- / but it's where they can start to use the language in their daily lives in- with more fluency and more confidence / and so this test / this Milestones test / tests from [CLB] level 4 all the way to [CLB] 9 / and the reason why it does that is because / the benchmarks required for colleges for example / on the whole tend to be a CLB 8 / and so we wanted to test at those two / key junctures / [CLB] 4 and at least [CLB] 8 (RP, Integration Branch, CIC, personal communication, April 26, 2011)
2.
so // the [CLB] 4 came from us / it's really CIC that thought 'OK / that's kind of a core federal role for us' / to at least try to get people up to a basic minimum standard / and CLB 4 is / considered to be what you need to / obtain your citizenship ... and the 7 8 9 was uh calls from all sorts of stakeholders from post-sec to: / sector councils / anyone who had an interest in / kind of // judging / what benchmark people had (GB, Integration Branch, CIC, personal communication, April 27, 2011)

From the above quotes it can be seen that in the settlement policy domain, the selection of one standard of language for integration has been elusive. Instead, the focus has been on the continuum of language ability, with different levels for different purposes, and all aligned to the common CLB framework. Within the continuum, attention has been focused on two levels or “key junctures,” a minimum level of language ability for participation in society (CLB 4), and higher levels for post-secondary education or for labour market participation (CLB 7, 8, 9). These two key junctures of CLB 4 and CLB 8/9 have come to be elaborated in different policy areas. The focus on CLB 8 has been incorporated into settlement language training policy, especially language training programs associated with higher level and labour market language training as well as preparation for post-secondary study. The minimum standard of CLB 4 for the purposes of participation in society will be elaborated in relation to naturalization and citizenship policy, the topic of the following chapter.

The Rescaling of Settlement Language Services

The provision of settlement services in Canada involves a variety of levels of government, due to the statutory sharing of responsibility for integration policy between the federal and provincial governments. However, more recent Canadian settlement policy and the relations between the federal and other levels of government (provincial, territorial, municipal) have been shaped by a general relativization of the *scale* of social and economic policies beyond that of the national scale, which is a characteristic feature of modes of governance in the contemporary period of globalization (see Jessop, 2000). One effect of this relativization of scale in settlement policy in Canada is the increasing regionalization of immigrant settlement patterns, which has had an impact on the provision of settlement services. Historically, the majority of

immigrants to Canada have settled in one of the three main metropolitan areas of Toronto, Montreal and Vancouver. Consequently, the majority of funding for settlement services, including settlement language training, has gone to those main centres of immigrant settlement. However, a growing proportion of more recent immigrants are following different settlement patterns, with secondary migration from the main metropolitan areas to other cities and provinces where demand for skilled migrant labour has been increasing. One such region is the western province of Alberta, which is experiencing an economic boom in its resource sector with the development of the oil sands. In response, the Canadian government, in 2009, initiated a pilot project of portable language training vouchers which migrants can redeem for settlement language training services anywhere across the country, in an attempt to accommodate the needs of newcomers who have settled in areas of secondary migration (CIC, 2009, October 16). These new settlement patterns for newcomers as well as the attempts at promoting language training are following the spatial configuration of regional economic development patterns, in particular in those sectors, such as the resource sector, most directly linked to the global economy.

The re-scaling of settlement services has continued at more micro-level scales. For example, the Strategic Plan for Settlement and Language Training devised by the federal government and the province of Ontario included for the first time a significant role for municipalities in the provision of settlement programs (CIC, 2006b, “Strategy 3”). The “Canadian model” for settlement policy has always been based on third sector (NGOs, community organizations) provision of federally funded settlement service programs. Recent program development has increasingly been coordinated at the municipal level, in the form of Local Immigration Partnerships (LIPs), and with provision of settlement services occurring at the

scale of local communities and neighbourhoods. A spatial focus on the community is also reflected in the names of program streams and specific initiatives in the newly merged Settlement Program, such as “Community Connections” and “Welcoming Communities” (Smith, 2010). The resulting discourse of community surrounding settlement services is associated with a growing communitarian conceptualization of the notion of integration with the immigration regime.

The Modernized Approach to Settlement Programming

In 2008, the Conservative government carried out an overhaul of settlement programming, adopting what it dubbed a “modernized approach.” The modernized approach brought about a complete overhaul of settlement programming, merging the three main settlement programs, including the LINC program into one Settlement Program.¹⁷ Intended to improve newcomer outcomes, it was to be “activity- and outcome-based to ensure that settlement programming is responsive and flexible to meet clients’ needs” (Smith, 2010, p. 1). Thus, the new policy architecture sets forth five sets of expected results, which are to be achieved through activities grouped into six streams of services, all of which is intended to allow for accountability in settlement programming.

Immigrant language training has been incorporated onto the new Settlement Program in the form of the “Language and Skills development” stream, the expected results of which relate to “[develop] the skills that newcomers need to function in Canadian society” (Smith, 2010, p. 2). As part of the accountability structure of the modernized approach, success in achieving

¹⁷ In addition to LINC, the other two programs were the Immigrant Settlement and Adaptation Program (ISAP) and the Host Program.

these outcomes is assessed by indicators such as “the percentage of clients who report that they have the language ability and skills they need to participate socially, culturally, and economically in Canada” (p. 2). The passages above represent language training as serving broad goals related to immigrant integration, namely to help newcomers function and participate in Canada in a number of ways, socially, culturally as well as economically. In the more concrete enumeration of the expected results in terms of language and skills, the activities to achieve these results include “[p]roviding language training so that newcomers have the official language skills needed to function and contribute to Canadian society” and “[p]roviding training to enhance skills and knowledge of the Canadian work environment” (p. 2). At another point, the language training is described as “language, literacy and numeric [sic] instruction” (p. 3). All of this, in addition to the representation of language use as language skills, reflects the continued recontextualization of the skills agenda of economic policy within settlement and integration policy, and particularly in relation to immigrant language training. In this way the modernized approach carries on the focus from the first phase of settlement policy of promoting the economic integration of immigrants by providing them with the valuable human capital, including language skills, which will allow them to find employment in the flexible labour market of the new economy.

However, the modernized approach (re)introduces broader themes of social integration within settlement programming, by contextualizing it in relation to wider government policy objectives of “help[ing] newcomers and citizens participate to their full potential in fostering an integrated society” (Smith, 2010, p. 1). The Settlement Program supports newcomers in a variety of ways by providing: language training so they have the language skills necessary to succeed in

Canada; the information they need to better understand life in Canada and make informed decisions about their settlement experience; the required assistance to find employment commensurate with their skills and education; and help to establish networks and contacts in their communities so they are engaged and feel welcomed in Canada.

These themes from broader citizenship and social inclusion policy agendas are incorporated in the new Settlement Program in the form of the “Community Connections” stream, a key element of which has been the “Welcoming Communities Initiative” (WCI). The aims of the WCI are described as follows:

Expected results under *Welcoming Communities* recognize the importance of social engagement as an integral aspect of the integration process and that integration is a reciprocal process with rights and responsibilities on the part of both newcomers and the community. Welcoming Communities projects support newcomers to form social networks and connect to the various dimensions of Canadian society while also engaging communities and neighbourhoods to welcome newcomers and support their full participation in the community. Activities focus on individual and community bridging, including: mentoring programs, supporting and encouraging volunteerism, fostering cultural awareness, anti-racism and welcoming communities, and neighbourhood services. (Smith, 2010, p. 3)

As can be seen from the above passage, while the focus in the first phase of settlement policy was on removing barriers to integration / participation associated with immigrants’ own attributes, such as lack of language skills, in the second phase, through such initiatives as the WCI, the focus has shifted to removing barriers posed by the host society, in line with the government’s stated model of integration as being a “two-way street.” The shift of attention to the host society also brings into the settlement policy domain themes related to wider agendas in terms of societal cohesion. The focus on “communities” reflects the influence of a

communitarian discourse of societal integration, which will be further elaborated in relation to citizenship policy, the topic of the next chapter.

Summary

This chapter has documented the developments in settlement services in Canada, showing how language came to play, and continues to play an important role in immigrant integration policy. Tracing the changes in ESOL provision over the last decade and a half has shown how language ability has been valued as a form of human capital necessary for immigrants' participation in the labour market. This focus was legitimated by the recontextualization of a large body of academic and policy oriented research on language ability as the key factor in successful economic integration of immigrants, and operationalized through language training programs that provide higher level and occupation specific language training. This revaluation of language in relation to economic integration, as a form of human capital in the labour market, has been extended to a broader notion of social integration within settlement policy where language ability serves as a form of social capital. In this way language has also been a focus of policies aimed at encouraging participation in society through various activities, including volunteering, and which are spatially located at the level of the community. This influence of a communitarian discourse in language and settlement policy is even more evident in the revaluation of national language in citizenship and naturalization policy, to which we will now turn.

CHAPTER 6: THE REVALUATION OF THE NATIONAL LANGUAGE IN CANADIAN CITIZENSHIP POLICY

This chapter examines the revaluation of the national language within the Canadian immigration regime in the recent formalization of the language requirement for naturalization. It traces the origin of the process of formalization of the naturalization language requirement in the emergence of a discourse of strengthening the value and responsibilities of citizenship during a process of reform of citizenship policy. It shows how this discourse recontextualizes discourse elements from republican and communitarian discourses of citizenship. Finally it describes the operationalization of this discourse in the reforms to the naturalization regime, including the citizenship test and assessment of the language requirement, and relates these developments to a general neo-liberalization of modes of social governance in Canada.

Reform of Naturalization Law: Revaluing Canadian Citizenship

The notion of a Canadian citizenship as distinct from the status of British subject dates to 1946. The 1977 Citizenship Act completed the process of denying Canadian citizenship to British and other commonwealth nationals, and also instituted a considerably liberal citizenship regime with a generous process for naturalization based on the principle that acquisition of Canadian citizenship was a right and not a privilege for all legal permanent residents. The residency requirement in the 1977 Act was minimal, and even the knowledge of language and society requirements were largely procedural, relating to the rights accruing to the legal status of citizen, while only demanding such a level of language ability as was required to conduct the citizenship interview (i.e., comprehend basic questions and convey basic answers).

In subsequent years, the liberal naturalization requirements of the 1977 Citizenship Act

came under fire. In 1987, the Conservative government published a position paper ('Green Paper'), *Citizenship 87: Proud to be Canadian*, which questioned the liberal application of rules for the determination of residency for the naturalization residency requirement. It also questioned the application of the language requirement, specifically the practice of waiving the language requirement for citizenship applicants over 60 years of age (Garcea, 2006).

However, the drive to revise the citizenship regime did not start in earnest until after the election of the new Liberal government in 1993. In 1994, the Minister for the newly created department of Citizenship and Immigration commissioned a report from the Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration, to guide the government in preparing a new act, and in particular to "identify ways in which the symbolic nature of citizenship could be enhanced" (House of Commons, 1994). The committee's report, entitled *Canadian Citizenship: A Sense of Belonging* (House of Commons, 1994), with its 21 recommendations, introduced what would become recurring themes in the citizenship agenda of subsequent governments, both Liberal and Conservative.

An overarching theme of the report is the need to enhance the symbolic value of Canadian citizenship (House of Commons, 1994, p. 1). Reporting the voices of the public heard in the committee's consultation, the report states:

There was general consensus that the Act should reinforce the most important aspect of citizenship – its symbolism. There is nothing in the Act now to indicate that citizenship is a matter for all Canadians – those born here as well as those choosing to become citizens of this country. This emphasis on symbolism and on the inclusion of all Canadians, [sic] became one of the focal points of the Committee's hearings. We are convinced that the new *Citizenship Act* must include a vision of citizenship. It must reflect the passion, pride and love of country that Canadians feel. (House of Commons, 1994, p. 2; emphasis in original)

The content of this symbolically valorized citizenship is expressed in a communitarian discourse of a sense of belonging and common values:

‘Belonging’ became one of the main themes of our testimony, as did pride in Canada, loyalty and the value of community. So did other key values that we all share: democracy, respect for others, a belief in equality, fairness, acceptance of diversity, the importance of fundamental freedoms and respect for the law. (House of Commons, 1994, p. 3)

These aspects of communitarian discourse are carried over in the report’s main recommendation for a preamble to the new citizenship act in the form of a “Declaration of Citizenship,” which would reflect the “core principles” of Canadian citizenship and the ‘common values’ that can bind together Canada’s diverse population (House of Commons, 1994, p. 7). This communitarian discourse is also evident in the representations of domains of social action related to citizenship, where the only specific domain mentioned, besides “Canada,” is the “community.”

In its goal to articulate the concept of *responsible citizenship*, which goes beyond the passive notion of citizenship as the enjoyment of rights, the report also contains discourse elements of what is distinguished in the citizenship studies literature as a republican conception of citizenship (Van Oers, 2010). Accordingly, the report includes within the responsibilities of citizens affirmation of the key values at the core of citizenship, possession of knowledge of society, and, most importantly, participation. However, unlike more traditional republican notions of citizen participation as specifically related to the domain of political activity, the report’s notion of participation is a broader one in relation to a variety of practices within the public sphere:

Participation comes in many forms. Most Canadians value their democratic right to vote and exercise their franchise whenever they have the opportunity. But participation in Canadian life goes far beyond voting. Some participate in the community through

volunteer work, membership in organizations working for the common good and being a helpful neighbour, to name just a few such activities. (House of Commons, 1994, p. 7)

Here republicanism and communitarianism, as concepts of citizenship, are combined as participation is localized in the domain of the community, and depicted as the means of achieving the sense of belonging and common values that binds society together: “We firmly believe as a Committee that it is through *participation* in the life of the community and the country that the sense of *belonging* is truly achieved” (House of Commons, 1994, p. 7; emphasis in original).

The report also has implications for the identity dimension of citizenship, implied in its description of the core values of Canadian citizenship. In the conclusion, the report states:

[T]he values and aspects of Canadian life that we cherish [are] ... [t]he importance of freedom, democracy and the rule of law. ... [t]he principles of justice, fairness, tolerance, and respect for our fellow citizens. ... [and] the equality of men and women, and of all people regardless of race, religion or ethnic origin. (House of Commons, 1994, p. 5)

Note how the list of the core values of Canadian citizenship takes the form of a set of universal features of a liberal, human rights discourse. This paradoxical phenomenon of positing universalistic liberal democratic values as the content of ostensibly particularistic national identities, has been remarked upon in relation to citizenship testing within the civic integration paradigm in Europe, which Joppke labels as the “paradox of universalism” (Joppke, 2008).

Finally, the report hints at other policy agendas that may be impacted by citizenship law:

The strengthening of common core values in our society will be essential to reinforcing our entire social fabric so that we will be able to meet the many challenges – economic, political and cultural – that we will face in the twenty-first century. (House of Commons, 1994, p. 33)

This provides for the recontextualization of the communitarian discourse of citizenship within

other policy domains, as well as the expansion of the notion of citizenship beyond the narrow political domain to other economic and cultural domains of civil society.

A Broader Vision of Citizenship

The perspective of the CIMM report was incorporated into the government's immigration plan for 1995-2000, *A Broader Vision* (CIC, 1994c). While recognizing the merits of Canada's liberal citizenship regime, including the high rate of naturalization of permanent residents, the Plan stated that more needed to be done "to draw attention to the rights and responsibilities inherent in Canadian citizenship" (CIC, 1994c, p. 25). In anticipating a new citizenship act, the plan endorsed many of the Standing Committee report's suggestions on how "to enhance the value and appreciation of citizenship" (p. 26).

The final paragraph dealing with the issue of citizenship mentions a number of themes that will be elaborated on in the ultimate revision of the citizenship legislation and naturalization procedure, namely the desire to strengthen the value of Canadian citizenship, the emphasis on the responsibilities of citizenship, and the goal of citizenship policy in creating a common bond between citizens old and new:

The government views an updated Citizenship Act as a key element of its approach to create a common bond between Canadians by birth and by choice. An increased emphasis on responsibilities, apart from rights, will serve to clarify the value of citizenship as viewed by newcomers and will offer Canadians by birth an important reminder of the great privilege that they enjoy. (CIC, 1994c, p. 27)

This shift to a notion of "common citizenship" will also become evident in relation to naturalization policy, where the requirements and procedure for acquiring citizenship will come to be used to bring newcomers to the "commonality" of Canadian citizenship (Language Policy Team member, Integration Branch, CIC, personal communication). Subsequent to the Plan, the

government implemented a written citizenship test as part of the procedure for assessing adequate knowledge of Canada (although not for knowledge of an official language). Initially this was part of efforts to bring efficiency to the naturalization procedure and to cut processing times to reduce a growing backlog of applications (Paquet, 2012, p. 249). However, this formal test was to become an important instrument for achieving a thickening of citizenship within the naturalization procedure. We will return to this below when discussing the later revision of the test and the corresponding study guide.

Attempts to Reform the Citizenship Act

Several attempts were made to pass a new citizenship Act, with a number of Bills coming before parliament during the period 2000-2003. In 2002, the Liberal government proposed amendments to the Citizenship Act. Bill C-18, as the proposed legislation was called, contained many of the themes of the drive to increase the value of Canadian citizenship. For the first time, the Bill included a clause stating the purpose of the Citizenship Act, which continued the liberal nature of the citizenship regime, e.g., to “encourage the acquisition of citizenship” and to “[affirm] that all citizens have equal status”). However it also expresses a thicker notion of citizenship, e.g., to “promote respect for Canadian principles and values” (Parliament of Canada, 2002b, n.p.).

The Bill intended to strengthen the residency requirement by clarifying that this entailed physical presence in Canada for three years within the six years prior to application for naturalization. This was to achieve the objective, mentioned in the purpose clause discussed above, of “requir[ing] a strong attachment to Canada for the acquisition of citizenship” (Parliament of Canada, 2002b, n.p.). While this strengthening of the residency can be seen to be

in line with a liberal citizenship regime, other aspects of the Bill C-18 attempted to bring about a thickening of the notion of citizenship. The knowledge requirements for naturalization under the Bill were to require applicants to demonstrate “adequate knowledge of an official language” and “adequate knowledge of Canada *and the responsibilities and privileges of citizenship*” (n.p.; emphasis added).

The Bill also proposed eliminating the position of “citizenship judge” and placing the task of adjudicating applications in the hands of senior civil servants appointed by the Minister. The effect this would have on the evaluation of the applicants’ knowledge of language and of Canada was not specified. It can be presumed, however, that it would have resulted in the formalization of the assessment procedure. Finally, the Bill also called for increasing the importance of the citizenship ceremony. This symbolic occasion was meant to increase applicants’ awareness of the responsibilities and privileges of citizenship and also to encourage them to participate in public affairs (Parliament of Canada, n.p.).

Updating Canada’s Citizenship Laws: It’s Time

The intention to update the citizenship act was reaffirmed in the 2004 Speech from the Throne, which stated “[t]he government is committed to [human rights and mutual respect]. It will modernize Canada’s Citizenship Act to reaffirm the responsibilities and rights of Canadian citizenship and our values of multiculturalism, gender equality and linguistic duality” (House of Commons, 2005, p. 4). In order to help draft a new citizenship act, the Minister commissioned another report from the parliamentary standing committee.

In 2005, the CIMM issued another report, *Updating Canada’s Citizenship Laws: It’s Time* (House of Commons, 2005) in which it again expressed support for new citizenship

legislation, which would include “a preamble in which the rights and responsibilities of citizenship are clearly addressed” (House of Commons, 2005). Similar to the proposed purpose clause of Bill C-18, the report’s suggestion for the preamble expressed a liberal notion of citizenship, e.g., in the statement that “citizenship should be seen as a right for those who qualify, rather than a privilege” and that “citizens must understand and obey Canada’s laws.” However, it also reflects a shift to a thicker notion of citizenship, e.g., in the statement that “citizens should participate in the democratic political system” and that “rights come with citizenship, *but also responsibilities*” (House of Commons, 2005, p. 5; emphasis added).

In contrast to Bill C-18, the report argued against eliminating citizenship judges and placing the adjudication of applications in the hands of civil servants. The Committee argued that there was still a need for exercising discretion in the adjudication process, in particular when it comes to the determination of adequate knowledge of language and Canada.

Reform of Naturalization Law: Strengthening the Language Requirement

A language requirement has been a part of Canadian citizenship law since the beginning of Canadian citizenship in 1946. The citizenship act of that year, which instituted Canadian citizenship as a status distinct from that of British subject, required knowledge of either English or French from applicants for naturalization as Canadian citizens. The 1977 *Citizenship Act* stipulates that applicants for naturalization have “an adequate knowledge of one of the official languages of Canada,” i.e., French or English (Citizenship Act, Section 5.1*d*).

The level of language ability required both in the 1946 and 1977 Citizenship acts was not overly demanding, as the meaning of “adequate knowledge” is specified in the 1977 Act’s Regulations as entailing “that the person comprehends, in that language, basic spoken statements

and questions; and that the person can convey orally or in writing, in that language, basic information or answers to questions” (Citizenship Regulations, Section 14*a, b*). The procedure for assessing these requirements of knowledge of language and Canada was an interview with a citizenship judge, with the judge being granted discretion to waive the knowledge requirements, including that of language, for certain applicants. This fairly liberal implementation of the language requirement would later be revised.

Reconsidering Waiving of the Language Requirement

The language requirement for citizenship, contained in the 1977 Citizenship Act, first became a topic of discussion in the early 1990s in the context of the review of the citizenship act undertaken by the newly elected Liberal government. The report of the CIMM, *Canadian Citizenship: A Sense of Belonging* (House of Commons, 1994), contained a lengthy discussion of the application of the language requirement stipulated in the 1977 Act. In particular, it addressed the common practice of waiving the language requirement. This was a common practice, exercised at the discretion of the citizenship judge, on compassionate grounds in individual cases and also for certain groups of applicants, such as those over 60 years of age. As was seen above, a 1987 Conservative government Green Paper, *Citizenship 87: Proud to be Canadian*, had already questioned the practice of waiving the language requirement for citizenship applicants over 60 years of age (Garcea, 2006). The CIMM report went further in criticizing the practice, recommending that the current provisions for waiving of the language requirement on compassionate grounds be applied sparingly, and “exercised on a case by case basis and only following a genuine effort on the part of the applicant to comply” (House of Commons, 1994, p. 24).

This recommendation was justified by the claim that the practice of waiving of the language requirement amounted to “*misplaced* compassion that could ghettoize people and hinder participation in the broader Canadian mosaic” (House of Commons, 1994, p. 23; emphasis in original). It was also legitimated with reference to one of the themes of the citizenship reform agenda, namely encouraging the participation of newcomers in Canadian society: “[w]ithout an adequate knowledge of an official language, there is the strong possibility that individuals will be confined to their home or local community, and may never be able to interact with other Canadians” (p. 23).

A shift from routinely exempting whole categories of applicants from the language requirement and only demanding compliance from those for whom it was deemed practicable, to requiring compliance from everyone and only allowing exemptions in rare cases reflects an increased valorization of language ability as a requirement for naturalization. The report dismissed arguments for waiving based on difficulties of language learning. In fact, the committee objected to the ‘waiving of the language requirement’ as discouraging language learning on the part of newcomers. It cited evidence (provided by a citizenship judge to the committee in the course of its investigations) that attendance at language and citizenship classes had dropped 10–15% after the age level for routine waiving was reduced to 60 from 65 years of age (House of Commons, 1994, p. 24). In making this recommendation, the committee stated that it was stressing the “importance of language to the integration process, [and] to that sense of belonging that we have identified as the essence of citizenship” (p. 23).

The 2005 CIMM report, *Updating Canada’s Citizenship Laws: It’s Time* (House of Commons, 2005), also reaffirmed the citizenship language requirement, although it simply

recommended continuing the status quo with respect to the granting of citizenship, stating that: “[a]pplicants for citizenship should be required to demonstrate an adequate knowledge of one of Canada’s official languages,” while still allowing the Minister to waive the requirement on compassionate grounds in individual cases (House of Commons, 2005, p. 12).

Call for Standardized Testing

Concern over the devaluation of Canadian citizenship was a central theme of the *Not Just Numbers* Report (LRAG, 1997a). In it, the legislative review group claimed that the current citizenship legislation does not “reflect any obligations [of new immigrants] to the country or to promote [their] integration into Canadian society” (LRAG, 1997a, p. 39). The report’s recommendation for strengthening the value of Canadian citizenship was to focus on the ‘core values’ that define Canada. Among these core values was language: “Language is also a defining value of Canada; some rudimentary knowledge of at least one of the official languages is seen as necessary for integration into Canadian society” (p. 6). Accordingly, the report endorses as a mandatory requirement for citizenship the obligation to demonstrate “knowledge of at least one official language” (p. 39). In addition to general references to the importance of language for integration, the language requirement “reflects the prospective citizen’s ability to be an informed participant in a democracy” (p. 39).

The LRAG report was also the first to recommend the formalization of the procedure for assessing the language requirement in its recommendation that “the Immigration and Citizenship legislation should require formal standardized language testing to determine knowledge of French or English” (LRAG, 1997a, p. 36). This recommendation was related to the report’s proposal, given the importance of language as “the key determinant for successful integration,”

that the new legislation should “emphasize the ability of immigrants to function in French or English before coming to Canada” (p. 35-36). The means for ensuring this is through “the development and consistent use of a reliable language test,” either one developed by the private sector or one adapted from another jurisdiction, such as Australia, New Zealand or Quebec (p. 35-36). This initial recommendation for the use of a standardized test for the assessment of language as part of the naturalization procedure would not be implemented for another 13 years.

Operationalizing the Revaluation of Canadian Citizenship

Amendments to the Citizenship Act

After all of the consultations and reports on reforming citizenship law, the government finally carried out amendments to the Citizenship Act in 2009. Bill C-37, the *Strengthening the Value of Canadian Citizenship Act*, was largely focused on the issue of the recovery of Canadian citizenship by the so-called “lost Canadians,” a term referring to a number of legal categories of individuals who were born abroad to a Canadian parent before the current Citizenship Act came into effect and who had unknowingly lost their Canadian citizenship under the previously obtaining regulations (Parliament of Canada, 2008). The ‘recovery’ of Canadian citizenship by these individuals, many of whom believed that they were Canadian citizens, was seen as a matter of justice, but was also related to the larger aim of the amendment, which was to strengthen the residency requirement for acquisition and retention of Canadian citizenship. The controversy over ‘Canadians of convenience,’ in relation to the crisis over the evacuation of Canadian citizens from Lebanon during the conflict with Israel in 2006, had raised concerns over the laxity of the residency requirement for citizenship. The resolution of the case of the lost Canadians was preliminary to the major change effected by Bill C-37, which was to repeal the mechanism for

passing on Canadian citizenship to second and subsequent generations born abroad and to limit Canadian citizenship by descent to the first generation born to a Canadian parent abroad.

The amended Act also reaffirmed the criteria for naturalization, namely that applicants must have “an adequate knowledge of Canada and of the responsibilities and privileges of citizenship” (Citizenship Act, Section 5.1*e*). The regulations also defined ‘adequate knowledge of Canada’ as having a “general understanding” of the right to vote and to run for elected office in federal, provincial, and municipal elections, as well as of the “chief characteristics” of either Canadian social and cultural history, political history, physical and political geography, or the responsibilities and privileges of citizenship (Citizenship Regulations, Section 15).

Improving the Citizenship Test

After strengthening the residency requirement for citizenship, the government moved to improve the citizenship testing procedures. In 2009, the Minister for Citizenship and Immigration delivered a speech in which he set out his vision for the future of the immigration, multiculturalism and citizenship programs. In the speech he announced “a top-to-bottom review of the citizenship program, to review the educational materials, to review and improve significantly the test that’s required of new citizens, to look at improving the language requirement as well” (CIC, 2009, March 18). The review of educational materials was to lead to the publication of a new study guide for preparation for the citizenship exam. The improvements to the test itself led to a redesign of the existing informal naturalization procedure, by means of an interview with a citizenship judge, as a formal written test (Paquet, 2012). Finally the improvement to the language requirement would result in the specification of an objective level of proficiency for adequate knowledge of one of Canada’s official languages, namely CLB 4, as

well as formalization of the procedure for determining whether an applicant has met the requirement (Paquet, 2012).

Paquet (2012), in her characterization of the Canadian citizenship testing regime, argues that “the introduction of a standardized test was primarily a technical decision” and that “the test has a minimalist conception of citizenship” (p. 255, 253). While this may have been true in 1995, the decision to revise the test in 2009 was associated with a more governmental approach to citizenship and an extension of the drive to strengthen the value of Canadian nationality and to thicken the notion of citizenship. This can be seen by looking at the content of the new study guide.

New Citizenship Study Guide

An important part of the improvement of the citizenship test was the publication of a new citizenship test study guide, *Discover Canada: The Rights and Responsibilities of Citizenship* (CIC, 2010[2009]). The new study guide, put out by the new federal Conservative government replaced an older version designed by the previous Liberal government, *A Look at Canada* (CIC, 2005[1995]), which had been in use since 1995. In its contents, the study guide sets out a vision of Canadian identity but also of the subject position of a responsible citizen. In terms of the former, language has an important symbolic value, whereby bilingualism is part of Canadian identity and the official language are symbols of national identity.

In the section entitled “Who we are,” the study guide presents a picture of Canada’s unique identity. This identity is the conventional notion of Canadian identity since the 1960s, which arose out of the government policies of official bilingualism, reflecting Canada’s origins in the two “founding peoples,” as well as the multiculturalism policy, reflecting Canada’s history

as a “nation of immigrants.” Bilingualism is represented in the guide under the heading of “English and French” in the following way: “English and French define the reality of day-to-day life for most people and are the country’s official languages. The federal government is required by law to provide services throughout Canada in English and French” (p. 11). Multiculturalism is represented in the sub-section “diversity in Canada” as follows: “Together, these diverse groups, sharing a common Canadian identity, make up today’s multicultural society” (CIC, 2010[2009], p. 13). Finally, language is included among important “Canadian symbols:” “English and French are the two official languages and are important symbols of identity. ... **You must have adequate knowledge of English or French to become a Canadian citizen**” (p. 39; emphasis in original). Thus in the study guide, language, in the form of the official languages, serves a symbolic function as an emblem of national identity and an indexical marker of nationality (i.e., membership in the national community)¹⁸. The content of that national identity/nationality is further elaborated in how the study guide represents what it means to be a citizen.

The new study guide reflects a retreat from a liberal approach to citizenship in terms of rights and a shift to a republican and communitarian focus on the responsibilities of citizenship. In the section “Citizenship responsibilities,” the guides states that “[i]n Canada, rights come with responsibilities,” and enumerates the latter as: obeying the law; taking responsibility for oneself and one’s family; serving on a jury; voting in elections; helping others in the community; and protecting and enjoying our heritage and environment (CIC, 2010[2009], p. 8). In terms of the different concepts of citizenship in the citizenship studies literature (see Van Oers, 2010), three

¹⁸ See Nygren-Junkin (2009) for a discussion of the representation of Canadian bilingualism in *A Look at Canada*.

of these responsibilities, obeying the law, voting in elections and serving on a jury, are the minimal procedural enactment of citizenship as juridico-political status, and would thus reflect a liberal concept of citizenship as rights (e.g., the right to vote). However, the other obligations listed not only reflect a more republican and communitarian approach to the obligations of citizenship, but also go further to reflect a particular variety of active citizenship that is linked to more specific governmental political strategies. For instance, “taking responsibility for oneself and one’s family,” which is described in the following way:

Getting a job, taking care of one’s family and working hard in keeping with one’s abilities are important Canadian values. Work contributes to personal dignity and self-respect, and to Canada’s prosperity. (p. 8)

The notion of participation as political activity, which is part of a (civic) republican concept of citizenship and based on the distinction between public and private, state and civil society within classical liberal thought, is here replaced by a notion of participation in economic activity as the responsibility of the enterprising subject/citizen of a neo-liberal governmental rationality translated into the citizenship domain (Rose, 1996; cf. the discussion below of Levitas [2005] on the centrality of paid employment within the discourse of social inclusion). Although language is not mentioned specifically, it can be inferred, given the importance of language within the discourse of integration discussed in previous chapters, that the importance of language for active citizenship is its key contribution to employability. This indicates that the conversion of the cultural capital of language ability into the symbolic capital of citizenship status is not a direct one, but occurs indirectly through the valorization of language proficiency within the economic domain of the labour market, which has become a privileged domain for the practice of citizenship.

At the same time, “helping others in the community” is described as follows:

Millions of volunteers freely donate their time to help others without pay – helping people in need, assisting at your child’s school, volunteering at a food bank or other charity, or encouraging newcomers to integrate. Volunteering is an excellent way to gain useful skills and develop friends and contacts. (CIC, 2010[2009], p. 8)

The focus on volunteering is linked to the transformation of social policy under neo-liberal state restructuring, where the provision of the social services of the welfare state has been privatized to the third sector of volunteer and charitable organizations, and where individuals have been “responsibilized” to provide for the themselves what were previously enjoyed as the social rights of citizenship.

Formalization of Language Assessment for Naturalization

It was only in 2009 that the government expressed any intention to modify the citizenship test, including the assessment of language ability. In a speech in March of that year, the then Minister of Citizenship, Immigration and Multiculturalism, Jason Kenney, announced a review of the citizenship program intended “to...improve significantly the test that’s required of new citizens, [and] to look at improving the language requirement as well” (CIC, 2009, March 18). In October of 2011, Citizenship and Immigration Canada announced changes to the way that language ability will be assessed within the naturalization process (CIC, 2011, October 15). According to the proposed changes, “adult citizenship applicants would be required to provide objective evidence of language ability with their citizenship applications” (CIC, 2011, October 15, para. 2). Acceptable “objective evidence” included “the results of a third party test; evidence of completion of secondary or post-secondary education in English or French; or evidence of achieving CLB/NCLC 4 in certain government funded language training programs” (para. 5).

The announcement further specifies the required language ability as *speaking* and *listening* at CLB level 4, which it describes as “basic fluent proficiency” (para. 8).

A Minimum Standard of Language for Citizenship

The announcement of changes to the way language will be assessed within the naturalization procedure legitimizes the proposed changes with a quote from the Minister stating: “[t]he ability to communicate effectively in either French or English is key to the success of new citizens in Canada” (CIC, 2011, October 15, para. 3). What is specifically implied by the phrase “the ability to communicate effectively” can be deduced by looking at the general performance descriptors from the Canadian Language Benchmarks themselves:

CLB Level 4 Speaking - Learner can take part in short routine conversations about needs and familiar topics of personal relevance with supportive listeners. Can communicate basic needs and personal experience. Can ask and respond to simple familiar questions. Can describe a situation; tell a simple story; describe the process of obtaining essential goods (e.g., purchasing, renting) or services (e.g., medical). Uses a variety of short sentences. Demonstrates control of basic grammar (basic structures and verb tenses). Uses correct past tense with many common verbs. Demonstrates adequate vocabulary for routine everyday communication. Clear evidence of connected discourse (and, but, first, next, then, because). Pronunciation difficulties may impede communication. Needs only a little assistance. Can use the phone only for very short, simple, predictable exchanges; communication without visual support is very difficult for him/her. (Pawlikowska-Smith, 2002, p. 55)

CLB Level 4 Listening - Learner can follow, although with considerable effort, simple formal and informal conversations and other listening texts/discourse on topics of immediate personal relevance and at a slower than normal rate of speech. Can recognize many topics by familiar words and phrases. Can follow simple, short, direct questions related to personal experience and general knowledge. Can understand many common everyday instructions and directions related to the immediate context. Can follow simple, short, predictable phone messages. Needs a little assistance (e.g., speech modification or explanation). Often requests repetition. (Pawlikowska-Smith, 2002, p. 57)

What is of interest in these descriptors of CLB Level 4 is the type of speech acts, genres and domains of language use that are represented. For instance, what learners are supposed to be able

to do includes the speech acts of asking, responding, describing, as well as instructing and directing. In addition, the descriptors specify the genres of conversations, stories, phone exchanges and messages. Finally the domains of language use mentioned cover a range of public domains, such as the commercial (“purchasing”), housing (“renting”), and health (“medical” services) domains, as well as private domains of “personal experience” and “everyday communication.” From all this it can be gathered that the language ability required is sufficient for “everyday needs” and not higher level abilities such as those that might be reasonable expected from the rhetoric of active citizenship and participation. Indeed the choice of CLB level 4 as the required level of language proficiency was based on a notion of a “minimum standard” of language required for citizenship.

How the choice of CLB 4 as the minimum standard of language for citizenship is understood by policy makers themselves can be gathered from the interviews that were conducted with members of Immigration and Integration Branches at Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC). In formalizing the naturalization language requirement in relation to the Canadian Language Benchmarks, CLB 4 came to constitute a key threshold in terms of the level of language required for everyday needs and to participate independently in society. It is this threshold of CLB 4 that became the basis of the ‘minimum standard’ of language required for citizenship, the equivalent of what had been demanded in terms of language proficiency within the naturalization adjudication procedure. As one interviewee, GB, the Senior Policy Analyst with the Language Policy Team, Integration Branch, CIC, described it:

[CLB 4 is] a basic minimum standard / and [it] is / considered to be what you need to / obtain your citizenship it’s not / like written hard and fast into the regulations / yet

anyway / although it's been discussed (GB, Integration Branch, CIC, personal communication, April 27, 2011)

As the development of immigrant language training programs for economic class immigrants, with their focus on higher level and occupation specific language training, has increasingly been taken up by the provinces and local service providers (for example with the expansion of Occupation Specific Language Training by the Ontario government following the Canada-Ontario Immigration Agreement), the national headquarters of CIC has turned its attention to meeting the language training needs of other immigrant populations. For instance, family class immigrants and refugees who are not selected on the basis of the criteria of the IRPA points grid for economic migrants tend to have lower levels of language ability and are not served by higher level and labour market language training programs. For these migrants, there is a need to bring them up to a minimum standard. In another personal interview, the Director General, Integration Branch, CIC, described the situation as follows:

Canada bring in lots of other people who / don't go through that selection process / so whether those are / our humanitarian obligations for refugees / whether they're spouses and dependents of principal applicants from the federal skilled worker program / whether those are / sponsored family members / there's a whole bunch of people coming in that don't get [sic] through [the IRPA] net that we want to get up to / a CLB 4 level at a minimum / to try to participate actively in Canadian society (DT, Integration Branch, CIC personal communication, April 27, 2011)

Indeed, provision of language training at CLB 4 constitutes the "bread and butter" of federal immigrant language training programming (personal communication). Ensuring that all prospective applicants for naturalization meet a minimum standard of language proficiency was also meant to address the issue, often raised by the Minister in speeches on the topic, of

individuals who have obtained Canadian citizenship despite having zero English and French ability (GB, Integration Branch, CIC, personal communication, April 27, 2011).

The formalization of the requirement of a basic or minimum standard of language for citizenship is the result of the translation of the same expert knowledge and political techniques related to language as were used in the domains of immigrant selection and settlement (e.g., the CLB benchmarks, formal assessment of language proficiency) into the domain of citizenship. However, the choice of a particular CLB level for the formal citizenship language requirement had to take into account the specific features of the population of naturalization applicants, in particular the different classes of immigrant and what level of proficiency they could reasonably be expected to meet for naturalization. How policy makers understood the choice of CLB 4 is expressed in the following comment from an interview with the Director, Immigration Branch, CIC:

/so if I'm saying / you know / for a labour market / integration point of view the minimum is / you know CLB 5 or 6 / we have to make sure that that follows through / so if we're only training to / CLB 4 and we're saying- in integration that's sufficient for labour market integration / then we have a disconnect ... they're not necessarily directly linked but we have to make sure that they / make sense from one level to the next / you know when I look at citizenship and think 'wow CLB 4 for citizenship' that seems phenomenally low to- to me uh / for other people they're going 'CLB 4 is just fine' / you know if you're arriving from zero / CLB 4 after 4 years- 3 years is maybe OK // uhm but I'm looking at it- from the standards that I'm looking at it / from the economic integration point of view / I'm going 'yeah CLB 4 is ridiculous' / but it may make sense for their own reasons / because they're looking at a more generic population at citizenship than what I'm looking at / in the selection system for skilled workers (HS, Immigration Branch, CIC, personal communication, April 27, 2011)

Thus, the choice of CLB 4 thus reflects an enforced compromise, or at least a middle ground in terms of language within the immigration and naturalization regime. It requires a formal, minimum level of language for citizenship that is not unduly onerous for family and

humanitarian class immigrants who have not been through the human capital selection process, while still being legitimized through the same discourse of integration that legitimizes the higher levels of language ability that economic class immigrants are expected to attain. Similarly, the ambiguity of the notion of participation underlying the concept of active citizenship, as applied to economic versus family and humanitarian class, immigrants allows it to be associated with a variety of levels of language proficiency to be met at different stages of the immigration-naturalization process, all the while providing a measure of discursive coherence to the operationalization of the citizenship language requirement.

Citizenship Education & Immigrant Language Training

The ambiguity of the notion of active citizenship applied to Canadian immigrant language training programs can be seen in the contestation, on the part of researchers and practitioners, over the content and aims of the citizenship education component of these programs. Preparing new immigrants for citizenship was always part of the federal government's immigrant language training programs, with citizenship education being an explicit part of the mandate of the LINC program (Derwing & Thomson, 2005). However, citizenship education during the 1980s promoted "passivity" on the part of new immigrants and simply took the form of preparation for the citizenship test, leading some observers to advocate for citizenship education aimed at "developing the knowledge and/or the skills to participate actively in society" (Derwing, 1992, p. 201).

Even with the shift towards a more active citizenship agenda, the notion of citizenship within immigrant language training remains highly contested. For example Pinet (2006) found that while the stages of production and reception of the LINC curriculum guidelines reflected

dominant notions of “liberal democratic” citizenship, in the third stage of implementation, teachers were able to create spaces for more critical and transformational approaches to citizenship education aimed at helping new immigrants to participate in Canadian society. In contrast, Fleming’s (2010) study of the Canadian Language Benchmarks found that very few of the benchmarks’ language descriptors contained elements pertaining to citizenship. The benchmarks contain only three explicit references to citizenship, including the ability to “write a letter to express an opinion as a citizen,” while mention of many of the key aspects of citizenship (e.g., voting) is completely absent (Fleming, 2010, p. 596). What Fleming finds most disturbing is how, within the benchmarks, practices of citizenship are connected with high levels of language proficiency, implying that “citizenship rights and responsibilities are appropriate only for those learners with exceptionally high abilities in English” (p. 610). Furthermore, the rest of the CLB presents “English language learners as having rights and responsibilities that pertain primarily to being good consumers” (p. 597). He summarizes: “[a]ctive participation as full citizens is...limited to the very highest levels of English language proficiency, with a tendency in all the documents related to the *CLB* [sic] to represent learners as somewhat isolated and passive consumers” (p. 598).

As the above criticisms of the dominant structure of citizenship education indicate, in regard to conceptions of citizenship, the contestation is not over “passive” versus “active” citizenship but also over forms of “active citizenship” (i.e., critical/emancipatory versus neo-liberal). While the language indicators of the CLB do not relate to the type of tasks that correspond to the emancipatory notion of citizenship endorsed by more critical citizenship education researchers and practitioners, the overall orientation of immigrant language training is

geared towards providing language skills which contribute to the formation of active neo-liberal citizen/subjects (cf. Kennelly & Llewellyn, 2011).

Citizenship the Canadian Way

In Canada, there has been a shift in the post-war citizenship regime, based on the state provision of welfare (health, pensions, unemployment benefits) and a sense of Canadian identity grounded in notions of social citizenship (Jenson & Phillips, 1996; 2001; Brodie, 2002; 2008). The result of neo-liberal economic and state restructuring in Canada has been a neo-liberal citizenship regime in which “the politics of neo-liberalism...is providing many of the terms in which citizenship is now being reconstituted” (Jenson & Phillips, 2001, p. 71). The key aim is to “reinvent society and solidarity within the context of...the ascendance of the neo-liberal state form” (Brodie, 2002, p. 379). This new approach to social governance has produced a new political subject, as the *Social Canadian* of the post-war citizenship regime has been replaced by the *Entrepreneurial Canadian* and the *Volunteer Canadian* (p. 390) within a “Canadian Way” discourse whose themes of active citizenship aim at the responsabilization of individual citizens.

Summary

This chapter has presented the final component of the first case study analysis, examining the revaluation of the national language in Canadian citizenship policy. It has shown how developments in naturalization procedure, and the formalization of the measures for assessment of language ability within that procedure, have occurred in the context of a wider policy discourses to strengthen the symbolic value of Canadian citizenship as well as redefine what it means to be a citizen. This new meaning of citizenship has been achieved through the recontextualization of a communitarian discourse and discourse of active citizenship associated

with a post-welfare, neo-liberal state project. As has been seen, these discourses have been operationalized, through the revision of the citizenship testing regime, including formalized language testing, in a way that focuses on the responsibilities of citizenship, active participation in the community and in the labour market. In this way, the chapter has accounted for revaluation of the national language in citizenship policy in relation to a marketization of citizenship, as the “Social Canadian” at the heart of the post war liberal citizenship regime is replaced by a neo-liberal citizen-subject. The following three chapters of Part III present the second case study, the United Kingdom, examining the revaluation of language within UK immigration, integration, and citizenship policy.

CHAPTER 7: LANGUAGE AND MANAGED MIGRATION IN BRITISH IMMIGRATION POLICY

This chapter begins the presentation of the second case study, the United Kingdom, tracing the revaluation of the national language in a set of language-related policies across the often distinct areas of immigration control, integration, and citizenship policy. This revaluation has occurred in the context of a radical transformation of the UK immigration and naturalization regimes following the 1997 election of the New Labour government. Within immigration policy, English language requirements have been included within the system for managed migration, beginning with the visa-based Highly Skilled Migrants Program in 2006 and culminating in the implementation of a Points-Based System from 2008 onwards. Within integration policy, the provision of English for speakers of other languages (ESOL) services for migrants has undergone an expansion as a policy instrument for the promotion of social inclusion and cohesion, first as part of the government's macro-economic skills strategy and subsequently aligned with a broader community cohesion agenda. Within citizenship policy, the UK government has implemented a language test as part of the formalization of the naturalization procedure. This policy, announced in a 2001 White Paper and made law with the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum (NIA) Act of 2002, was legitimized through a civic communitarian discourse, as part of a broader civic renewal agenda. The subsequent requirement of passing the knowledge of language and life in the UK test for granting of indefinite leave to remain (i.e., permanent residency) further extended the citizenship-testing regime bringing it into a closer alignment with immigration control measures. What accounts for these developments? This and the following two chapters outline these developments in each of the respective areas, tracing the

processes through which the policies were adopted, identifying the discourses with which they were legitimized, as well as their links to wider UK government policy agendas in the social and economic policy domains.

A Brief History of Language Policy in the UK

The revaluation of the English language in immigration policy, which can be observed in recent years, was foreshadowed by developments in the 1980s regarding the position of Standard English within the English education system. Historically, the dominance of English in Britain had been achieved without any statutory recognition as the official language. However, British governments often have become involved in explicit language policy in relation to educational policy (Ager, 1996, p. 48). During the 1980s, the then Conservative government's education policy was influenced by a number of government reports, such as the 1985 Swann Report, which focused on the supposedly unifying role that the English language played in British society (p. 70). Similarly, the 1988 Kingman Report expressed the merits of Standard English in the following way: "it contains the best of the national heritage, it is the only language all Britons have in common, it is the only variety not associated with territory, and it is that best suited for the transmission of culture, for literature and for literacy" (cited in Ager, 1996, p. 70).

Accordingly, the 1988 Education Reform Act made promotion of Standard English, along with the teaching of the canon of English literature, a key feature of the National Curriculum (Ager, 1996, p. 71). Such decisions by the Department of Education to make English a compulsory subject at all levels of the National Curriculum in England have effectively established a de facto national language policy (p. 64).

This de facto language policy establishing the dominance of Standard English in British society, and the ideological trappings which accrue to it through its unifying force as a symbolic marker of national identity and heritage, undoubtedly serves as an underlying motivating force for the revaluation of English within immigration and naturalization policy. However, a more immediate context for this latter development can be traced to the recent transformation in British immigration policy under the New Labour government, which brought about a shift from a policy of zero migration to an increasingly open policy of economic migration.

Immigration under New Labour: The End of Zero Migration

British immigration policy throughout the twentieth century has been largely restrictionist (Hansen, 2000; Joppke, 1999). After the dismantling of the British Empire, in the 1950s and 60s, control measures were implemented to restrict the entry of migrants from the newly independent former colonies into Britain. The 1962 Commonwealth Immigrants Act instituted a work voucher system composed of 3 tiers (A, B, C). Tier C, into which commonwealth and Asian migrants were channelled, was heavily restricted. With the end of economic migration in the 1971 Immigration Act, the United Kingdom became essentially a country of “zero-migration” (Hansen, 2000). The dominant policy model was one of control measures to limit migration and “race relations” legislation to manage the diversity of ethnic minority communities already present in Britain. Along with the 1971 Immigration Act, the 1976 Race Relations Act constituted the “two pillars” of post-WWII UK immigration policy (Sommerville, 2007).

Immigration policy became an issue in the 1990s, largely as a result of increased flows of asylum seekers arriving at British ports of entry. Dealing with the asylum issue was a pressing matter for the New Labour government elected in 1997. The first New Labour reforms of the

immigration regime were introduced in the 1998 White Paper *Fairer, faster and firmer: A modern approach to immigration and asylum* (Home Office, 1998), and enacted into law in the 1999 Immigration and Asylum Act. As a response to the politicization of immigration that had developed in the 1990s and concerns over the numbers of asylum seekers, the focus of the White paper and the new legislation was generally one of restriction (Somerville, 2007, p. 21). In this way, these initial reforms exhibited a certain amount of continuity with the approach over the previous 30 years. However, in other ways the new government's reforms in the area of immigration constituted a significant shift in policy.

The major change under New Labour in terms of immigration policy occurred in the period 2001-2007, when the new government committed Britain to a policy of economic migration (Somerville, 2007, p. 4). This change was in response to a "call (especially since the mid-1990s) to liberalise forms of migration that are deemed economically desirable" (Overbeek, 2002, p. 9). This call, a reflection of increasing demands for migrant labour accompanying the restructuring of the British economy, came from disparate group of voices, including private sector employers, the business media and the centre-left think tank Institute for Public Policy Research (IPPR) (Flynn, 2005, p. 468).

Symbolic of the change to come in the objectives of the immigration system under New Labour was the fact that the 1997 annual report of the Immigration and Nationality Directorate (IND), which each year sets forth policy objectives for the immigration system, dropped the long-standing language regarding the aim of immigration policy "to restrict severely the numbers coming to live permanently or to work in the United Kingdom" (cited in Flynn, 2005, p. 464). The result of this change in orientation was that an observer, 10 years later, could write that

“[t]he UK is no longer a country of ‘zero-migration’, both in reality and in the goals and intentions of policy” (Somerville, 2007, p. 5). Indeed the extent of the change would lead the popular press as well as individuals on the right of the political spectrum, years later, to refer to New Labour’s “open door policy” (see e.g., O’Grady, 2013, May 17).

Our Competitive Future: Building the Knowledge Driven Economy

The “reattachment of economic to migration policy” (Somerville, 2007), which was the lasting achievement of the New Labour reforms, was related to a particular version of economic policy, one that would shape the specific details of the subsequent system of “managed migration.” The New Labour economic agenda was signalled early on in its first term with the 1998 publication of the Department of Trade and Industry White Paper *Our Competitive Future: Building the Knowledge Driven Economy* (Department for Trade and Industry [DTI], 1998). The aim of the economic strategy is improving the competitiveness of the UK in the global market to meet the challenges of the knowledge driven economy:

Our competitiveness depends on making the most of our distinctive and valuable assets, which competitors find hard to imitate. In a modern economy those distinctive assets are increasingly knowledge, skills and creativity rather than traditional factors such as land and other natural resources. (DTI, 1998, p. 14)

A key concern is with developing the skills base of the UK workforce: “People are at the heart of the knowledge driven economy.... In a fast moving world economy, skills must be continually upgraded or our competitiveness will decline” (DTI, 1998, p. 28). The urgency of the situation is emphasized by reference to a 1997 Skills Audit which found the UK workforce lagging behind those of other countries in terms of qualifications, prompting a commitment to “fundamental reform of education at every level” (DTI, 1998, p. 29). The White Paper also announced the

establishment, by secretary for education David Blunkett, of a “National Skills Taskforce” to carry out a cross-departmental review of skills development schemes in order to better meet the needs of business.

Thus the White Paper set out an economic agenda in terms of increasing economic competitiveness and creating a knowledge-based economy. The government’s focus on workforce skills development, as expressed in the White Paper, led to the implementation of a specific policy agenda, the *Skills for Life* strategy, launched in March 2001 and aimed at improving the skills levels of the adult working population (DfEE, 2001b). This concern with the skills level of the workforce as part of a strategy for a KBE would also shape the managed migration system, particularly the institution of a Points-Based System for economic immigration. As will be seen, the New Labour policy of economic migration, or “managed migration,” will be the context of an increased focus on issues of language within the immigration regime.

Expanding Economic Immigration

The economic perspective set out in the *Our Competitive Future* White Paper made the New Labour government receptive to the calls for a liberalization of economic immigration. The 1999 Pre-Budget Report announced that the New Labour government was “making it easier for skilled foreign workers ... [to] work in the UK” (cited in Somerville, 2007, p. 30). In 2000, the government conducted a review of international migration and its impact on the economy, which reaffirmed their views on the potential economic benefits of migration. The then Minister for Immigration, Barbara Roche, stated in a speech to the IPPR on 11 September, 2000: “[The] UK

[is] in competition for the brightest and best talents ... [and] we need to explore carefully their implications for immigration policy” (cited in Somerville, 2007, p. 30).

From 2001 onwards, the rhetorical commitments to expand economic immigration were turned into more pro-active measures (Somerville, 2007). The first steps the UK government took to increase economic migration were to expand the existing Work Permits system, which offered entry to qualified migrants with a job offer from a British employer. Under New Labour, the number of work permit holders increased from around 40,000 in the mid-1990s to over 200,000 ten years later (Flynn, 2005, p. 465). More significantly, the government introduced, as a pilot program in 2001, the Highly Skilled Migrant Program (HSMP). The introduction of the HSMP continued the expansion of economic migration. However, in terms of absolute figures, the HSMP only ever accounted for a fraction of the number of economic migrants entering through the work permit system. What is most significant about the HSMP is that it signalled the adoption of a different approach to economic migration than the work permits system, one focused on selecting migrants on the basis of their potential economic benefit rather than on the possession of a job offer. In macro-economic terms, the new direction of the HSMP was one “based [not] on employer demand but instead on the supply side: the skills of the individual migrant” (Somerville, 2007, p. 31).

Managed Migration

The most lasting contribution of New Labour to UK immigration policy has been the implementation of the new system of managed migration. The main innovation of the new system was the endorsement of the idea “that migration can be used as a positive economic asset that contributes to macro-economic health” (Somerville, 2007, p. 22). The term was introduced

in the 2002 White Paper, *Secure borders, safe haven: Integration with diversity in modern Britain* (Home Office, 2002), and it entailed a new paradigm for immigration policy:

Managing migration means having an orderly, organised, and enforceable system of entry. It also means managing post-entry integration and inclusion in the economy and society, helping migrants to find their feet, and enabling members of the existing population to welcome them into their communities. (Home Office 2002, p. 22)

Controlling Our Borders: Making Migration Work for Britain

After some initial small scale efforts to implement the new paradigm, through expansion of the work permits scheme and the piloting of the High Skilled Migrants Program, a top to bottom review of managed migration routes was launched by Prime Minister Tony Blair in the spring of 2004, which led to the publication, in February 2005, of a Green Paper entitled *Controlling Our Borders: Making Migration Work for Britain, Five Year Strategy for Asylum and Immigration* (Home Office, 2005a). The Green Paper further develops the approach to managed migration, the aim of which is “agreeing immigration where it is in the country’s interests and preventing it where it is not” (Home Office, 2005a, p. 5). Restating the case that “the UK needs migration for economic reasons” (p. 13), the paper also makes clear who it is that will be allowed in: “Skilled migrants bring new skills, ideas and attitudes to the UK, and help meet skills and labour shortages, easing inflationary pressures and increasing productivity” (p. 14). The focus on skilled migrants is justified in terms of a globalist discourse whereby they are said to contribute to “broader government objectives to increase innovation, to respond to the challenges of global economic change, [and] to shift towards a high-skill economy” (p. 15).

The centrepiece of the Green Paper is the announcement of the merger of all of the work (and study) related entry routes into a single points-based system (PBS). The proposed “single,

simple scheme” (Home Office, 2005a, p. 37) is described in broad strokes in the body of the paper, as well as an Annex 3. The PBS was originally to have 4 “tiers” for highly-skilled, skilled, low skilled migrants and students respectively with points being allocated for “qualifications, work experience, income, and other relevant factors” (p. 16). This last category includes language. The role of language as a points criterion is further specified in the Annex to the Green Paper, which states that Tier 1 (“doctors, scientists, engineers, innovators and entrepreneurs”) was to have an English Language requirement of “Band 8 on the IELTS scale” (p. 37). This reference is to the language proficiency scales of the International English Language Testing System (IELTS), a joint venture of the British Council, IDP, IELTS Australia, and Cambridge ESOL Examinations. An internationally recognized standard for English language assessment, the IELTS scale measures 9 different levels of English competence, from “Band 1: Non-user” to “Band 9: Expert User,” for each of the four skills of listening, reading, writing and speaking. The definition of “Band 8 or Very good user” is as follows:

[H]as fully operational command of the language with only occasional unsystematic inaccuracies and inappropriacies. Misunderstandings may occur in unfamiliar situations. Handles complex detailed argumentation well. (www.ielts.org)

The requirement of a high level of language ability (IELTS Band 8 or “Very good user”) indicates the role that language will play in the managed migration system, namely as a means of selecting for “skilled” and “highly skilled” migrants. In addition, the fact that the only requirement initially specified is for Tier 1, that is, for highly skilled migrants with no job offer, indicates that language proficiency requirements will be associated especially with the more “supply-side” aspects of the PBS.

The Green Paper also establishes a link between English language requirements and permanent settlement by mentioning the intention to “introduce English language tests for everyone who wants to stay permanent [sic] in the UK” (Home Office, 2005a, p. 9). This relates to the second focus of the Paper. Besides selecting for skilled migration, the other purpose of the proposed PBS is controlling access to permanent settlement. Unlike the temporary work permit schemes it replaced, the PBS incorporates a route to permanent residency. However, as with the number allowed to enter, the number allowed to stay has to be managed:

Long term settlement must be carefully controlled and provide long term economic benefit. Permanent migrants must be as economically active as possible; put as little burden on the state as possible; and be as socially integrated as possible. (Home Office, 2005a, p. 21)

Accordingly, the points-based system limits access to permanent settlement to skilled migrants entering under Tiers 1 and 2, while those entering under the other work-related routes for low-skilled and temporary migrants will not be given a path to permanent settlement.¹⁹ As will be seen, in discussing the specific architecture of the PBS when implemented, the pattern that was to emerge is one where language requirements, skills levels, and length of stay all overlap to a significant extent, corresponding to the main fault lines within the PBS.

Selective Admission

A consultation process was initiated in July of 2005 with the publication of the consultation document *Selective Admission: Making Migration Work for Britain* (HO, 2005b).

The government’s response to the consultation process, which closed in November 2005, was set out in a command paper published in March 2006. The consultation document, *Selective*

¹⁹ Note that permanent residence was still to be accessible via humanitarian and family reunion routes (albeit for ‘genuine’ refugees and immediate family only).

Admission, solicited input on the directions sets forth in the Green Paper as well as on the specifics of the proposed points based migration scheme. The document set out in broad strokes the details of the proposed PBS, which included a single points-based system of five tiers focused on skilled workers.

One focus of the consultation was determining the most important attributes for the skilled tiers (1 and 2). Among other things, the consultations process contributed to the elaboration of the role of language in the proposed PBS. In respect to language, the document states, citing evidence from Canada, Australia and New Zealand, that “English language ability is a key predictor of success” for new immigrants (Home Office, 2005b, p. 18). Respondents rated English language ability as the second most important attribute for Tiers 1 and 2 after skills/qualifications (Home Office, 2006, March, p. 44). The need for language ability was seen as especially needed in certain occupations, as “[g]enerally, respondents felt that a working knowledge of English was necessary, particularly in the health sector” (Home Office, 2006, March, p. 45). Even for lower skilled jobs, language ability was also seen as being important, with a majority (close to 70%) expressing the feeling that there should be a language requirement for the low skilled Tier 3 (Home Office, 2006, March, p. 45).

Selecting Wisely

The public consultations on the Selective Admission document produced a consensus on the overall approach to the reforms but also revealed some contestation over the particular form the new system should take. This contestation is evident in the submission of the Institute for Public Policy Research, entitled *Selecting Wisely* (IPPR, 2005). As was mentioned above, the IPPR had taken a leading role in advocating for the economic benefits of increased migration

since the 1990s. The IPPR's consultation submission likewise focused on the economic impact of the proposals, specifically addressing the issue of the skills mix of labour migration to Britain and whether the proposed managed migration system would adequately meet Britain's labour market needs.

The document emphasized the "importance of having a flexible, employer-led system for selecting workers" (IPPR, 2005, p. 25) and claims that the proposals effectively end the employer-led work permit scheme, the entry route for the lion's share of current labour migrants. The document points out that the skills needs of the British labour market extend beyond the highly skilled end of the skills spectrum, with increasing demand for lower skilled workers to fill vacancies in the service and hospitality sectors of the UK economy. It was critical of the proposed structure for only providing for limited recruitment of low skilled migrants, through Tier 3, and only on a temporary basis (p. 25). It recommended the creation of "flexible and responsive low-skill migration channels" (p. 1). It critiques the distinction between highly skilled (Tier 1) and skilled (Tier 2) migrants in the proposed system as arbitrary, and their differential treatment under the managed migration system as not responsive to actual labour market needs.

The IPPR report also points out the contradiction of including an employer-led category, such as Tier 2 - Skilled Workers, within a longer-term, human capital, points-based system, in particular the potential problem of applicants who have received a job offer being unable to qualify for entry under the points system. The report expresses a preference, as is the case in a number of other countries (including Canada), for maintaining separate programs to respond to short-term labour market needs and address longer-term human capital goals. In the absence of such a proposal, it recommends merging Tier 1 and 2 into a combined "skilled migration

category” and creating a “unified point system” that would award extra points for a job offer or skills in a shortage occupation, in addition to those awarded for the human capital attributes of, e.g., qualifications, age, and English language ability. As to the precise formula for awarding points, the report suggests that “if the points awarded for a job offer were set sufficiently high, applicants would need only additional points for English language ability and no criminal record to meet the points target” (IPPR, 2005, p. 26). The benefit of such an arrangement is that it would “[maintain] the employer-led nature of the scheme” (p. 27).

The point of contestation that emerges out of the IPPR’s consultation submission is whether the new system of managed migration should continue to be based on employer demand aimed at meeting short term labour market needs or whether it should adopt a more supply-side approach in terms of selecting for human capital as part of the longer term macro-economic goal of up-skilling the UK workforce. This contradiction within the managed migration system between employer demand and supply-side approaches, between the need for (highly) skilled versus low skilled migrants, between selecting economic migrants for their human capital versus recruiting foreign workers to fill labour market gaps shaped the ultimate architecture of the PBS, with implications for the role of requirements for English language ability as admissions criteria within the managed migration system. The next sections will examine in detail the points based system, specifying the role of language requirements within each of the different Tiers as implemented.

Language and Managed Migration

The Points-Based System

The document, *A Points-Based System: Making Migration Work for Britain* (Home Office [PBS], 2006), outlines the government's new points based approach for the management of a specific segment of migrants, those coming to the UK for work or study. In line with the overall aim of the reforms, the intended 'outcomes' of the new system are "better identifying and attracting of migrants who have most to contribute to the UK"; "a more efficient, transparent and objective application process;" and a reduction of abuse through improved compliance management (Home Office 2006, p. 1). The key pillars of the points-based system are a "five Tier framework" for the categorization of migrants and a "structured decision-making" process for the awarding of points based on "objective and transparent criteria" (other features are a revised system of Sponsorship for employers and educational institutions recruiting foreign workers and students, and financial securities to be exacted from those applicants deemed at risk of breaching the rules) (p. 2). The five Tiers, each associated with a number of specific criteria to be met, are: Tier 1 – Highly skilled migrants, Tier 2 – skilled migrants, Tier 3 – low skilled, temporary migrants, Tier 4 – students, and Tier 5 – youth mobility and temporary workers (p. 15). Points are awarded for attributes and control factors related to the applicant's potential success in the labour market and likelihood of compliance with the immigration rules (p. 16). Attributes and control factors are either requirements or positive indicators, with points awarded for them differently for each Tier.

Within the system, language requirements for English language competency were to play an important role. This approach had been prefigured by the addition of an English language

requirement to the HSMP in November of 2006. To gain entry, in addition to attaining a pass mark of 75 points, HSMP applicants would also have to pass a language requirement at IELTS Band 6 ('competent user') or higher. The requirement could be met by providing IELTS or alternate test results, or holding a degree equivalent to BA and taught in English (United Kingdom Border Agency [UKBA], 2008).

In the PBS, which would incorporate the HSMP within it, demonstrating English language competency was to be a central part of the system's architecture (see Table 1). The level of language required for each tier was to vary, as was whether the level was to be required as a control factor (as with Tiers 1 and 2) or only considered as an attribute and positive indicator (as for the remaining Tiers) (Home Office [PBS], 2006, p. 16). The specifics of the requirements are defined with reference to the common scales for language proficiency of the Common European Framework of Reference (CEFR) for languages and language learning (Council of Europe, 2001a, 2001b). The switch from the IELTS to the CEFR as the framework of language proficiency is noteworthy. This reflects a shift from a framework of absolute standards of language proficiency to functional standards. The CEFR standards are expressed in "can do" statements. This makes them easier to relate to a general "skills" approach, such as the government's *Skills for Life* strategy. Also the CEFR was developed as part of the neo-liberal transformation of European higher education and thus shares the same macro-economic perspective as the *Our Competitive Future* agenda.

Table 1.**Language Requirements in the Points-Based System**

Tier of PBS	Language Requirement
Tier 1 Highly Skilled General and Entrepreneur..... Investor..... Post Study Work.....	CEFR C1 or IELTS 6.5 or GCSE Grade C No requirement to demonstrate English language ability Deemed to have met English language ability requirement
Tier 2 Skilled General or Sportsperson..... Minister of Religion.... Intra-Company Transfer.....	CEFR A1 CEFR B2 No requirement to demonstrate English language ability
Tier 3 Low Skilled.....	No blanket requirement to demonstrate English language ability
Tier 4 Students.....	Requirement for course of language study at CEFR A2
Tier 5 Temporary Workers and Youth Mobility.....	No requirement to demonstrate English language ability

Highly Skilled Migrants Under the PBS

As was mentioned above, when the PBS was first proposed in the White Paper, *Controlling Our Borders* (Home Office, 2005a), language was already linked to the highly skilled tier (Tier 1) of the proposed system, which was to have an “English language requirement – Band 8 on the IELTS scale” (Home Office, 2005a, p. 37). Implementation of the new system began in February 2008 with the introduction of Tier 1 Highly Skilled Migrants, the details of which were set forth in the *Highly Skilled Migrants Under the Points Based System (Tier 1): Statement of Intent* (Home Office, 2007, December). For highly skilled applicants, “competency

in the English language” is one of the three objective criteria for which points are awarded, with “a high level of English” proficiency required. As the Statement explains:

Requiring migrants to speak English is a key part of the Government’s immigration policy. It improves migrants’ labour market outcomes and participation in the workplace, and assists with integration and social cohesion. As a result we think it is right that all skilled migrants coming to the UK should meet specific English language requirements. For Tier 1, in particular, we think it is right to require a high level of English (Home Office, 2007, December, p. 5)

The statement of intent further specifies how the requirement is to be met:

Applicants will need to prove their competence in English language by proving they:

- Have passed a test in English equivalent to level C1 of the Council of Europe’s Common European Framework of Reference for Language Learning, or
- Come from a majority English speaking country, or
- Have taken a degree taught in English. (p. 11)

The requirement is defined with reference to the common scales for language proficiency of the Common European Framework of Reference (CEFR) for languages and language learning (Council of Europe, 2001a). Within the Tier 1, the language requirement is C1 of the CEFR, with certain exemptions for specific sub-categories. Applicants under the General sub-category (which subsumes the HSMP) and the Entrepreneur sub-category (which subsumes the Innovators scheme) must meet the requirement in one of three ways, either through proof of test results, of coming from a majority English speaking country or of having taken a degree taught in English. However, applicants under the Investors sub-category for individuals with financial assets of over £1 million or other personal assets worth at least £2 million are exempt from the language requirement “because they should not need to work and consequently there will not be the same necessity to be able to speak English” (Home Office, 2007, December, p. 12). Also, applicants

under the Post Study Work sub-category, that is graduates from UK universities, are deemed have met the language requirement.

The language requirement for the attribution of points for Tier 1 reflects the role of language proficiency within the system of managed migration. The requirement to demonstrate a high level of language proficiency is related to the aim of selecting highly skilled migrants in order to maximize the economic benefits of migration. This can be seen for the General category under Tier 1, with the requirement of a C1 level of language as an indicator of the human capital of highly skilled applicants. The global descriptor for Level C1 (Proficient User) of the CEFR is:

Can understand a wide range of demanding, longer texts, and recognise implicit meaning. Can express him/herself fluently and spontaneously without much obvious searching for expressions. Can use language flexibly and effectively for social, academic and professional purposes. Can produce clear, well-structured, detailed text on complex subjects, showing controlled use of organisational patterns, connectors and cohesive devices. (Council of Europe, 2001b, p. 5)

While the requirement of level C1 reflects the importance of a high level of language proficiency as valuable human capital, the exemptions to the language requirement for some sub-categories under Tier 1, mentioned above, establish some interesting (non-)equivalencies when it comes to other attributes of economically valuable migrants. For instance, the fact that applicants under the Investors sub-category are exempted from the language requirements shows that they are valued for their financial rather than human (e.g., linguistic) capital. Also, the justification for this exemption (that investors do not need to work) shows that language proficiency is a proxy for employability and thus required for certain types of economic activity (i.e., employment) but not others (such as investment). Meanwhile, the fact that applicants in the Post Study Work sub-category, that is recent graduates from eligible UK post-secondary institutions, are deemed to

have met the language requirements, shows how the level of language in the requirements is associated with the domain of higher education as well as the domain of the labour market (i.e., work).

Skilled Workers Under the PBS

The roll out of the points based system continued in October 2008 with the implementation of Tier 2 (Skilled Workers), the details of which are set out in the *Skilled Workers under the Points Based System (Tier 2): Statement of Intent* (Home Office, 2008, May). As had been indicated in the document *A Points Based System* (Home Office, 2006, March, p. 25), demonstration of competence in the English language was also made a requirement for migrants entering under Tier 2, that is, skilled workers taking up positions in shortage occupations with a resident labour market test. The Tier 2 Statement of Intent specifies the level of language ability required from applicants under the General Skilled Worker sub-category as a basic user level, equivalent to A1 of the CEFR (Home Office, 2008, May, p. 12). The Council of Europe provides the following global descriptor for Level A1 (Basic User) of the CEFR:

Can understand and use familiar everyday expressions and very basic phrases aimed at the satisfaction of needs of a concrete type. Can introduce him/herself and others and can ask and answer questions about personal details such as where he/she lives, people he/she knows and things he/she has. Can interact in a simple way provided the other person talks slowly and clearly and is prepared to help. (Council of Europe, 2001b, p. 5)

The same level of English proficiency is required of migrants under the Sportspeople sub-category and Intra Company Transferees, but in the latter case only if they are applying for leave to stay beyond three years. The pre-existing, more stringent language requirement for ministers of religion seeking entry is continued under the new system, with migrants under the ministers of religion sub-category of Tier 2 required to meet a level of English equivalent to B2 of the CEFR.

It is interesting to account for the difference between the Tier 1 and the Tier 2 language requirements. The lower level of language required of migrants under Tier 2 can be explained as a corollary to the lower skill level of this Tier compared to Tier 1. Why are “highly skilled” migrants required to demonstrate proficiency in English at level C1, while “skilled” migrants are only required to meet level A1? The key difference between the two tiers is that Tier 1 is for migrants without a job offer and who are free to find work on the open labour market, while Tier 2 is for migrants who already have a job offer. As was already mentioned, Tier 2 replaced the Work Permit scheme, which was the predominant employer-led system for recruiting skilled migrants. This reveals a difference in the importance of language competence between the demand- or employer-led aspects of the PBS and the supply-side aspects. The emphasis on higher levels of language in Tier 1 reflects the greater concern with the human capital attributes of migrants being selected to add to the supply of highly skilled workers in the UK labour force, rather than simply responding to employer demands to fill specific shortages. This further illustrates the link between language proficiency and a particular notion of “employability” within the managed migration system, one not related to the language needs of particular jobs per se but rather to the attributes of flexibility and adaptability which are necessary for success in a changing labour market.

Students Under the PBS

The next Tier of the PBS to be implemented was Tier 4 Students, the details of which were set forth in a Statement of Intent (Home Office, 2008, July). The criteria for Tier 4 involved a language requirement, as well as one in regards to level of study. In order to gain entry as a Student under Tier 4 applicants must be on a course of study at level 3 of the National

Qualifications Framework (NQF), that is, one leading to a recognized pre-university qualification (e.g., “A level”) or on a language course at level A2 of the CEFR. The proficiency level A2 (Basic User) of the CEFR is characterized by the Council of Europe in the following global descriptor:

Can understand sentences and frequently used expressions related to areas of most immediate relevance (e.g. very basic personal and family information, shopping, local geography, employment). Can communicate in simple and routine tasks requiring a simple and direct exchange of information on familiar and routine matters. Can describe in simple terms aspects of his/her background, immediate environment and matters in areas of immediate need. (Council of Europe, 2001b, p. 5)

Requiring a course of study at A2 has the effect of limiting the entry of foreign students with little or no prior knowledge of English. Students wishing to study beginner English can still enter but must do so on a more precarious, shorter-term student visitor route (Home Office, 2008, July, p. 11). The main motivation for the language requirement within Tier 4 was to prevent abuse of the student visa category as a route of entry for low skilled migrants from outside the EU. This is reflected by the fact that this requirement is presented under the heading “stricter rules to protect the UK’s labour market” (p. 5). The details for Tier 4 thus further illustrate the emerging pattern of links between levels of language proficiency, skills levels of migrants, and length of stay within the managed migration system.

Temporary Workers Under the PBS

The final Tier to be implemented was Tier 5 Temporary Workers, the details of which were set forth in a Statement of Intent (Home Office, 2008, May). The Tier is for temporary migrants whose purpose of entry is primarily non-economic, for example creative artists and sportspeople, volunteers for charities and religious organizations, as well as temporary workers

in diplomatic missions and international organizations. In addition it covers Youth Mobility Schemes for the entry of young people to work or otherwise “experience life in the UK,” as part of reciprocal arrangements with sending countries.

The criteria for entry under Tier 5 do not include any language requirement. This is because of the temporary nature of all of these routes of entry, which grant stay for a maximum of 24 months. While relatively minor within the PBS, Tier 5 thus illustrates the link, which will become more important in subsequent developments not only within the PBS but the immigration regime in general, between requirement of language proficiency and routes of entry that lead to long-term, permanent settlement as opposed to short-term, temporary stay.

Low Skilled Workers Under the PBS

The proposed Tier 3 of the PBS was intended to replace the various sector-based schemes for the recruitment of low skilled labour for the agricultural, health and hospitality sectors, such as the Seasonal Agricultural Workers Scheme (SAWS). However, the implementation of Tier 3 was also intended to phase out these programs for low skilled migration, which recruited migrants from outside the EU. The expectation was that the UK demands for low skilled labour would be met from within the EU. This expectation was specifically based on the experience of the 2004 expansion of the EU to include 8 countries of Eastern Europe which resulted in a larger than anticipated influx of low skilled migrants workers, especially from Poland. As such, it was believed that the low skilled labour needs of the UK economy would henceforth be filled by

migrant workers from the so-called “A8 countries” of Eastern Europe²⁰. Thus, almost as soon as the PBS was announced, the plans for Tier 3 were suspended, which effectively barred entry to the UK for all low skilled economic migrants from outside of the EU. The plans for Tier 3 left open the possibility of the reintroduction of low skilled migration schemes should the need be demonstrated, which would be left to a Skills Advisory Body (SAB) to determine. However, to date Tier 3 has never been used.

Unlike the other Tiers, the plans for low skilled Tier 3 did not contain a language requirement. This decision was based on responses from employers to the consultations on the PBS concerning the relation between English language proficiency and low skilled workers:

We agree with respondents to the consultation exercise that there are some low-skilled jobs for which English language should be a requirement (e.g. some jobs in healthcare and hospitality). However, there are also some jobs (e.g. agriculture) for which English may not be necessary. Rather than imposing a blanket requirement which might not be appropriate in all cases, we have decided that an appropriate level of English for the job in question will be set by the employer. It will be for the operator and the employer together to ensure that the selected migrants meet that requirement, overseen by the compliance arrangements for sponsorship. (Home Office, 2006, March)

The details of low skilled Tier 3, and specifically the lack of language requirement again illustrate, although as negative proof as it were, the role of language within the PBS. The relatively high level of language requirements in Tiers 1 and 2 serves as a way of selecting for skilled migrants. However applied across the board they would serve as an obstacle to meeting the demand for low skilled migrant labour that still exist within the UK labour market. Hence, the decision was taken to forego a blanket requirement as to language ability for all Tiers

²⁰ The “A8” or “Accession Eight” countries, refers to a group of countries that acceded to the European Union in May 2004 (the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia).

including the low skilled Tier 3. Also note the fact that the determination of level of language required, or even whether there should be a language requirement at all for certain categories of low skilled labour, is to be left to employers to decide. This shows that within the PBS low skilled migration is to be managed in a demand-driven way, which also accounts for the reduced importance of language ability as a selection criterion for low skilled migrants.

Language Requirements and Immigration Control

The previous sections have traced the revaluation of the national language within British immigration policy. The picture that emerges allows us to draw some conclusions as to how language requirements may or may not function as immigration control measures. The implementation of the points-based system and the inclusion of formal language requirements as an important aspect of the system's architecture, while providing a procedure and criteria for the selection of migrants, has not resulted in an absolute reduction in the numbers of immigrants entering the UK. During the period of the New Labour government, and the especially since the PBS, the number of economic immigrants entering the UK has increased significantly. This can be seen in the statistics for net migration to the UK during those years. After sitting at marginally positive levels throughout the 1990s, net migration rose sharply after 1997, averaging between 150,000 and 250,000 a year to 2013 (ONS, 2013, p. 6). Other support for the claim that New Labour's managed migration system as implemented was more expansive than restrictive comes from developments in immigration policy since the defeat of the Labour government in 2010. Under the subsequent Liberal Democrat-Conservative coalition government, there has been a turn towards more restrictive policy, with a series of immigration control measures, including drastic limits on the numbers admitted annually under the PBS as well as the eventual suspension

of most of the Tiers themselves, being introduced, with the aim of significantly reducing the absolute numbers of immigrants admitted to the UK. These more recent developments, as well as their significance for the present analysis, are discussed in more detail in the final chapter of the dissertation.

Summary

As we have seen, the effect of the PBS generally, and of the language requirements within it specifically, in determining the character of the increased flow of economic migrants entering the UK has been partial and limited. The central importance of language proficiency as a criterion within the system is as a human capital attribute, which can be used for the selection of highly skilled migrants, as part of the strategy for maximizing the economic benefits of immigration for Britain. The ability of the PBS to effectively manage economic migration, however, including through the use of language requirements as the key selection criterion for valuable economic migrants, has been constrained by a number of factors. Chief among these is the fact that the PBS only applies to migrants coming from outside of the EU but not to those from EU member states, who have the right to live and work in UK as EU nationals. This has meant that the PBS has not been able to manage the entry of low skilled migrants, especially from the more economically depressed parts of Central and Eastern Europe, filling the demand for low skilled labour in the UK. Even if the border controls of the PBS did govern the entry of EU nationals, the language requirements used to select for skilled migrants would not be used to exclude low skilled migrant workers. From the Statement of Intent for Tier 3 it is clear that there would not be a language requirement for migrants entering through a low skilled PBS route. In this, the government has taken the advice of those who argued against the PBS as not being

flexible enough to meet the needs of the UK labour market, including the demand for low skilled labour (see e.g., IPPR, 2005). In this way, the PBS represents a compromise between a demand-led scheme responsive to short-term labour market gaps and a more supply side approach to selecting migrants for their human capital. In this compromise “Australian style” system, as it is dubbed, language is central to the supply side, human capital aspects of the system (highly skilled and skilled Tiers 1 and 2), while not factoring in the more demand-driven aspects (low skilled and temporary Tiers 3 and 5).²¹

It should also be noted how the dividing line between demand and supply side approaches distinguishes not only between low skilled and skilled labour; there is also a distinction maintained within the PBS between routes to permanent settlement and those for temporary migration, with only skilled migrants offered the possibility to settle permanently. The resulting association of language requirements not only with skilled forms of migration but also with permanent settlement will come to have greater prominence in relation to the revaluation of language within the domain of citizenship policy. However, before discussing that topic, the next chapter will trace the revaluation of national language within British integration policy by examining developments in immigrant language training, or English for speakers of other languages (ESOL), policy in the UK.

²¹ In fact, the Australian system is even more unequivocally demand-driven with language requirements subordinate to the demand side aspects of the system. Within the list of occupations in demand for which migrants are eligible to enter, there is a subset of “Occupations Requiring English” for which an English language requirement must be met.

CHAPTER 8: LANGUAGE SKILLS AND COMMUNITY COHESION IN BRITISH INTEGRATION POLICY

This chapter examines the revaluation of the national language, which was observed in UK immigration policy, within the domain of integration policy. As will be shown, this has taken the form of a greater concern over the effects of language ability on the integration process of new immigrants and also for dealing with issues of social exclusion in settled Black and Minority Ethnic (BME) communities. The chapter accounts for the transformation of provision of English for Speakers of Other Languages (ESOL) within integration policy during the first decade of the millennium as the result of the recontextualization of the discourse of language skills leading to the expansion of ESOL as part of the UK government's national skills strategy, Skills for Life. It further traces the emergence of issues of language and language learning as a central concern for broader government agendas, detailing how measures of language ability have been a key part of the operationalization of government strategies aimed at "social inclusion" and "community cohesion."

A Brief History of ESOL Policy in the UK

The provision of English for speakers of other languages (ESOL) services in the UK dates to the 1960s and the "integration" measures adopted towards commonwealth immigrants. Funding to local governments for English language training was provided for in the Local Government Act of 1966 (Ager, 1996, p. 95; Cantle, 2005, p. 37). During the 1970s there was only very limited ESOL provision available in large cities such as London, Manchester and Birmingham. In the 1980s and 1990s provision grew in response to the increased numbers of immigrants and refugees. In particular, a Language and Literacy Unit was established within the

Inner London Educational Authority of the Greater London Council to develop ESOL, literacy and numeracy programming for the capital (CT, ESOL Lead, NIACE, personal communication, August 19, 2010). Also as migrants' settlement became more dispersed, more and more Local Authorities began providing ESOL training.

However, the most significant change in ESOL policy came in the early 2000s, when ESOL received a massive boost in policy attention due to its incorporation into the government's skills strategy, *Skills for Life*, launched in March 2001 (Department for Education and Employment [DfEE], 2001). The scope of the changes to ESOL were expressed by the ESOL Lead at the National Institute of Adult Continuing Education (NIACE), as follows:

in 2001 / when the government launched the / Skills for Life agenda / and / funding linked with it / we had more funding // than we had ever had in the previous / 20 years / and / a whole set of very significant changes took place / springing from Skills for Life / in 2001 / we had a national curriculum for the first time / we had national standards for the first time / we had / teacher training courses and / a set requirement for teacher qualifications / we had a whole / suite of ESOL qualifications being developed by the awarding bodies / we had the literacy test introduced we had- suddenly the profile of the workforce changed because ... a lot more people were able to look at ESOL as a career ... that was / the change / the most significant change in the last 40- 50 years (CT, NIACE personal communication, August 19, 2010)

This strategy arose out of the findings and recommendations of the report of the working group on adult basic skills, *A Fresh Start* ("Moser Report") (DfEE, 1999). The report was the government's response to the findings in the International Adult Literacy Survey (IALS) of a "literacy skills deficit" and sought to identify ways of improving the literacy and numeracy skills of the UK workforce. It was a key influence in promoting attention to issues of language ("literacy") within macro-economic policy, and would also transform the provision ESOL in the UK.

ESOL and The National Skills Strategy

The Moser Report

The Moser report confirmed the findings of the IALS as to the skills challenges facing the UK economy. Citing evidence that one in five adults in Britain are functionally illiterate, the report calls for a National Strategy to reduce the number of adults with low levels of skills (DfEE, 1999). The focus of the Moser Report is *functional literacy*, which it defined as “the ability to read, write and speak in English [and to use mathematics] at a level necessary to function at work and in society in general” (Department for Education and Skills [DfES], 2001, p. 3). The report called for a national strategy to cut in half the number of functionally illiterate adults of working age by 2010. This amounts to raising the literacy level of 3.5 million people. The goal was also to achieve a rate of 95% of all adults over 19 years of age having adequate literacy. The report quantified “basic skills” in terms of three levels, Entry Level, Level 1 and Level 2 covering roughly the literacy skills acquired in primary and secondary school. The recommendations of the Moser report around improving adult literacy were adopted in the government’s 2001 National Skills Strategy, *Skills for Life*, the implementation of which included the development of a new set of national standards and a new core curriculum for adult literacy in England.

Breaking the Language Barriers

The focus of the Moser report had been the skills needs of the domestic UK workforce. However, it did point out that adults who don’t speak English as their first language face particular challenges, and called for further investigation of the specific skills needs of that segment of the population. Following the publication of the Moser Report, a “working group on

English for speakers of other languages” was set up, composed of members from the DfEE, the adult education associations NIACE and NATECLA, and ESOL providers. The group’s terms of reference were: “To consider, through consultation and research, the particular basic skills needs of adults who do not speak English as their first language and to make proposals as to how those needs can best be met as an integral strand of the national adult basic skills strategy” (DfEE, 2001, p. 27). The recommendations in the group’s report, *Breaking the Language Barriers* (DfEE, 2001), would ensure that ESOL would be added to the Skills for Life agenda as a distinct attention to *language* as well as literacy and numeracy skills.

In its analysis of the needs of ESOL learners, the report emphasizes the similarity of the situation of ESOL learners to that of adults with poor basic skills more generally. As is the case for adults with poor basic skills, those who lack fluency in English are denied access to a variety of life opportunities: “Lack of fluency in English is likely to affect individuals’ ability to secure employment or advancement in the workplace, to gain benefit from further education, to access community and social services and to participate in community life” (DfEE, 2001, p. 10). The report therefore argues for situating ESOL policy within the broader skills strategy: “Although ESOL learners have many needs distinct from those of basic literacy and numeracy learners - and those needs should be specifically addressed - there are many issues common to both. We therefore judge that it will be to the advantage of ESOL learners if provision for them is developed as part of the Government’s wider strategy to improve adult basic skills” (p. 17). The report also made specific recommendations in regards to linking standards, curriculum, and assessment of ESOL with national standards for basic skills.

Adult ESOL Core Curriculum

In fulfilment of the recommendations of the ESOL working group's report, a new Adult ESOL core curriculum was developed. The *Adult ESOL Core Curriculum* (DfES, 2001) elevated ESOL provision as a central plank of the government's strategy for increasing the skills levels of the UK workforce. As the Minister for Adult Skills, John Healey, stated, the curriculum was clearly situated within this agenda: "*Skills for Life*, the national strategy for improving adult literacy and numeracy skills, is one of the government's highest priorities. As part of the drive to raise standards, we will improve the quality of literacy, *language* and numeracy provision." (DfES, 2001, p. v; emphasis added).

The Core Curriculum is an integrated curriculum, covering all four skills areas, i.e., speaking, listening, reading, and writing. It includes a description of language standards in the form of "can do" statements, combined with "level descriptors" providing "objective criteria for assessing level and performance" (DfES, 2001, p. 6). As part of the skills agenda, the curriculum is aligned with National Standards for Adult Literacy and Numeracy, which were developed as part of the Skills for Life framework. The new National Adult Literacy Standards were based on the tripartite framework of language and literacy skills at three levels, Entry Level, Level 1 and Level 2, with the Entry Level further divided into Entry 1, Entry 2 and Entry 3. In the *Skills for Life* document, the levels are equated with school levels: E1 = Level 1 or age 5; E2 = Level 2 or age 7; E3 = Level 3 or age 9; L1 = Level 4 or age 11; L2 = GCSE or age 16.

The Skills for Life targets for raising literacy levels had been expressed in terms of basic functional literacy, which the Moser report had defined as roughly equivalent to Level 1.

However, in terms of ESOL, qualifications at Entry Level 3 and above were to count towards the

targets for improving literacy levels within the Skills for Life strategy. In the new Adult ESOL core curriculum, the standards for Entry level 3 are described as follows, for the four skills of speaking, listening, reading, and writing:

At this level, adults can:

listen and respond to spoken language, including straightforward information and narratives, and follow straightforward explanations and instructions, both face-to-face and on the telephone;

speak to communicate information, feelings and opinions on familiar topics, using appropriate formality, both face-to-face and on the telephone;

engage in discussion with one or more people in a familiar situation, making relevant points and responding to what others say to reach a shared understanding about familiar topics [...]

read and understand short, straightforward texts on familiar topics accurately and independently;

read and obtain information from everyday sources [...]

write to communicate information with some adaptation to the intended audience. (DfES, 2001)

Entry level 3 falls below the level of functional literacy, which was the focus of the Moser Report, and well below the higher levels of language skills required for the labour market. However, as can be seen from the description above, this level is presented as something of a minimum level of language ability required for the purposes of communicative interaction in everyday life. As will be seen further below, Entry Level 3 will come to serve as a kind of threshold of language proficiency within the immigration regime, outside of the Skills for Life framework.

The inclusion of ESOL as a specific focus within the skills agenda, reflected in the minister's reference to "literacy, *language* and numeracy provision," was to provide a massive boost to ESOL. With ESOL a part of Skills for Life, funding for ESOL tripled between 2001 and 2004 (Department for Innovation, Universities and Skills [DIUS], 2008, January, p. 3). The

numbers of people attaining ESOL qualifications also increased, contributing to the attainment of the Skills for Life targets. With the success, there also came some difficulties. Demand for ESOL increased, especially after the 2004 accession to the EU of the A8 countries of central and Eastern Europe. This increase in demand for ESOL was to have a significant impact on ESOL. As DP, the head of the three member ESOL Policy Team in the Department of Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS), explained in a personal interview, the influx of East European migrant labour put a strain on ESOL funds within the *Skills for Life* budget:

there's been a bit of an interesting debate around ESOL in the last / couple of years because / as I said that huge / influx / of people from the / A8 / countries / so that's Eastern Europe mostly / and there has been a bit of a problem because // employers were employing migrant labour and / basically sending them off to college / the local college / the local provider for / ESOL training / and that was / in some areas / creating a huge demand on / the service and uh / I would say the majority of employers weren't paying for that / the employer related bit / of the further education budget / wasn't really being spent on ESOL provision / they weren't using it for that / they were / accessing it in other ways / so that was a huge problem for us (DP, ESOL Policy Team, BIS, personal communication, August 18, 2010)

The problem of the growing cost of ESOL was one of the issues that were highlighted in the review of ESOL policy carried out in 2006.

More Than a Language

The state of ESOL under the Skills for Life agenda was evaluated in a review carried out by the National Institute for Adult Continuing Education (NIACE) in 2006. The report, *More Than a Language* (NIACE, 2006), argued that ESOL was not being given adequate attention within Skills for Life strategy. Specifically, it recommended more provision of ESOL for work qualifications to meet the need for vocational ESOL training. The issue of the strain being placed on the Skills for Life budget by increased costs of ESOL provision was addressed by the report's

most significant recommendation, which was for the implementation of fees for Skills for Life provision, including ESOL. Previously, Skills for Life training had been provided with “full remission of fees,” i.e., free of charge. As this model was becoming untenable, the ESOL review recommended introducing a means tested system of fees for all Skills for Life courses, including ESOL. Fees would continue to be waived at lower skills levels (i.e., below Level 1) while fees would be applied, at vocational rates, for courses above Level 1, with remission for those in financial need and with loans available for those going for higher levels of skills qualifications (Levels 2, 3, and 4).

World Class Skills

Many of the recommendations of the NIACE review specific to ESOL were echoed in the government’s general skills review, also carried out in 2006, the findings of which were presented in the report entitled *Prosperity for All in the Global Economy - World Class Skills* (United Kingdom, 2006, December). The Leitch Review, as it was called after its chair Lord Leitch, called for an increase in the skills levels of the Skills for Life targets in order to make UK a “world leader in skills” by the year 2020. While Skills for Life, following the Moser Report, had been about attaining targets in basic literacy and numeracy at Level 1, the new focus was to be on “world class skills,” that is intermediate and high level skills at Levels 2, 3 and 4. The new targets, to be achieved by 2020, were for 95% basic skills, and of those 90% at intermediate Levels 2 and 3 and 40% at the high skill Level 4.

In addition to the increase in skills levels, the Leitch review also recommended focusing on economically valuable skills demanded in the workplace. This demand-led approach would involve employers in the provision of skills training to make their enterprises more competitive,

and the responsabilization of individuals to invest in their own skills development to make them more employable.

The Leitch Review recommendations were put into effect in the next phase of the Skills for Life strategy, launched in 2009. The new strategy, called *Skills for Life: Changing Lives* (DIUS, 2009, March), incorporated much of the perspective of the Leitch Review, namely focusing Skills for Life on employability and providing literacy, language, and numeracy skills training that is flexible and responsive to individuals' and employers' needs (DIUS, 2009, March, p. 5). These new priorities had an impact on the provision of ESOL, which remained a key part of the Skills for Life strategy. The focus on "world class skills" is reflected in an increase in the skills levels for ESOL as part of the new Skills for Life targets. Whereas achievements in ESOL at entry level 3 and above had counted towards the 2004 and 2010 Skills for Life targets, only ESOL qualifications at level 1 or above were to count towards the new target (p. 23). The focus on employability was reflected in ESOL programming with the introduction of new ESOL for Work qualifications, which were "designed to offer a more job focused, practical approach to English-language skills" (p. 23). These new qualifications were an attempt to shift somewhat towards a demand-led system in that they were to be partially funded by employer contributions. Engaging employers in the provision of ESOL services had been a recurring concern in ESOL policy. Especially as the cost of ESOL began taking up an increasing proportion of the Skills of Life budget, there was an attempt to implement the principle that if employers are employing migrant labour then they should meet the cost of English language training for those workers. The strategy that was used to convince employers to foot more of the

bill for ESOL was explained by GB, a member of the ESOL Policy Team at the Department of Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS), in the following way:

there is one qualification that we / introduced a couple of years ago ... which is called 'ESOL for work' / which was an attempt to- / which is much more work based ESOL / and deals much more / with the language of / the workplace / and it was an attempt to help engage employers who we had traditionally seen as not really engaging with ESOL and taking part of- / because / an employer would get so much benefit if somebody were to learn English / you know / through teamwork / better productivity / better retention / I mean / these are all shown to be the case / with people- if people improve their / English because / we / felt for a long time / that employers should take part of the responsibility in funding ESOL courses / where their employees take them / so the ESOL for work qualification was an attempt to help engage / employers / in doing that / by saying / here's something where you will / very- / you know / if it wasn't obvious enough already here's- / it's even more obvious for you / that you're getting benefit from this / however uptake on this was- has been negligible / so we're actually going to stop funding / that particular / qualification (GB, ESOL Policy Team, BIS, personal communication, August 31, 2010)

Despite the attempts to engage employers in ESOL funding, uptake of the ESOL for Work qualifications was negligible, leading the government to stop funding that work-based ESOL training program. Henceforth the needs for vocational ESOL training would continue to be met through the general Skills for Life framework of courses and qualifications, rather than through workplace based programs. And as has been seen, the lack of employer engagement in funding the costs of ESOL would be resolved by shifting the burden onto learners themselves through the imposition of fees for Skills for Life ESOL courses.

The imposition of fees within Skills for Life had been a recommendation of the NIACE review as a way of meeting increasing costs. This recommendation was implemented in 2007 onwards, but only for ESOL courses with the rest of the Skills for Life continuing to have full fee remission (GB, ESOL Policy Team, BIS, personal communication, August 31, 2011). The fees for ESOL were initially set at 37.5% of the cost, but were continually increased in yearly

increments reaching 50% in 2010. While remission of fees has continued for lower Levels of ESOL and for learners in financial need, the imposition of a fees-based structure of provision was to have an influence in shaping the future of ESOL policy.

While the NIACE review called for ESOL to receive the full attention it was due within Skills for Life, it also called for more cross-departmental coordination around issues of ESOL. This is an indication of the growing sense that ESOL should be a broader concern for government beyond the narrow issue of literacy skills development. While its link to the Skills for Life strategy had led to the rapid growth in ESOL provision, the institution of fees for ESOL meant that it was beginning to diverge from that agenda. This change also was the beginning of a sense on the part of policy actors involved in ESOL policy development of a divergence between the two. As GB of the ESOL Policy Team, BIS, expressed it:

certainly in terms of- / with the fees policy / that's / I think where / in terms of manpower / ESOL started to become a bit more separate from the rest of Skills for Life / because it was requiring a whole team to deal with it on its own / and because it had become distinct/ through nature of- that there was now fees attached to it / so it did change to quite a degree / I think that's where it started to take on / you know / a slightly separate identity // and I think that's kind of grown over time / they've kind of grown apart slightly (GB, ESOL Policy Team, BIS, personal communication, August 31, 2010).

The implementation of fees from 2007 onwards for ESOL within the Skills for Life agenda meant that publicly funded ESOL was henceforth to be focused on “the most vulnerable learners [...] most at risk of social exclusion and isolation in their communities” (DIUS, 2009, March, p. 23). This change of orientation of ESOL provision was achieved through a national consultation on ESOL conducted by the Department for Innovation, Universities and Skills (DIUS) in early 2008, the report of which was published in 2009 and which led to a New Approach to ESOL policy in 2010 that aligned ESOL policy with the government's community

cohesion agenda. This shift in orientation of ESOL, partly motivated by developments within the Skills for Life agenda and objective circumstances, was also motivated by the revaluation of language within the government's approach to dealing with issues of social inclusion, integration and cohesion.

ESOL and Community Cohesion

The beginning of a distinct “community cohesion” agenda dates from the government response to the social unrest in the Northern cities of Bradford, Oldham, and Burnley in the summer of 2001. As a policy strategy, it can be divided into two phases, roughly corresponding with the second and third Labour governments. The first phase extends from the 2001 ‘disturbances’ to 2005, and is book-ended by two reports, *Community Cohesion*, the report of the Community Cohesion Review Team (also known as the “Cantle Report”) (Home Office, 2001a) and *The End of Parallel Lives?*, the final report of the Community Cohesion Panel (Home Office, 2004, July). During this period, the community cohesion agenda was in the remit of the Home Office, and the main discourse production associated with the agenda was the issuance of a number of guidance documents for use by local authorities for building cohesive communities.

The second phase can be roughly dated from the 7 July 2005 terror attacks in London up until the 2010 election of the new Conservative/Liberal-Democrat coalition government. It begins with the report *Our Shared Future* (Commission on Integration and Cohesion [CIC], 2007), and culminates in the government's *Cohesion Delivery Framework* (Department for Communities and Local Government [DCLG], 2009, January). During this period, the community cohesion agenda came into the remit of the Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG). There also occurred a redefinition of the concept of community cohesion,

and a move to more closely align it with a “racial equality” (i.e., anti-discrimination) strategy. This new orientation is reflected discursively in the increased prevalence of a discourse of “integration” within the community cohesion agenda.

The “disturbances” that hit several northern English cities in the summer of 2001 led to a large amount of discourse production as governments at all levels attempted to identify the causes of the unrest. In the immediate aftermath of the events of 10 July 2001, a number of government reports were issued, including those of the Home Office Ministerial Group, an independently commissioned review team, as well as local review teams in the cities of Bradford, Oldham, and Burnley. The analysis that follows will examine the key documents, from the Home Office’s Community Cohesion Unit (CCU) and later the DCLG, which established a national community cohesion agenda.

The Concept of Community Cohesion

The Community Cohesion Review Team was established by the Home Secretary to advise on national policies in response to the disturbances and aimed at “developing confident, active communities and social cohesion” (p. 5). The review team, chaired by Ted Cante issued the final report, *Community Cohesion* (“Cante Report”) (Home Office, 2001a), which is examined in detail below.

The report identifies the main cause of the disturbances as segregation:

Whilst the physical segregation of housing estates and inner city areas came as no surprise, the team was particularly struck by the depth of polarisation of our towns and cities. The extent to which these physical divisions were compounded by so many other aspects of our daily lives, was very evident. Separate educational arrangements, community and voluntary bodies, employment, places of worship, language, social and cultural networks, means that many communities operate on the basis of a series of

parallel lives. These lives often do not seem to touch at any point, let alone overlap and promote any meaningful interchanges. (Home Office, 2001a, p. 9)

This physical separation between communities has led to ignorance and hostility.

In such a climate, there has been little attempt to develop clear values which focus on what it means to be a citizen of a modern multi-racial Britain and many still look backwards to some supposedly halcyon days of a mono-cultural society, or alternatively look to their country of origin for some form of identity. (Home Office, 2001a, p. 9)

The solution to this situation lies in the concept of “community cohesion:”

We believe that there is an urgent need to promote community cohesion, based upon a greater knowledge of, contact between, and respect for, the various cultures that now make Great Britain such a rich and diverse nation. (Home Office, 2001a, p. 10)

It also combines the goal of cohesion with that citizenship:

It is also essential to establish a greater sense of citizenship, based on (a few) common principles which are shared and observed by all sections of the community. This concept of citizenship would also place a higher value on cultural differences” (Home Office, 2001a, p. 10)

The Cantle Report is generally credited with coining the term “community cohesion.” The concept is elaborated on in Chapter 3 (“The concept of community cohesion”). The first thing to be said is that the report contextualizes its explicit focus on community cohesion as being an extension of the social exclusion agenda: “Community cohesion is...closely linked to other concepts such as inclusion and exclusion, social capital and differentiation, community and neighbourhood. In this way it has indirectly been the focus of a number of policies and initiatives aimed principally at reducing social exclusion” (Home Office, 2001a, p. 13).

In defining the concept, the report represents community cohesion as occurring across a number of “domains.” These are given as: common values and a civic culture; social order and social control; social solidarity and reductions in wealth disparities; Social Networks and Social

Capital; and place attachment and identity (Home Office, 2001a, p. 13). Appendix C of the report provides a fuller analysis of the concept of community cohesion. In establishing a contrast with notions of community cohesion that are “defined largely in economic terms” (p. 69), it reiterates the critique, in the body of the report, of past policies aimed at the regeneration of disadvantaged areas as not doing enough to promote, and in some cases even undermining community cohesion. The appendix cites a Canadian source for a broader definition of “social cohesion” based on “developing a community of shared values” (p. 70). This communitarian element is picked up on in the informal use of the concept in the UK with the core meaning of “commitment to common norms and values” (p. 71).

In terms of the report’s recommendations for building cohesive communities, the focus is on breaking down segregation and divides between communities, for instance in housing and education policies. The key to breaking down segregation, however, is through the development of “social capital.” The report draws heavily on the American neo-communitarian Robert Putnam’s thesis on the importance of social capital for successful communities. However, while Putnam’s original thesis was formulated on the basis of social capital derived through membership in a variety of voluntary associations (recreational bowling leagues, the Knights of Columbus, etc.), the recontextualized notion of social capital in the Cattle report is specifically operationalized in the form of *volunteering*: “Volunteering is considered an essential part of social capital which...is closely linked to community cohesion” (Home Office, 2001a, p. 72).

Language and Community Cohesion

Examination of the report's explicit references to "language" will reveal the dominant discourse or representation of language within the report. This will give insight into the function of language in the elaboration of the concept of "community cohesion."

There are eleven explicit references to language in the Cantle report. In almost all cases, language is represented as distinct or named varieties of language, most commonly "English language / English" (four times). There are two references to "language development," with respect both to "second / minority / ethnic languages" as well as "English." While this reflects the fact that language learning and language teaching was an issue that was raised in consultations (both references occurring in Annex B which reports the public responses to the review team's questionnaire), this is not an example of a language pedagogical discourse in the report.

As seen in the quote above, the Cantle report identified language as a factor in segregation, with "separate language networks" being one form of the "parallel lives" on which communities were operating. In this way, language is a proxy for social networks and other types of association whose presence or absence is correlated with community cohesion. Thus the value of language within the Cantle report lies in its relation to the social capital model that is central to the notion of community cohesion. Language is either an indicator of individuals' or communities' social capital, or itself a specific kind of social capital, namely *bridging capital*, which is necessary for social cohesion.

Building Cohesive Communities

The government's reaction to the Cantle report was given in the response document, *Building Cohesive Communities: A report of the Ministerial Group on Public Order and Community Cohesion* (Home Office, 2001b). This report ("Denham Report") recontextualizes the Cantle report, as well as those of the local review teams, by summarizing their findings as representing a "strong consensus" in identifying "segregation" as a central concern. It also refers intertextually to other documents related to a racial equalities agenda, specifically studies by the Commission for Racial Equality (CRE) on racial segregation in the North of England, and by the Policy Initiatives Unit (PIU) on ethnic minority access to the labour market. It further boils down the findings into "key issues." Language is specifically mentioned in relation to one of these, "cohesion and segregation," where it is identified as a factor in segregation:

There are a number of reasons why people may choose to be close to others like themselves. These include the need for security and support, access to schools, and proximity to shops and places of religious worship. For ethnic minorities, such as the Pakistani and Bangladeshi communities in Bradford, Burnley and Oldham, language may also be an important factor if they do not speak English. (Home Office, 2001b, p. 12)

This link connects concerns over community cohesion within a pre-existing racial equalities policy focus. Language is also invoked in relation to the government's civil renewal agenda in terms of promoting "active citizenship:"

It will be important for Government to be clear about some key, but contentious issues in this debate. In an open liberal democracy, citizenship is founded on fundamental human rights and duties. The laws, rules and practices that govern our democracy, uphold our commitment to the equal worth and dignity of all our citizens. We must tackle head on racism and Islamophobia. It will sometimes be necessary to confront cultural practices that conflict with these basic values, such as those which deny women the right to participate as equal citizens. Similarly, it means ensuring that every individual has the wherewithal, such as the ability to speak English, to enable them to engage as active citizens in economic, social and political life. Common citizenship does not mean cultural

uniformity. Our society is multicultural, and it is shaped by the interaction between people of diverse cultures. There is no single dominant and unchanging culture into which all must assimilate. The public realm is founded on negotiation and debate between competing viewpoints, at the same time as it upholds inviolable rights and duties. Citizenship means finding a common place for diverse cultures and beliefs, consistent with our core values. (Home Office, 2001b, p. 20)

The report also refers to language in relation to the recontextualization of a broader citizenship agenda, where the English language is represented as “a common value:”

The articulation of these common values will feed into the broader citizenship agenda, which remains a core plank of government’s future social policy development. Ministers will provide a lead on this in the coming months. We will establish a Panel of people with relevant skills and experience from outside Government to work with the Ministerial Group in taking this forward. The Immigration, Asylum and Citizenship White Paper, due for publication in the New Year, will focus on promoting citizenship for those entering the country and those seeking naturalisation – including recognition of and adherence to fundamental rights and duties, and to English as our shared language. (Home Office, 2001b, p. 20)

As will be seen, this recontextualization of the citizenship agenda, in terms of promoting “common values,” including the English language, will be continued in the naturalization law reform agenda, discussed below. Language also figures in the elaboration of a specific community cohesion policy agenda, not so much through its symbolic worth as a common value, but rather as one indicator of a “cohesive community,” as a proxy for social capital.

Operationalization of a Community Cohesion Agenda

Guidance on Community Cohesion

Following the Cantle and Denham reports, the concept of community cohesion was developed into a “discrete policy agenda,” institutionalized in the Home Office’s Community Cohesion Unit (CCU) and operationalized through the issuance of guidance on cohesion to local authorities (Somerville, 2007, p. 55). The *Guidance on Community Cohesion* (Local Government

Authority [LGA], 2002), issue by the Home Office, provides the first explicit definition of community cohesion. It defines a “cohesive community” as one where:

There is a common vision and sense of belonging for all communities; [t]he diversity of people’s different backgrounds and circumstances are appreciated and positively valued; [t]hose from different backgrounds have similar life opportunities; and [s]trong and positive relationships are being developed between people from different backgrounds in the workplace, in schools and within neighbourhoods. (LGA, 2002, p. 6)

Besides offering a definition, the Guidance also begins the process of identifying quantitative indicators for evaluating community cohesion through such instruments as the Audit Commission’s Quality of Life survey. Not surprisingly, given the identification of language as a factor in segregation, one indicator for the baseline assessment and monitoring of progress on community cohesion is given as the assessment of “use of first and second languages” (LGA, 2002, p. 16)

The discourse of language as an “indicator” of community cohesion is retained in the brochure *Building a Picture of Community Cohesion* (Home Office, 2003). Described as the “first major effort to quantify community cohesion” (Fuller, 2011, p. 65), it provides 10 indicators of community cohesion, linked to the four elements of the definition provided in the Guidance. Language figures amongst the indicators for two of the elements: the amount of “talk” between communities as an indicator that “strong and positive relationships are being developed between people from different backgrounds;” and school qualifications in English as an indicator that “those from different backgrounds have similar life opportunities” (Home Office, 2003). Again, we see that the value of language (“talk”) is as a proxy for the informal associations (‘strong and positive relationship’) between people from different backgrounds, i.e., their social

capital. Also, language, in the form of school qualifications in English, is valued as an indicator of “similar life opportunities.”

The End of Parallel Lives?

The end of the first phase of the Community Cohesion agenda is marked by the final report of the Community Cohesion Panel, *The End of Parallel Lives?* (Home Office, 2004, July). It continues the focus on community cohesion as overcoming divides between communities, reiterating the importance of social capital for building community cohesion:

‘Social Capital’ is a term used to describe the networks of voluntary association, whether through formal organisations or informal contacts, at a community level. These networks appear to have been in decline, with many aspects of volunteering and local action becoming increasingly under pressure. This, in turn, means that the opportunities to build community spirit within communities and on a cross-cultural basis become scarcer. ...[T]here is some evidence that the lack of social capital is also an issue in the UK.... Many of the policies of the Home Office’s Communities Group, including the Active Communities Directorate and the Civil Renewal Unit, as well as the Community Cohesion Unit will help to build social capital. In any strategy, however, to maintain and re-build social capital, we believe that it is essential to take the opportunity to ensure that all activities embed cross-cultural contact (or ‘bridging’ capital) from the outset to ensure that understanding and tolerance is developed and that fear and ignorance is defeated. (Home Office, 2004, July, p. 21)

While language is not mentioned specifically, as we have seen, within the Community Cohesion discourse, language is conceived of as “bridging capital” allowing for “cross-cultural contact” between communities.

Language is specifically mentioned in the report in relation to the educational attainment of pupils with English as an Additional Language (EAL). It is interesting to note that, while low educational attainment had been identified as having a negative impact on cohesion, the report found that low English language proficiency did not constitute a barrier to educational attainment for EAL students in the long term: “while there is an initial achievement gap, there is a strong

catching up effect and by the time pupils reach GCSE stage, pupils with EAL tend to outperform their English-speaking counterparts from similar socioeconomic backgrounds” (Home Office, 2004, July, p. 26).

This first phase of the community cohesion agenda, with its shift in policy discourse from *social* cohesion to *community* cohesion, reflects an abandonment of concern for material inequalities between and within communities (Ratcliffe, 2011, p. 28). For example, the reference in the definition of a cohesive community to “similar life opportunities” rather than similar *outcomes* shows ideological affinities with the New Labour goal of equal opportunity rather than wealth redistribution (p. 28). It is in relation to the focus on social capital as a way of providing opportunity that language comes to prominence as one specific indicator for evaluating cohesion.

Our Shared Future

A second phase of the Community Cohesion agenda is opened by the final report of the Commission on Integration and Cohesion (CIC), *Our Shared Future* (Department for Communities and Local Government [DCLG], 2007). The report sets out a new understanding of integration and cohesion based on four underlying principles. These are: shared futures; a new model of rights and responsibilities; a new emphasis on mutual respect and civility; and visible social justice (p. 7). In this way the CIC report recontextualizes again the citizenship agenda (responsibilities), while reintroducing a concern from an earlier equalities agenda (“social justice”).

With the Commission on Integration and Cohesion a discourse of integration comes to take up prominence within the community cohesion agenda. Signalled in the Commission’s very name, the centrality of a concept of integration for community cohesion is emphatically

expressed in the Commission's final report, where the conjoined phrase "integration and cohesion" appear no less than 197 times in the main body of the report (approximately 135 pages). In the first phase of the community cohesion agenda, "integration" did figure as well. For instance in the Cantle report, the forms "integration" or "integrated" appear 16 times. However, it was used in the sense of physical integration e.g., of housing, schools, etc., and was in this way linked to the main theme of segregation of communities. This was still the dominant use of the term in the Community Cohesion Panel's final report.

The introduction of the integration discourse is associated with, and part of the redefinition of community cohesion that marks the second phase of the Community Cohesion agenda. The report provides the new definition, which now includes six rather than four elements. These are:

- There is a clearly defined and widely shared sense of the contribution of different individuals and different communities to a future vision for a neighbourhood, city, region or country;
- There is a strong sense of an individual's rights and responsibilities when living in a particular place – people know what everyone expects of them, and what they can expect in turn;
- Those from different backgrounds have similar life opportunities, access to services and treatment;
- There is a strong sense of trust in institutions locally to act fairly in arbitrating between different interests and for their role and justifications to be subject to public scrutiny;
- There is a strong recognition of the contribution of both those who have newly arrived and those who already have deep attachments to a particular place, with a focus on what they have in common;
- There are strong and positive relationships between people from different backgrounds in the workplace, in schools and other institutions within neighbourhoods. (DCLG, 2007, p. 10)

Language figures in the report in relation to the principles and definition of integration and cohesion. For instance, "lack of language and employment skills" is listed as one of a number of "barriers to integration" (DCLG, 2007, p. 67). However, it figures most prominently in the

recommendations around the provision of ESOL. In a prior, interim statement, the Commission had expressed its “commitment to a shared language as being fundamental to integration and cohesion.” In the section “support for learning English,” the final report states: “English is both an important part of our shared heritage, and a key access factor for new communities to the labour market and wider society. It binds us together as a single group in a way that a multiplicity of community languages cannot.” (p. 73). This legitimizes the recommendations of the report related to the funding and provision of ESOL services, and which propose dealing with the strain on resources from increasing demand by finding more “innovative” and “flexible” ways of funding ESOL provision. These include recognizing the opportunities for informal language learning in the “community” and making use of partnerships with the voluntary sector.

Another important aspect of the report’s recommendations is that ESOL provision should be incorporated into the government’s policies to combat unemployment and be provided through employment centres:

[I]n recognition of the economic benefits of ESOL, we think it should be repositioned as part of the LSC strategy for tackling worklessness, and should link into Job Centre Plus schemes. Poor English language skills is one of the biggest barriers to accessing work and we therefore welcome the new ESOL for Work qualification that will be introduced from September 2007. (DCLG, 2007, p. 74)

In order to encourage employers to contribute more to funding of ESOL services, the report also recommends that language be included in employers’ commitments to skills development as part of the latest stage of the skills strategy, as outlined in the Leitch Report (DCLG, 2007, p. 75). These recommendations to realign ESOL provision within the government’s Skills Strategy, represents a return to the government’s original approach to ESOL and its incorporation within the Skills for Life framework with the Adult ESOL Core Curriculum.

Cohesion Delivery Framework

The new paradigm for integration and cohesion set forth in the CIC report was operationalized in the *Cohesion Delivery Framework* (DCLG, 2009, January). The framework continues the development of indicators for evaluating community cohesion. However, these indicators are now linked to an outcomes based approach to public service delivery, introduced after the government's 1998 comprehensive spending review. Specifically, the indicators are linked to performance targets, set out in the revised 2007 Public Service Agreement (PSA) 21, of "build[ing] more cohesive, empowered and active communities" (HM Government, 2007). The three new national indicators of integration and cohesion, set out in PSA 21, are:

- The percentage of people who believe people from different backgrounds get on well together in their local area
- The percentage of people who feel that they belong to their neighbourhood
- The percentage of people who have meaningful interactions with people from different backgrounds. (DCLG, 2009, January, p. 10-11)

The framework presents some findings on "factors influencing cohesion." One factor, related to personal characteristics is given as "language:" "Not being able to speak English prevents people from mixing" (DCLG, 2009, January, p. 31). To meet the national community cohesion targets, the framework identifies some "targeted cohesion actions" to address specific issues. For instance, to address the issue of "low levels of people having friends in another ethnic group" or "large number of new immigrants" in a local area, promoting ESOL is given as a possible action (p. 38-40). Thus, in the Cohesion Delivery Framework, the promotion of ESOL becomes a "targeted cohesion action" for meeting the targets related to the national indicators of community cohesion.

It is quite natural that the elaboration of language as an important indicator within the community cohesion agenda, as well as the promotion of English language learning as a targeted cohesion action, should have an impact on the provision of ESOL. Indeed this is exactly what happened, as the Labour government took steps to align ESOL policy more closely with the community cohesion agenda.

Loss in Translation

Another example of the revaluation of the national language within the community cohesion agenda is the change in policy on translating government publications into community languages. From 2007 onwards there occurred a shift in attitude towards translation compared to the first phase of the community cohesion agenda, where providing materials translated into community languages was endorsed as a way of providing access to, and engaging members of ethnic minority communities in settlement services and policy. For instance, the 2002 Local Government Association's (LGA) *Guidance on Community Cohesion* recommended that local authority housing departments "make available translated materials or provide access to community language speakers" in their management of housing services (LGA, 2002, p. 40).

A change in policy was indicated in the February 2007 interim statement of the Commission on Integration and Cohesion, which raised questions about the appropriateness of translation into community languages. While recognizing the necessity of translation in certain circumstances, the report argues that "translation of public materials can also prevent interaction between groups, prevent language skills being developed, and in extreme cases even cause suspicion across groups" (CIC, 2007, February, p. 19). Lastly, but not least, the growing cost to local governments of providing translation was also raised as an issue.

The Commission's final report, *Our Shared Future*, argued for a more selective approach to translation, one that was "driven by need, and set firmly in the context of communications strategies for all residents" (CIC, 2007, p. 165). It also provided a 'checklist' for use by local authorities to decide whether or not to translate written materials. This perspective on translation was endorsed "wholeheartedly" by the Minister for Communities and Local Government, who, believing this was an issue that required immediate action, promptly issued new guidance to local authorities on the translation of written materials (DCLG, 2007, December). The new Guidance followed closely the CIC's recommendations, including restating verbatim the translation checklist from the CIC report.

This new policy towards translation follows from the overall emphasis within the CIC's Final Report on the integrative function of English and the concomitant desire to promote English language learning on the part of newly arrived migrants as well as members of settled ethnic minority communities. From this perspective, translation of materials into community languages was no longer seen as an issue of accessibility for members of ethnic minority communities who do not speak English, but rather as an obstacle to their acquisition of English, and thus their integration into the broader society. The Commission argued that the current practice of many local authorities of using translation as a "first approach," though well-intentioned, was actually counterproductive and based on a misunderstanding of the statutory obligations to accommodate speakers of languages other than English (CIC, 2007, p. 73-74).

Henceforth, the use of translation would be guided by the following principles: (1) there is no legal reason for all materials to be translated; (2) translation can never be a substitute for learning English; (3) translation should be reduced except where it builds integration and

cohesion; and (4) translation should be considered in the context of communications to all communities (CIC, 2007, p. 167-168).

The central aspect of this new attitude towards translation is the way it counter-poses translation into community languages to the provision of ESOL. The idea is that providing translation is a disincentive to English language learning and therefore its use should be reduced. Moreover, even when local authorities do engage in translation, it should be “done in a way that helps people learn English,” by, for instance, producing bilingual translations, or using pictures with English text rather than translation (DCLG, 2007, December, p. 10).

The counter-posing of translation to ESOL reappears in regard to the issue of costs associated with providing settlement services. In the CIC report, funding for translation and ESOL spending are treated as being in zero-sum competition. Thus local authorities’ increased efforts to support English language learning, as recommended by the Commission, are to be paid for out of savings achieved through reducing translation: “[A]reas should consider using the money they save on translating written materials to add to the pot available for English lessons” (CIC, 2007, p. 73).

Subsequently, the CLG’s new guidance on translation was incorporated within the government’s accountability structure for delivering community cohesion, where following the guidance on translation was specified as a “targeted cohesion action” for achieving the outcomes of “building good relationships between people; helping people feel they belong; and helping people feel they have things in common with other people in the local area” (DCLG, 2009, January, p. 13). Specifically, use of the translation guidance was seen as a way of addressing the issues of a “large number of new immigrants” and others “not speaking English.” It was also

mentioned as an action for addressing situations where the “existing population have negative views about migrants” and there is a “low level of trust in local institutions” (DCLG, 2009, January, p. 38-40). This would seem to endorse the analysis of the Commission on Integration and Cohesion’s report, *Our Shared Future*, which stated that overuse of translation can “cause suspicion across groups” (CIC, 2007, p. 19). The focus on the legitimacy of translation policies in the eyes of a public wary about migration also reflects the fact that there has been a politicization of translation and interpreting services within UK public discourse, related not just to competing attitudes towards migrants but also to notions of entitlement within the welfare state (Tipton, 2012).

Focusing ESOL on Community Cohesion

The NIACE report *More than a Language* (NIACE, 2006) argued for a more cross departmental approach to ESOL, as issues of language were relevant to a larger number of areas than skills development. Accordingly, in 2008, the government initiated public consultations on future directions for ESOL policy with a view to expanding it beyond the narrow skills agenda and orienting towards issues of inclusion and cohesion. The result of the consultation process was the *New Approach to ESOL* (DIUS, 2009), which more explicitly aligned ESOL policy with the community cohesion agenda.

ESOL Consultations

The consultation document, *Focusing ESOL on Community Cohesion* (DIUS, 2008, January), citing the CIC report’s statement that English language ability was the most important issue facing integration and cohesion, makes the following proposition:

[T]o foster community cohesion, a new partnership approach to planning is necessary which

targets English Language provision at local need. We need a ‘whole community approach’ in which ESOL needs are considered as part of wider local planning arrangements, such as Local Area Agreements and City Strategies. (DIUS, 2008, January, p. 8)

The consultation document points out that the current Skills for Life ESOL agenda is not meeting the English language needs of the most disadvantaged groups. It therefore proposes focusing ESOL provision on a number of priority groups, namely “excluded women, parents of at-risk families, those with low levels of literacy in their first language and with no formal secondary education, as well as refugees and asylum seekers” (DIUS, 2008, January, p. 8-9).

The government proposed a “new partnership approach” to ESOL planning, one that “targets English language provision at local need” (DIUS, 2008, January, p. 9). The proposal also calls for greater engagement of employers and the voluntary and community sector in the provision of ESOL services. ESOL funding is still to be coordinated centrally, by the Learning Skills Council (LSC), but spending decisions are to be based on local priorities.

Consultations Report

The government’s response to the consultations reported general support for the proposition of targeting ESOL on integration and cohesion (DIUS, 2009, May, p. 4). It also noted some interesting areas of debate raised by stakeholders. One was the exclusion of migrant workers from the list of priority groups. The consultation document’s priority in terms of ESOL had been on long-term, legal residents, that is, not short term economic migrants, who were expected to pay for their own language training (or to have the costs paid for by their employers). However, the influx of large numbers of migrant workers (from Eastern Europe for example) without any language ability to certain areas has been a central concern from an integration and cohesion perspective, which led many local stakeholders to argue for provision of ESOL services

to migrants workers. This debate over whether to include migrant workers within national ESOL priorities reflects a conflict between local estimations of English language needs and the government's desire to target ESOL provision on long-term residents while excluding short-term migrants. This differentiation between short- and long-term migrants in relation to ESOL provision and English language needs, while remaining ambiguous and contested within integration and cohesion policy, will be institutionalized within the domain of naturalization policy, where there will be a strict divide between those migrants entering through long-term settlement routes with access to citizenship and for whom naturalization language requirements will be required, and those entering through short-term routes who are denied long-term settlement and thus not required to demonstrate English language ability.

Another issue raised was the conflict between the proposed ESOL priorities and existing ESOL targets. Local needs to be addressed in the new priorities were at lower levels of language ability (Pre-Entry and Entry levels), while the current targets focused on higher levels of language (DIUS, 2009, May, p. 6). Indeed, despite the focus within the Skills for Life strategy on higher levels of literacy skills for the workplace, especially after the Leitch Report, the vast majority of ESOL provision, 85%, is at the Entry Level (Language Policy Team member, BIS, personal communication). Also raised in the consultations, was the negative impact on ESOL provision due to the fact that only ESOL qualifications at the relatively high Level 1 count towards Skills for Life targets. This issue is also one of concern for policy makers and has shaped their estimation of the on-going link between ESOL qualifications and the Skills for Life agenda. In a personal interview, GB of the ESOL Policy Team at the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS) described how the situation has

not served ESOL that well / in terms of / when there is a squeeze on budgets at the provider level / what providers will tend to do is they'll want to try and retain / some of the target bearing provision so they continue to get Brownie points for them / so if there's a choice between ESOL for example / and literacy and numeracy / which have much more overt ... targets / I think / if there's been a squeeze / ESOL has tended to get it disproportionately because it doesn't have as many- as much target bearing provision (GB, ESOL Policy Team, BIS, personal communication, August 31, 2010)

This conflict between the need for ESOL provision for underserved populations at lower levels of proficiency and funding mechanisms and targets that privilege higher levels of language proficiency for the workplace was symptomatic of a growing divergence between the broader aims of the ESOL and Skills for Life agendas, which ultimately lead to the proposal to realign ESOL with the community cohesion agenda.

The New Approach to ESOL

Coming out of the government's response to the consultations, a *New Approach to ESOL* was rolled out in 2009, which targeted the provision of ESOL at fostering integration and community cohesion. (DIUS, 2009, May). The *New Approach* was set alongside the next phase of the Skills for Life agenda, which implemented the recommendations of the Leitch Review on attaining world-class skills.

The reorientation of ESOL policy towards community cohesion reflects the divergence of the ESOL and Skills for Life agenda. In the New Approach to ESOL, provision was to be delivered locally where needs could be identified and services targeted at priority groups. This practice of identifying priorities for ESOL provision was associated with fiscal concerns and attempts to control public spending on ESOL:

the last administration was also looking / to certainly / ensure that ESOL was being spent in a / very value for money way / on our priorities / and it was very much a / case of / this is a limited pot / therefore you need to ensure it hits the priorities / that we want it to hit /

but it was really- it was wanting to do that through that / New Approach to ESOL that I mentioned / which was / getting / L[ocal] A[uthoritie]s and their partners / involved / at the local level / to identify / priorities for ESOL // and then / working with local providers / to ensure that those targets were then being // uhm that provision was being targeted at them and that those / priority groups / to use the phrase / were the ones having ESOL spent on them (GB, ESOL Policy Team, BIS, personal communication, August 31, 2010)

In this way, the shift from ESOL as a universal entitlement to a means tested and targeted service mirrors the fate of other social benefit programmes under neo-liberal restructuring of the welfare state.

While the Leitch Report and the subsequent phase of the Skills for Life agenda carried on the neo-liberal skills discourse that had surrounded ESOL policy since 2001, the development of the New Approach to ESOL reflected the translation into ESOL policy of a style of governance and a communitarian philosophy associated with New Labour's broader community cohesion agenda. Mirroring a "joined-up" style of government at the national level, the New Approach's "whole community" approach to ESOL involved various partners, including the Department for Innovation, Universities and Skills (now Business, Innovation and Skills), the Department for Communities and Local Government, the Department for Works and Pensions, and the Home Office, in addressing the English language needs at the local level and across all dimensions of local authority planning. This cross-departmental approach is evidence of the central importance that language generally, and ESOL policy in particular, had come to occupy in relation to New Labour policies surrounding issues of employment, social inclusion, and community cohesion.

Language, Integration, and the Nation-State

Much of the literature on the discourse of integration in Britain has understood the social cohesion agenda in the context of domestic race relations policy and identified continuity with

previous discriminatory approaches to black and minority ethnic populations. From this perspective, this agenda is a reaction on the part of the nation-state in attempting to shore up a national identity and sense of belonging in the face of denationalizing forces of globalization, including increased migration. However, investigation into the origin of this social cohesion orientation reveals a supra-national influence, namely the development of a EU policy domain on immigrant integration. An understanding of the role that EU level discourses and policy processes have played in shaping UK integration policy is provided by data from an interview I conducted with a Technical Advisor from the Border Agency of the UK Home Office. This informant, CH, played a central role in policy development in relation to issues of language and immigrant selection, integration and citizenship, as well as being the UK representative at the EU policy making level. The description of his participation in the key policy network for EU bureaucrats working on the domain of immigrant integration gives an insight into the growing coordination at the EU level around issues of integration, even while immigrant integration remains a domestic competence of the EU member states:

increasingly Europe / is a player / uhm and that's quite interesting I'm the UK representative on the National Integration Contact Points Network / so that's a group of / experts on integration from around the EU // and we: / essentially determine the EU policies around integration / it's interesting because the EU actually has no: competence to direct what / all the member states should do / it's a matter of domestic competence / at the moment / under the: Lisbon Treaty ... it's possible / the EU will start to take some competency over integration policies / across the EU / ... we're going to be having a first / conversation / about a new approach to integration / under the auspices of the Lisbon Treaty / we'll then start to think about / you know are there particular / facets of integration that could reasonably be: / EU competence / in other words where the EU would add value // or should it remain exclusively national competence (CH, UK Border Agency, personal communication, August 25, 2010)

The most significant development in the domain of integration policy at the EU level has

been the agreement of a set of common basic principles for integration in 2004 (Council of the European Union, 2004, November 19). Largely an initiative of the UK and Germany, the common principles, among other things, inscribed an emphasis on language ability within the EU's approach to integration policy, stating that "[b]asic knowledge of the host society's language, history, and institutions is indispensable to integration" ("Principle 4," p. 20).

As well as a consensus around language as the key to integration, the common basic principles are also informed by a particular understanding of integration in terms of a number of hierarchically ordered "domains" of social activity. This understanding of integration through the "domains of integration" framework was explained to me as follows:

you start at the bottom / where you have absolutely basic needs / and in order to care for your family / you want to become economically self-sufficient / so economic integration is / probably the first domain // after that / you start to think about / social integration / about cultural integration / and the social stuff you probably get from work / y'know you meet people / you have a social life / from that social life you start to become / immersed in / the culture yeah / and hopefully you become a citizen / you become politically savvy as well so / that's the fourth domain the political integration / and that's kind of EU-speak and that's // a very basic framework for integration / but language underpins it because you can't do any of those things unless you have / a bit of language competence (CH, UK Border Agency, personal communication, August 25, 2010)

The hierarchical ordering of the various domains of integration in the above description was justified by the informant on the basis of a common sense notion of a hierarchy of human needs. However, the priority given to the economic domain in relation to integration also articulates of the notion of "domains of integration" with a broader EU social policy discourse of "social inclusion," which gives primacy of place to economic integration (i.e., participation in paid employment) as the basis for social cohesion (Levitas, 2005). This domains of integration framework and discourse of social inclusion, as well as the consensus about language as the key

to integration within the common basic principles, have all been translated into UK integration policy and practices.

While the common basic principles have been a source of legitimacy for integration policy at the member state level, the EU has also been a source of monetary funds, with the establishment, in 2007, of the European Fund for Integration (EIF), a funding mechanism to support implementation of integration policy at the national level. As the Technical Advisor from the UK Border Agency explains, the guidelines for distributing the fund have shaped how EU level principles on integration are implemented at the member state level:

out of [the creation of the framework of common basic principles for integration] came a demand for money / you know / we've got a framework / but what can we do at a European level / to support the / delivery of that framework / so there were protracted negotiations at / the EC level / in which I was involved / uhm fascinating stuff / really getting into the / depths of / EU law / and the challenge was actually to find a hook / that we could hang this on // uhm because there's / you know / a very tight legal framework within the treaties / and the only hook / we could find that- was actually that of / admissions procedures / believe it or not (CH, UK Border Agency, personal communication, August 25, 2010)

Through these EIF funding guidelines, EU level integration policy has been linked to immigration control policies ("admissions procedures") at the member state level, a possible factor in a trend across Europe whereby measures ostensibly aimed at integration are being introduced in immigration policy as entry criteria. How the EIF moneys were used in the UK was explained by the Technical Advisor, UK Border Agency, as follows:

it links back to the priorities for the fund / and the fact that we had to link it to admissions procedures / one of the eligible actions for the / fund / is to develop admissions procedures that are / clear and simple / transparent / and actually support integration / so: that's what we did / we took a chunk of the money and / completely redeveloped the system // now it's worth making the point that / the development of the points based system cost / 24-25 million / pounds / in total / but we supported those / very specific bits of the system / that supported integration // there were large chunks that had / nothing

much to do with integration / so we couldn't make the connections / but the stuff around language / we supported / you know / developing that part of the language issue ... and that / as I say / leads directly to integration (CH, UK Border Agency, personal communication, August 25, 2010)

In this way, in the UK, the EU moneys were used to fund in part the development of new admissions procedures, in particular the language related aspects of the Points-Based System (PBS), which are seen as directly linked to the goal of integration.

Besides the common basic principles and the EIF, the EU integration policy domain has been constituted by the publication of an *Integration Handbook* for use by policy makers across the EU (Niesson & Huddleston, 2009). This handbook has been a factor in the spread of the EU discourse of integration and social cohesion, as well as the diffusion of the new civic integration paradigm across the EU member states. Thus the reassertion of national identity in the form of robust integration measures in the UK and, it can be assumed, in other EU member states has been facilitated and shaped by supranational policy networks, agendas, and discourses.

Summary

This chapter has traced the revaluation of national language within British integration policy through examining the developments in ESOL policy under the New Labour Government. ESOL received a massive boost in the early part of the new millennium when addressing the English language needs of speakers of other languages was incorporated into the Skills for Life strategy for promoting adult basic skills. This greater attention to ESOL was motivated by a neo-liberal economic perspective on the importance of language and literacy skills in general for the new knowledge-based economy. As the provision of ESOL increased and demand continued to grow, the Labour government recognized the importance of language issues to broader policy

strategies and goals beyond that of adult skills promotion. While the acquisition of economically valuable English language skills continued to be seen as a key tool in achieving social inclusion, language also came to be seen as centrally important in combating a wide range of dimensions of social exclusion. This role of English language proficiency as valuable social capital within the government's community cohesion agenda was also behind the revaluation of national language in naturalization and citizenship policy, which is the topic of the following chapter.

CHAPTER 9: THE REVALUATION OF THE NATIONAL LANGUAGE IN BRITISH CITIZENSHIP POLICY

In 2002, after the publication of a government White Paper, *Secure Borders, Safe Haven*, proposing a language test as part of the process for naturalization as a British citizen, the renowned Oxford sociolinguist Deborah Cameron wrote an article in the journal *Critical Quarterly*, dismissing the whole idea as an anachronism. While she provides an intellectually rigorous critique of the test, she seems confident in the belief that the idea will go nowhere, so out of touch is it with current British attitudes to language and national identity. Her conclusion states: “The White Paper on immigration might be making an issue of something that is not (yet) an issue for the British population at large. If so, that is one more reason to hope that, by the time this piece appears, the proposal to make English language proficiency a qualification for British citizenship will have been consigned to the waste-basket where it belongs” (Cameron, 2002, p. 72). In the following 5 years, the New Labour government was to implement a formalized language and citizenship testing regime first for naturalization applicants, subsequently for applicants for marriage visas as spouses of British citizens, and finally for all those applying for indefinite leave to remain in the UK. How did the UK government manage to make language such an issue, both against the prevailing attitudes of the general public, and the better advice of experts such as Cameron?

This chapter will trace within British citizenship policy the revaluation of the national language that was identified in the previous two chapters within the domains of immigration and integration. It will begin by examining the emergence of a discourse of active citizenship within a civil renewal agenda for education, and its subsequent recontextualization within naturalization

policy. It then examines the operationalization of this discourse in the newly implemented citizenship testing regime of knowledge of life and language in the UK. Finally, it characterizes the use of citizenship and language tests as political technologies within neo-liberal strategies for the responsabilization of citizens and the governmentalization of community.

Reform of UK Naturalization Law

The idea of citizenship policy is a novel concept in the UK. Historically, the legal status of citizenship in the UK has been secondary to that of subject, which, up until the mid twentieth century, included both members of the “home nations” as well as those of the colonial territories and dominions. After the period of decolonization following the Second World War, there was a need to distinguish the status of subject of the British crown from that of British nationality. As Somerville puts it, the aim of UK citizenship policy from 1948 to 1981 was “to realign nationality rights with immigration rights” (Somerville, 2007, p. 56). This meant the gradual restriction of access to British nationality for citizens of commonwealth countries.

The requirements for naturalization as a British citizen under the British Nationality Act of 1981 included being “of good character” and having “a sufficient knowledge of the English, Welsh or Scottish Gaelic language” (BNA, 1981). However, in practice the language requirement was not enforced, being assumed rather than formally assessed. The White Paper *Secure Borders, Safe Haven* announced the intention to “require applicants for naturalisation to demonstrate that they have achieved a certain standard” by providing results of a formal language test as part of the naturalization process (Home Office, 2002).

In addition to the formalization of assessment of language ability, the White paper also announced the intention of implementing “a simple examination” for citizenship applicants to

demonstrate “sufficient knowledge about life in the United Kingdom,” which was added to the requirements for naturalization in the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act of 2002 (NIA, 2002). The task of defining what was meant by “sufficient knowledge” in regard to language as well as life in the UK within the proposed citizenship-testing regime was assigned to a “Life in the United Kingdom Advisory Group,” with the resulting “Life in the UK” test being implemented in 2005.

In order to understand this formalization of the naturalization procedure, including the requirement of language ability, it is useful to look at how the “simple citizenship exam” was legitimated in the *Secure Borders, Safe Haven* White paper:

In an increasingly diverse world, it is vital that we strengthen both our sense of community belonging and the civic and political dimensions of British citizenship. In particular, we intend to offer language teaching and light touch education for citizenship for those making a home in the UK – with a view to a simple examination for citizenship applicants similar to that which exists in many other countries. This will strengthen the ability of new citizens to participate in society and to engage actively in our democracy. This will help people understand both their rights and their obligations as citizens of the UK, and strengthen the bonds of mutual understanding between people of diverse cultural backgrounds. It will also help to promote individuals’ economic and social integration. We have no wish to see applicants fail the requirements. We want to see them meet the requirements and become British citizens. If they do fail, they can apply again whenever they wish. (Home Office, 2002, p. 11)

As the language of the above paragraph demonstrates, the revaluation of the national language within citizenship policy is interdiscursively linked to the broader New Labour citizenship agenda.

New Labour’s Citizenship Agenda: Education for Citizenship

Since the late 1990s there has been a “quiet revolution” in citizenship policy under the Labour government (Somerville, 2007, p. 56). The UK government has pursued a citizenship

agenda, including the reform of naturalization law but also a broader policy agenda aimed at revaluing, or deepening the meaning of citizenship. The content of this agenda, conducted under the label of a “civil renewal” agenda, was most clearly formulated in a 2003 lecture by the Home Secretary, David Blunkett, and which focused on the importance of active citizenship within “efforts to strengthen communities [and] revitalize our democracy” (Blunkett, 2003, June 11, p. 1).

A concern with citizenship, as distinct from naturalization policy, became an explicit focus of UK government policy in the late 1990s in response to a concern over lack of engagement in the political process on the part of the public in general, and a perceived high level of anti-social behaviour among young people in particular. The solution, from the New Labour perspective, was to be found in education. Accordingly, the 1997 government White Paper, *Excellence in Schools*, included a commitment “to strengthen education for citizenship and the teaching of democracy in schools” (DfEE, 1997; cited in DfEE, 1998). To that end, an Advisory Group, chaired by Sir Bernard Crick, was set up to make recommendations for the inclusion of citizenship as a mandatory subject in the National Curriculum for schools in England. The key planks of the government’s citizenship education policy agenda were set out in the group’s final report, issued in September 1998, entitled *Education for Citizenship and the Teaching of Democracy in Schools* (DfEE, 1998).

The overall approach of the report is expressed in the Introduction: “We aim at no less than a change in political culture of this country both nationally and locally: for people to think of themselves as active citizens” (DfEE, 1998, p. 7). The report is organized in three main sections: the first sets out ‘what we mean by citizenship,’ specifically elaborating on the notion

of active citizenship, while the second part contains the group's recommendations. The third part presents a framework of learning outcomes as a basis for incorporating citizenship education into the national curriculum for schools in England.

In the section "What we mean by citizenship," the group endorses a notion of "active citizenship," which is elaborated in explicit critique of the dominant paradigm of citizenship in post-WWII Britain, that of T.H. Marshall. Marshall's theory of citizenship focused on the gradual extension of the rights associated with citizenship, first civil and political and later social, to wider sections of the population. In contrast, active citizenship places more emphasis on the *duties* rather than the *rights* of citizenship, especially social rights such as state welfare provisions. Consequently, this notion of active citizenship entails a broader notion of participation and involvement in public affairs, which is not restricted to the narrowly defined activities of the political domain. As the Group state: "We firmly believe that volunteering and community involvement are necessary conditions of civil society and democracy" (DfEE, 1998, p. 10). The way that "community involvement," "civil society," and "democracy" are connected in the previous quote is an indication of a communitarian conception of citizenship within this active citizenship agenda. While in a liberal conception of citizenship, civil society, a domain of political activity free of state interference, is the fount of liberal political virtues and hence the condition of a vibrant democracy, in this description of active citizenship, it is involvement in the "community" which is the condition of both civil society and democracy. The use of community here is part of the discursive construction of a space for citizen involvement beyond the state, but which is part of state governmental strategies, such as the education for citizenship agenda.

The promotion of active citizenship is the abiding feature of the New Labour citizenship agenda, where, as in the domains of immigration and integration, the majority of policy “has restricted rights and emphasized responsibilities” (Somerville, 2007, p. 61). Through this focus on responsibilities, the new notion of participatory citizenship is interdiscursively linked with a broader neo-liberal policy agenda of welfare state restructuring. This connection is acknowledged explicitly in the *Education for Citizenship* document itself, which contextualizes the implementation of the active citizenship agenda as being “especially important at a time when government is attempting a shift of emphasis between, on the one hand, state welfare provision and responsibility and, on the other, community and individual responsibility” (DfEE, 1998, p. 10).

What kind of education is necessary for this new type of active citizenship? Three things: social and moral responsibility; community involvement, and political literacy (DfEE, 1998, p. 11). This is beyond simply acquiring a level of civics knowledge. Instead: “citizenship education is education for citizenship, behaving and acting as a citizen, therefore it is not just knowledge of citizenship and civic society; it also implies developing values, skills and understanding” (p. 13).

Most significant in this regard is “political literacy,” which comprises the “knowledge, skills and values” that young people need to make them effective in public life (DfEE, 1998, p. 13). The term “political literacy” is significant for two reasons. First it is an example of the use of the notion of literacy as a metaphor for the activities in a particular domain of social action, understood in terms of competencies. This reflects a *skilling* of citizenship that entails, beyond its metaphorical sense, a certain kind of language use. As the report states, “[t]alk’ or discourse is obviously fundamental to active citizenship” (p. 14). In other words, doing citizenship is to a

large degree talking about citizenship, and so education for citizenship must involve training in the type of language use associated with citizenship.

An idea of the type of language use, as well as the notion of citizenship, being advocating can be taken from the report's framework of learning outcomes for citizenship education. These outcomes are "developmental and sequential, and ...reinforce and further develop the concepts, values and dispositions, skills and aptitudes and knowledge and understanding which pupils acquire" at each of the four key stages of the primary and secondary curricula (DfEE, 1998, p. 35). Each of these "four essential elements of education for citizenship" (i.e., concepts, values and dispositions, skills and aptitudes and knowledge and understanding) has a discursive aspect, which can be seen in the way the learning outcomes are specified. For example, the "skills and aptitudes" listed in the learning outcomes include a number of speech acts and discourse genres which pupils are to be able to accomplish. These include: *express an opinion, discussion, debate* (Key Stage 1); *make oral presentation, analyse, discuss and reflect* (Key Stage 3). These types of language use fit with a general view of participatory, active citizenship.

More interestingly, the "knowledge and understanding" element of citizenship education includes understanding the meaning of key terms. The terms given as examples are taken from different fields, including terms related to British political institutions (*cabinet, Prime Minister, act of parliament, Welsh Assembly*); general principles of political liberalism (justice, freedom of speech, rule of law); a more specifically human rights discourse (human rights, discrimination, pluralism, natural justice); and a number that are related to the particular notion of active citizenship being promoted (*rights and responsibilities, voluntary service, volunteer, charity*).

Together, these speech acts, genres and key terms constitute an order of discourse for the domains of social practice designated as active citizenship.

The *Education for Citizenship* report, in its theory of citizenship and aims for citizenship education, clearly established the basis of a citizenship agenda for the promotion of active citizenship. In its framework of learning outcomes of citizenship education it sets out the skills and competencies that are required for active citizenship, and which will serve as the basis for the teaching and assessment of citizenship in the National Curriculum for schools in England.

Recontextualization of the Citizenship Agenda

The Cantle Report

The themes of this citizenship agenda informed the analysis in the *Cantle Report* into the causes of the 2001 disturbances in the Northern Cities (Home Office, 2001a). Besides the recommendations for improving community cohesion, discussed in the previous chapter, the report also made recommendations regarding citizenship, specifically in relation to the importance of shared values. The recommendations on this theme reflect a communitarian discourse of developing a “new compact” in terms of rights and responsibilities between communities, and of promoting “new values” of a common citizenship. The report calls for an open national debate to elaborate what these rights and responsibilities and new values should be. It is in respect to the first issue, rights and responsibilities, that the issue of language is specifically invoked:

We believe that such a debate should seek to determine both the rights and responsibilities of each community. Whilst respect for different cultures is vital, it will also be essential to agree some common elements of ‘nationhood’. This might revolve around key issues such as language and law. For example, a more visible support for anti-discrimination measures, support for women’s rights, a universal acceptance of the

English language (seen as particularly important in some areas) and respect for both religious differences and secular views. (Home Office, 2001a, p. 19)

Language is also invoked in respect to the second issue, new values:

We have resisted the temptation to set out our proposals for these new values as this should be the result of a debate. Nevertheless, we would expect the new values to contain statements about the expectation that the use of the English language, which is already a pre-condition of citizenship, (or a commitment to become fluent within a period of time) will become more rigorously pursued, with appropriate support. This will ensure that subsequent generations do not bear the burden of remedial programmes and, more importantly, that the full participation of all individuals in society can be achieved much more easily. This is not to diminish the value and role of second and minority languages, which reinforce sub cultural identities. (Home Office, 2001a, p. 19)

The perspective on language and citizenship in both of these passages is framed by interdiscursive links with the broader citizenship agenda, a central element of which is the discursive opposition between “rights” and “responsibilities.” The first passage is structured around a list of the respective rights and responsibilities of “each community,” viz., the “majority” and “minority ethnic” communities. While each community has their respective rights and responsibilities (“anti-discrimination measures” versus “support for women’s rights,” “respect for religious differences” and “respect for secular views”), the list includes “a universal acceptance of the English language.” The qualifier “universal is somewhat enigmatic, but presumably could be taken as implying that the English language is a right and/or responsibility for all sides (a right to be provided by the majority and a responsibility to learn on part of minority communities). This interpretation is confirmed by the mention in the next passage, of provision of language training, i.e., “appropriate support”, as corollary of a “more rigorously pursued” language requirement.

The second passage quoted above proposes a stronger English language requirement as ensuring “the full participation of all individuals in society.” This interdiscursive link with the civil renewal agenda legitimizes the proposal in relation to the theme of active citizenship. The perspective on language and citizenship of the Cattle report would ultimately inform the proposals for reforming naturalization law in the 2002 White Paper and which were implemented in the 2002 Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act.

Citizenship and Naturalization

As was mentioned above, reforms to the naturalization procedure for applicants for British citizenship were outlined in the White Paper, *Secure Borders, Safe Haven* (Home Office, 2002), and enacted in law with the 2002 Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act. These included the institution of a formal test of knowledge of language and of living in the UK as a requirement for naturalization.

The White Paper recontextualizes the government’s civil renewal and citizenship agenda within naturalization policy.²² This can be seen in the way the proposal to introduce a naturalization test is legitimated by being introduced as “light touch education for citizenship” (Home Office, 2002, p. 11). Potential opposition to the proposal is mitigated by describing the test as “a simple examination” no different from that which “many other countries” employ. Moreover, the proposal for a test is not made explicitly but rather is presented as a minor appendage to the main proposal “to offer language teaching and light touch education for citizenship for those making a home in the UK” (Home Office, 2002, p. 11). Also, charges of an exclusionary intent behind the proposal are rebutted pre-emptively by stating the government’s

²² The passage analysed in the following paragraphs is cited in full on p. 210 above.

“wish” to see applicants pass the test and with the provision for being able to sit the test multiple times:

We have no wish to see applicants fail the requirements. We want to see them meet the requirements and become British citizens. If they do fail, they can apply again whenever they wish. (Home Office, 2002, p. 11)

However, more significant than these rhetorical legitimization strategies is the interdiscursive aspect of the White Paper’s proposal, combining elements of the government’s citizenship, community cohesion, and social inclusion agendas. These include “participating in society and engaging actively in our democracy,” “understanding both the rights and obligations of citizens,” “strengthening the bonds of mutual understanding between people,” and promoting “economic and social integration.” Thus citizenship policy, that is naturalization (“citizenship as status”) policy, is positioned as a nexus connecting a variety of policy agendas, the aims of which can be served by the promotion of citizenship and enhancing the significance of British nationality.

The two main concrete proposals in the White Paper for increasing the significance of British citizenship were for a citizenship ceremony and a test of knowledge of language and life in the UK. The proposal for a language test is legitimated in the following way:

Becoming British through registration or naturalisation is – or should be – a significant life event. It can be seen as an act of commitment to Britain and an important step in the process of achieving integration into our society. Yet, in spite of this, some applicants for naturalization do not have much practical knowledge about British life or language, possibly leaving them vulnerable and ill-equipped to take an active role in society. This can lead to social exclusion and may contribute to problems of polarisation between communities. We need to develop a sense of civic identity and shared values, and knowledge of the English language (or Welsh language or Scottish Gaelic, which are provided for in the British Nationality Act 1981), can undoubtedly support this objective. (Home Office, 2002, p. 32)

Requiring knowledge of the English language from citizenship applicants is part of increasing the symbolic value of British nationality by making naturalization “a significant life event” (which was also achieved through the introduction of a citizenship ceremony). Lack of knowledge of language (and “British life”) is identified as preventing taking an active role in society, and thus leading to social exclusion and community polarization. However, the real value of knowledge of English is the role it can play “develop[ing] a sense of civic identity and shared values.” Language is thus implicated in the identity aspect of citizenship, and in debates over national identity, what it means to be British. The issue of the relation between “English language” and “Britishness” will be examined in more depth below, in relation to the report of the Life in the UK advisory group, whose task it was to devise the contents of the new naturalization test.

Two other points can be made about the representation of language within the White Paper. First, language is most commonly represented as named varieties of language, usually “the English language” or simply “English.” This is not surprising since the value of language for the White Paper’s aim of increasing the significance of British nationality lies in the place of the English language within British identity, where it functions as “our common language.” (It should also be noted that, although the White Paper refers at times to “British language,” this also includes the ‘Welsh language’ and ‘Scots Gaelic’ as well as English.)

Secondly, most of the references to language are taken from what can be termed an educational or pedagogical discourse, for instance; “language teaching,” “language training,” “English language acquisition,” “language classes,” “courses in English for speakers of other languages.” This also should not be surprising since it relates to the White Paper’s stated goal of

“preparing people for citizenship by promoting language training and education for citizenship” (Home Office, 2002, p. 11), and reflects the recontextualization of the citizenship education agenda within naturalization policy.

The proposals relating to the naturalization procedure contained in the White Paper were formally enacted into law with the 2002 Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act. The new legislation also took the additional step of extending the requirement of passing the test to those applying for naturalization as spouses of British citizens, who had hitherto been exempt from the language requirement of the 1981 Nationality Act.

Neither the White Paper nor the new nationality legislation set forth the content of the proposed naturalization test. That task was delegated to an independent advisory group with the official remit “to advise the Home Secretary on the method, conduct and implementation of a ‘Life in the United Kingdom’ naturalization test” (Home Office, 2003b, p. 3). The main issue of contention in this respect was what was meant by “sufficient” knowledge of language and society. Chosen to chair the Life in the UK advisory group was Sir Bernard Crick, who had also served as the chair of the citizenship education advisory group. Given this fact, it can be expected that there will be continuities between the approach taken by the Life in the UK advisory group and the previous advisory group on citizenship education. An intertextual and interdiscursive analysis of the group’s final report, *The New and the Old* (Home Office, 2003b) identifies numerous links with the wider citizenship and citizenship education agenda.

The New and the Old

The remit of the Life in the UK advisory group established in 2002 was to determine the meaning of ‘sufficient’ in regards to the knowledge of language and life in the UK stipulated in

the reforms to naturalization law which were announced in the *Secure Borders, Safe Haven* White Paper and implemented in the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act. The Group's findings were presented in the report, *The New and the Old* (Home Office, 2003b), also referred to as the Crick Report after the group's chair, Sir Bernard Crick.

The report outlines, in Chapter 1, the group's remit and program of work against the background of the government's reform of nationality and immigration legislation. Of interest for the present purposes is the way that the formalization of the citizenship language requirement in a naturalization test is legitimated:

The language requirement has been part of nationality law for many years, but the requirement was undefined and in application varied, often perfunctory and sometimes uselessly minimal. The government has decided that this is quite unsuited to the changing needs of both employment and integration. (Home Office, 2003b, p. 4)

The importance of a more formal and presumably more robust language requirement for employment is expanded upon on the next page:

Considerable economic benefits follow from helping migrants to come into employment and helping those in employment to increase their skills and therefore income. Home Office research suggests that *English language skills* are associated with an increase of around 20 per cent in the likelihood of employment and also a greater potential for earnings for those already in work. This suggests that *English language training* may contribute directly to the growth of the United Kingdom economy through increasing the size of the workforce, as well as through savings to the exchequer in removing dependence on state aid and reducing tax credits. And – do we need to say? – that being employed restores dignity to the individual, just as unemployment and low pay are associated with a range of social problems hindering integration. (Home Office, 2003b, p. 5)

The prevalence of lexical items from an economic discourse in the above passage lends an aspect of hybridity to the report. This reflects the recontextualization of a discourse of language as skills

necessary for employment. This discourse of language is also apparent in relation to the discourse of integration in the report, discussed further below.

Another legitimization strategy that the report employs is “double-voiced” discourse implicitly rejecting actual or potential criticisms (Blackledge, 2005, p. 221). For example, the report describes the new requirements for naturalization, including knowledge of language, “not as a new hurdle but as a much needed entitlement.” (Home Office, 2003b, p. 8). The use of the negative (“not as a new hurdle”) implies the critique of some that the requirements are too onerous and will prevent people from acquiring citizenship. However, the explicit rebuttal of the implied criticism (that the requirement of knowledge of language should be seen ‘as a much needed entitlement’) is more than a rhetorical trope, but an intertextual, interdiscursive reference to British educational language policy, reflecting the same entitlement discourse which surrounded the promotion of Standard English in the National Curriculum in the 1980s and 90s (Ager, 1996, p. 71).

The links with other government policy agendas and discourses is evident in Chapter 2 of the report, “Our aims and assumptions,” which recontextualizes the government’s broader citizenship agenda, as the basis for its operationalization in the recommendations for the naturalization test. As seen from the following passage, the guiding principle behind the report is the aim of active citizenship:

The question of naturalisation requirements cannot be separated from the general aims of public policy to increase participative citizenship and community development, as shown in the recent establishment of *Citizenship as a National Curriculum subject* in the English schools.... [A]nd new or expanded initiatives are underway in all parts of the United Kingdom to increase adult participation and citizenship skills. (Home Office, 2003b, p. 9)

It is this policy agenda that is to be recontextualized within naturalization policy and extended to new citizens:

The two senses of “citizenship”, as nationality as defined by law and as participation in public life, should support each other. In what has long been a multicultural society, new citizens should be equipped to be active citizens. (Home Office, 2003b, p. 9)

The report also links its work to the UK’s long-standing policy of multiculturalism, as indicated in the last quote. As was seen above, “multiculturalism” was the name given to the policy framework, developed in the 1960s and 1970s, aimed both at the integration of new immigrants and the promotion of good race relations between the white community and settled Black and Minority Ethnic (BME) communities. The report discusses the issue of multiculturalism in relation to the identity that should be associated with British citizenship. In outlining its notion of British identity, the report presents both continuity with as well as a critique of past policy. The notion of British identity that emerges is one that is presented as not cultural assimilation but which grants a privileged position to the English language in providing the basis for a common citizenship.

Firstly, the report starts by asserting the premise that Britain is a multicultural society; however, the diversity of identities in such societies is presented as being possible only based on a framework of common civic values:

Who are we British? For a long time the United Kingdom has been a multinational state composed of England, Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales, and also a multicultural society. What do we mean by a multicultural society? We see a multicultural society as one made up of a diverse range of cultures and identities, and one that emphasises the need for a continuous process of mutual engagement and learning about each other with respect, understanding and tolerance – whether in social, cultural, educational, professional, political or legal spheres. Such societies, under a framework of common civic values and common legal and political institutions, not only understand and tolerate

diversities of identity but should also respect and take pride in them. (Home Office, 2003b, p. 10)

Then, the notion of British identity is presented as an overarching identity, which can bind all the other identities together:

To be British seems to us to mean that we respect the laws, the elected parliamentary and democratic political structures, traditional values of mutual tolerance, respect for equal rights and mutual concern; and that we give our allegiance to the state (as commonly symbolised in the Crown) in return for its protection. To be British is to respect those over-arching specific institutions, values, beliefs and traditions that bind us all, the different nations and cultures, together in peace and in a legal order. (Home Office, 2003b, p. 11)

Note how “to be British” is presented as respecting the law, giving allegiance to the state, etc.

This reflects what Joppke identified as the paradox of the civic integration paradigm, where particular national identities can only be expressed in terms of the values of applied political liberalism (Joppke, 2008).

What comes next is another example of double-voiced discourse, whereby this notion of integration through a common, British civic identity is defended against charges of assimilationism: “So to be British does not mean assimilation into a common culture so that original identities are lost” (p. 11). The notion of identity being presented is claimed to be consistent with the liberal norms of pluralism that underlie multiculturalism. However, there is also an implicit criticism of multiculturalism: “There is wisdom in the old saying ‘variety is the spice of life’.... But such variety does not mean ‘communities operating on the basis of a series of parallel lives’” (Home Office, 2003b, p. 11).

Here the intertextual reference to the Cantle report and its diagnosis of the causes of the disturbances in the northern towns is used to legitimate a critique of multiculturalism which, not

so much a retreat or the pronouncement of its death, does entail a reformulation of the concept, in contrast to separatist multiculturalism, with the focus shifting to the “things that we have in common.”

Finally, the report presents the role of the English language within this new identity:

Use of the English language itself is possibly the most important means of diverse communities participating in a common culture with key values in common. There is also the fact that people need some level of English for the crucial matter of basic employment as well as for everyday life. Immigrants may choose to work other than in an English-speaking situation, but they should not feel trapped in it by reason of not having English. But even so, large areas of Wales and some parts of Scotland furnish clear examples that bilingual cultures are not inherent threats to the unity of the state and to the integration of diverse communities, old and new. Speaking mainly one language in the home and mainly another at work has not threatened the integration of either state or society. But if some in the home cannot speak any English, that is plainly to their great disadvantage. (Home Office, 2003b, p. 11)

The English language is presented as the best means for participating in the common culture and values underlying British citizenship. Furthermore, the important place of English in the British identity is not meant to exclude or demean the presence of other languages within Britain. This leads Blackledge to state that the Crick report shows an enlightened acceptance of bilingualism. In contrast to the “topos of threat” in most other public and media discourse surrounding bilingualism, Crick’s claim that bilingualism is not a threat to unity is “the most positive official reference to languages other than English” (Blackledge, 2005, p. 222).

Naturalization Language Test

The most important section of the report for present purposes is Chapter 5, “Language and tests for naturalization,” which presents the group’s recommendations for the naturalization language test. Based on the view that the test should not be “unduly onerous,” the report states that the purpose of the test should be “educative and integrative” (Home Office, 2003b, p. 20).

Accordingly, the group rejects the idea of a test of a common standard of language, instead recommending the assessment of progress in language learning:

So WE RECOMMEND as a major component of naturalisation the assessment of applicants' *progress* in developing language skills, rather than requiring a common language standard for all applicants. Assessment should demonstrate progress between the levels set out in the National Standards for adult literacy and the Adult ESOL Core Curriculum. Progress should be measured from the applicant's starting point. Any "one size fits all" approach is unlikely to be successful. (Home Office, 2003b, p. 20)

As mentioned above, the levels for language ability are those of the National Standards for English set out in the Adult ESOL Core Curriculum. These are defined in the appendix (Home Office, 2003b, p. 21). Within the testing regime, ESOL Entry level 3 is a threshold, with those above taking the Life in the UK test, and those below required to demonstrate progress in an ESOL with Citizenship course of study. The level of language proficiency required was aligned with a mainstream qualification that would be recognized by employers and further education institutions, namely the ESOL Skills for Life framework (UK Border Agency, Home Office, personal communication). ESOL Entry 3 is defined as follows, according to the national standards, for each of the four language skills. For Speaking and Listening, adults at Entry level 3 can:

listen and respond to spoken language, including straightforward information and narratives, and follow straightforward explanations and instructions, both face-to-face and on the telephone; speak to communicate information, feelings and opinions on familiar topics, using appropriate formality, both face-to-face and on the telephone; engage in discussion with one or more people in a familiar situation, making relevant points and responding to what others say to reach a shared understanding about familiar topics ... connected with education, training, work and social roles. (DfES, 2001)

Reading at Entry level 3 entails the ability to:

read and understand short, straightforward texts on familiar topics accurately and independently [and] read and obtain information from everyday sources ... such as

forms, notes, records, e-mails, narratives, letters, diagrams, simple instructions, short reports. (DfES, 2001)

Adults at Entry 3 for writing can:

write to communicate information with some adaptation to the intended audience ... in documents such as forms, notes, records, e-mails, letters, narratives, simple instructions, short reports. (DfES, 2001).

Finally, the standard of Entry 3 of the Skills for Life framework was deemed to be equivalent to the Council of Europe's Common European Framework of Reference for language learning (CEFR) level B1 (UK Border Agency, Personal Interview). The CEFR defines an individual at proficiency level B1 as someone who:

[c]an understand the main points of clear standard input on familiar matters regularly encountered in work, school, leisure, etc. Can deal with most situations likely to arise whilst travelling in an area where the language is spoken. Can produce simple connected text on topics which are familiar or of personal interest. Can describe experiences and events, dreams, hopes and ambitions and briefly give reasons and explanations for opinions and plans." (Council of Europe, 2001b, p. 5)

Within the Advisory Group's discussions, the choice of a level of language proficiency for the new citizenship test was highly contested. The nature and extent of the contestation over the choice is revealed in the accounts of two participants in the Advisory Group whom I interviewed. The two individuals, providing somewhat contrasting viewpoints, were CH, the Technical Advisor at the UK Border Agency, and an ESOL researcher from King's College London, MC, who has written on the implementation of the citizenship testing regime in ESOL classrooms from a critical perspective (Cooke, 2009). From the perspective of the UK Border Agency, CH described the discussions in the Advisory Group over the level of proficiency to be required in the new citizenship-testing regime as follows:

now / one of the really interesting discussions when / the advisory group was / developing its recommendations was / you know what is the appropriate level / what should we expect of them // and we got in a bunch of / language experts / and they were some of the hottest discussions that you could imagine around that / because / there was actually no right answer ... / a:nd / so there was hot debate about the absolute level / but at the end of the day / we agree:d that we would have / a moderate level of English / technically its ESOL entry 3 ... that equates to B1 / on the Council of Europe Framework / which is known as- / it's 'Threshold' / where you've got / kind of a developing competence / you know you're relatively confident / in familiar situations / you can just about cope in unfamiliar situations / but by no means would we say you were / quote 'fluent' / kind of in the middle somewhere (CH, UK Border Agency, personal communication, August 25, 2010)

Even after opting for a "moderate level" of English language proficiency, concerns continued to be raised by members of the committee about the achievability of that level for all immigrants.

These concerns led to the inclusion of an 'alternate route' of an ESOL course with citizenship materials within the UK citizenship testing regime:

now the / ESOL experts said / that even that would be unachievable for some people / particularly those who'd had no formal education / again with the migration patterns to the UK / that was an issue for us / so we came up with this / wonderful idea of / progression ... you can actually become a citizen / with a- a very basic level of knowledge / provided that you've shown you've progressed / one level / in the ESOL framework / that's why these materials are / geared towards particular language levels / so we've got pre-entry to entry 1 / entry 1 to entry 2 / entry 2 to entry 3 and so on / so that's the alternative route if you like / most people can get to entry 3 without too much hassle / and they'll take our ... stand alone test ... / uhm but others / as I say / will take a language course / and they'll produce a certificate at the end of it / saying they've / gone through one level / to the next (CH, UK Border Agency, personal communication, August 25, 2010)

From the perspective of the ESOL professionals on the Advisory group, the alternate ESOL route was the result of fierce contestation on the part of ESOL researchers and practitioners and was seen as a sort of compromise that was won by those opposed to the whole idea of a citizenship test:

now a lot of the ESOL people / on the committee / never agreed with a test / they never thought it was a good idea // however / they were in this committee and as far as I can tell / the test was never up for argument / there was always going to be a test / but some of the ESOL people on the committee were saying- were fighting against the idea of a test / all along / which is quite interesting because I think they kind of believed that / there was not going to- that they could convince them to / only have citizenship classes / because a test is by its nature // highly problematic / discriminatory / used for sorting purposes / so there was always this very blurred / weird / feeling around citizenship testing and ESOL / being brought / together ... and / as I said / because some of them thought they might even be able to fight the idea of a test / they secured this dual kind of thing that we've got ... where if people are not up to a certain level they can do classes instead ... so that was secured by people on the Crick committee / who were insisting that the level- / originally / the Home Office just wanted a test / and it was going to be originally a language test / and so the arguments that ensued / on the Crick committee around this / kept saying / no you can't test / you can't just keep testing / what about people who for whatever reason / haven't reached that level / and it was going to be at level Entry 3 ... which is quite high / and so people were saying / it's too high / it's too high / you know what about / all those people who've been around for years but have been working in / you know / ethnic minority units or they've been / you know / raising kids and they've been living in communities that / have not meant that they've needed to go out and // do a lot of English and stuff like that / so they really really fought that one / and secured / this deal that we now have / which is if you don't have the level up to Entry 3 // then you can do citizenship classes / which are ESOL classes with a citizenship element in them / so that was a result that came out of lobbying very hard / from the ESOL people on the Crick committee (MC, ESOL Researcher, personal communication, August 27, 2010)

While the compromise of the ESOL with citizenship route was the result of contestation over the very idea of a citizenship test, the subsequent “buy in” to the idea of a citizenship ESOL course on the part of the ESOL community, which will be discussed below in relation to the development of the citizenship materials for ESOL, was achieved on the basis of the way that the citizenship testing regime was discursively articulated as an extension of the citizenship education agenda.

Educative and Integrative

The majority of the references to “language” within the Crick report are taken from what can be termed a pedagogical discourse. There are numerous references to language teaching,

language learning, language development, language classes and language courses. There is also explicit mention of ESOL, with mentions of language proficiency and language assessment referenced to the national ESOL standards. This reflects the continuity between the group's recommendations on language and naturalization and the citizenship education agenda.

However, alongside the pedagogical discourse of language there also appears an economic discourse of language use as “language skills.” This hybrid discourse of language reflects the incorporation of education, and language education, within the Skills for Life agenda. The educative aspect of the legitimization of the naturalization language test is also expressed in neo-liberal terms:

In making a recommendation for naturalisation which demonstrates an individual's progression from one ESOL level to the next, we believe that we are encouraging new citizens to become lifelong learners. Such learners will be likely to continue to develop their language skills, and a whole range of other employment, recreational, educational and social skills, long after they have gained citizenship. (Home Office, 2003b, p. 23)

The goal of getting individuals into education is part of a larger policy aim of promoting “lifelong learning,” a buzzword of the KBE discourse (Jessop, 2004).

From the text of the chapter, it is clear that the integrative function of the test is based on a notion of integration that is primarily economic. This is evident in relation to the levels of language ability to which the test is referenced, namely the National Standards for English and the Adult ESOL Core Curriculum, which were developed as part of the Skills for Life agenda to increase the skills levels of the UK workforce (p. 21). This focus on skills for employability is specifically brought to bear on immigrant communities within the report. Presented in a shaded text box within the main body of the text, is an extract from a Cabinet Office Strategy Unit report, entitled “Ethnic minorities and the Labour Market:”

Labour market achievement is ultimately linked with the economic and social inclusion of minority groups. If ethnic minorities are overrepresented among the unemployed or the economically inactive population, or are employed in jobs which are low paid or have limited prospects for promotion and employment, then, as a group, they will tend to be marginalised. Such disengagement from mainstream society will result in limited participation in public institutions ... which may in turn exacerbate existing tensions. (Home Office, 2003b, p. 24)

The Operationalization of Knowledge of Life in the UK

As was seen above, the enrolment of the ESOL practitioner community within the citizenship-testing regime was achieved only through intense contestation over the nature of the regime in question. While the uneasiness with testing was and remains a sticking point for many within the ESOL community, the belief in the value of citizenship education as empowering for prospective citizens was part of the perspective of many of the ESOL practitioners involved in the Advisory Group's discussions. As MC, the ESOL researcher who was involved in the discussions, describes it:

there were also people who did / buy into ... or who were convinced of / the arguments that / this legislation would be empowering for / students ... I personally don't subscribe to that but I can see the power of it // because the idea of it was that it was going to be about / knowledge that would help people to / be / fuller / functioning citizens / then by the dint of that argument means that / classes about citizenship / had to be a good thing / because people would have more / knowledge / and therefore that would be much more / likely for them to be empowered and integrated better / so that's the kind of liberal / argument / around why / the ESOL people bought this / you know // which is not to say that there wasn't a huge row about it at the time (MC, ESOL researcher, personal communication, August 27, 2010)

It was on this basis that the ESOL community was incorporated into the Life in the UK project and the implementation of the Crick Report's recommendations for the naturalization-testing regime. These recommendations were operationalized and materialized with the development of the *ESOL Materials for Citizenship* (NIACE, 2010[2006]) for the ESOL route for naturalization

and the production of the handbook for the Life in the UK naturalization test, *Life in the UK: A Journey to Citizenship* (Home Office, 2007[2004]). These two texts will be examined below to see how the focus of the citizenship agenda on civic values and active participation was continued in a program of citizenship education for new immigrants, delivered largely through a course of language teaching, as well as a test of knowledge of life in the UK.

ESOL Materials for Citizenship

The proposals of the Crick Report brought ESOL policy, which since 2001 had been part of the government's skills agenda, within citizenship policy. The new testing regime required the development of materials for the ESOL with citizenship course. These were developed by the Home Office and NIACE in 2005, as the *ESOL Materials for Citizenship* (NIACE, 2010[2006]).

The Crick report had stated that in devising the content of the citizenship test, the focus should be on practical knowledge with the guiding principle being promotion of active citizenship: "The overriding priority in a Programme of Studies aimed at integration must be for new arrivals to learn sources of practical help and information relevant to active citizenship" (Home Office, 2003b, p. 13). Therefore, the group proposed a unified "'language-with-civic-content' teaching and learning" program (Home Office, 2003b, p. 13). The content of the program of studies was covered by six categories, namely: British national institutions in recent historical context; Britain as a multicultural society; knowing the law; employment; sources of help and information; and everyday needs.

In the development the ESOL citizenship materials, the six focus areas suggested in the Crick Report were elaborated into 12 themes. These were: "What is Citizenship?," "Parliament," "The UK in Europe," "The Commonwealth and the UN," "UK History and Geography," "The

UK as a Diverse Society,” “Human Rights,” “Working in the UK,” “Health,” “Housing,” “Education,” “Community Engagement,” and “Law” (HO & NIACE, 2005, n.p.).

In terms of content, the materials dealt with a lot of issues that ESOL teachers had been doing as part of their practice from years but on an ad hoc basis with no support in terms of materials or a curriculum (CT, ESOL Lead, NIACE, personal communication, August 19, 2010). Aside from formalizing things, the ESOL citizenship materials also broadened what was taught, and in this respect were welcomed by teachers, especially the more interesting topics of human rights. Indeed the materials were used in an empowering way by some teachers and were popular with students. The ESOL Lead at NIACE, CT, who was involved in the materials’ development, described the materials and their reception as follows:

I think there is value / in those materials in that / uhm they give some good quality content / fo:r- / and a context / in which the ESOL teacher can deliver / the national curriculum // I think / they’re also thought provoking a:nd / many learners li:ke the slightly more challenging / aspects of some of those materials / for example arou:nd // the law / equal opportunities / Westminster and how it works ... when we were drafting these materials / and when we first went out / to ask practitioners / it was very interesting that the ESOL teachers / were quite protective of / the ESOL learners / and said ‘oh I don’t think this- / I think this is a bit too difficult / I don’t think my learners will like this / no I’m not sure about this / we’ve never done this before’ / a:nd actually those newer sections / were the most popular / and learners loved them / absolutely loved the:m and / many of them made trips down to the houses of Parliament and / you know / had the local councilor come in and talk to the group / and- or the local chief of police / and held him to account / for whatever they felt was an issue in their local area / so actually they proved to be extremely popular items so maybe: / maybe: those materials have broadened the kind of content / that ESOL teachers are delivering at the moment (CT, NIACE, personal communication, August 19, 2010)

This evaluation of the citizenship materials for ESOL and of their reception by ESOL teachers was confirmed to me by the ESOL researcher, MC, in our interview²³:

they managed to get really really great people ... to do ... the materials ... you know they're great / they're very good / and so / on the one hand some ESOL teachers were / going you know- / 'queasy' / 'Home Office test' / on the other hand / they were going / 'yeah but / you know / at least it's something for us to teach / it's better than / you know / 'Mrs. Khan goes to the doctor's every week' / it's better than / you know / 'get change out of a pound down the market' / which is what the old ESOL / fa:re had always been / so people were kind of inspired by the fact that they could talk about / human rights / and they could do interesting stuff for once / and so gradually it started to be kind of accepted / and became part of the ESOL // sce:ne as it were (MC, ESOL Researcher, personal communication, August 27, 2010)

As these accounts show, the citizenship materials for ESOL did open up an ideological space for a pedagogy of empowerment within ESOL citizenship classes. In this way, the materials reflect a great deal of continuity in terms of the values of civic participation first elaborated in the program of political literacy for citizenship education (DfEE, 1998). Indeed, the type of participation that was being promoted in some ESOL classrooms, for example holding the local chief of police to account for issues in the local community mentioned in the above quote, are quite radical practices of citizenship.

Subsequent revisions of the citizenship materials for ESOL, however, ordered in 2009 by the Home Office, led to an increase in emphasis on volunteering and the addition of sections on community engagement (CT, ESOL Lead, NIACE, personal communication, August 19, 2010). This reflects the shift in focus in terms of active citizenship, advocated in the Commission on Integration and Cohesion report, away from abstract instruction in civic values and onto the

²³ For a more critical view of the way that the materials and the new testing regime in general were received by learners in one ESOL for citizenship class, see Cooke (2009).

types of practical activities that were being advanced in the community cohesion agenda, especially volunteering in the community.

To see exactly how the government's agenda in terms of active citizenship has been operationalized within the Life in the UK testing regime, including the ESOL route, let us examine the Life in the UK Handbook and the ESOL citizenship materials.

Life in the UK: A Journey to citizenship

A look at the content of the study guide or handbook for the Life in the UK test, *Life in the UK: A Journey to Citizenship* (HO, 2007[2004]) reveals the tendency for the practices of active citizenship to become localized at the scale of the “community.” The first edition of the handbook reflected the republican discourse of citizenship that had informed the broader civic renewal agenda. The influence of a communitarian view of citizenship was increasingly evident following the revision of the handbook in 2007 to better align with the government's community cohesion agenda.²⁴ Significantly, this included the addition of a chapter on “Building Better Communities.” While this is not one of the chapters that is tested as part of the Life in the UK test, its place in the materials does provide learners with a concretization of the notion of active citizenship by describing the practice of being a good, full, and active citizen through contributing to the community.

Active citizenship in the ESOL Materials for Citizenship

The citizenship materials for ESOL, developed as the curriculum for the ESOL route within the Life in the UK testing regime, were revised in 2010 to bring them more in line with

²⁴ This revision also involved a complete rewrite of the Handbook at CEFR level B1, to bring it in line with the language requirement for naturalization (UK Border Agency, Home Office, personal communication).

the government's community cohesion agenda. As a result, the materials demonstrate a liberal discourse of citizenship heavily tinged with communitarian elements. For example, the first unit, 'Citizenship and Society: An overview', provides learners with a list of 12 vocabulary items for citizenship. These are: *society, community, respect, government, values, morality, charity, freedom, diversity, justice, rights, responsibilities*. The 2010 revisions included the addition of two entirely new sections, "Volunteering" and "Getting involved in your community." The first of these presents the concept of volunteering to learners and relates the practice of volunteering to the notion of active citizenship. This focus on practices of volunteering for being an active citizen is carried over in the chapter, "Getting involved in your community." Of particular interest is the sample vocabulary exercise provided in the section "Volunteering and Active Citizenship," where learners are asked to match a set of six lexical items to a set of six definitions. The six vocabulary items are: *community, befriending, active citizenship, integrate, volunteer, and commitment*. What is interesting is that the vocabulary relating to citizenship is strikingly similar to the policy discourse on citizenship examined above (e.g., the terms *community, active citizenship, and integration*). Moreover, most of the definitions provided for the terms are circular, referring to the other terms in the set, thus constituting a closed discourse. For instance, "to integrate" is defined as "become a full member of a community/society," while "active citizenship" is defined as "becoming very involved in the community by volunteering." This discourse sets up equivalency between integrating and active citizenship as constituting full membership / involvement in the community. Finally, the term "community" is defined as "a group of people who live in the same area and/or have the same interests, religion race, etc." Of note is how the notion of community is given a spatial as well as a moral, ethical or cultural

basis. This will be important for the discussion of practices of active citizenship, especially volunteering.

The aim of the ESOL citizenship materials, just like the citizenship agenda as a whole, is not simply to provide learners with the knowledge necessary to participate fully in society, but to inculcate certain practices of citizenship. The element of participation inherent in the notion of active citizenship has been noticed by observers, but the specific nature of the practices that constitute active citizenship has not been examined. The notion of participation is central to a variety of conceptions of citizenship, be they liberal, republican or communitarian, where it may take a variety of forms such as voting, running for political office, membership in voluntary associations, etc. The particular form of participation privileged in the active citizenship agenda is volunteering, which articulates not only with a communitarian conception of citizenship, but with a more general phenomenon of privatization of responsibility onto individual citizens that is part of an advanced liberal governmental strategy for the management of societal risks, e.g., economic marginalization, social unrest, etc. (Rose, 1996, p. 58). Within the ESOL citizenship materials, the virtue of volunteering is expressed in terms of benefits for individual migrants themselves as well as the collective society. For individual migrants, volunteering is a way to develop valuable social capital, including the opportunity for English language learning, which will further their economic and social inclusion. For society as a whole, volunteering, especially *inter*-community rather than *intra*-community volunteering, establishes links between communities (or creates “bridging social capital”), contributing to the development of a broader sense of community necessary for a cohesive society, the ultimate goal of the community cohesion agenda. From this perspective, proficiency in the English language derives its value as

social capital in respect to a citizenship agenda, which locates active participation in the domain of the community, and in respect to a community cohesion agenda based on the imagining of society as a “community of communities.”²⁵

Alignment of Naturalization and Immigration Policy

The Extension of Language Testing

The testing regime announced in the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act and developed by the Life in the UK advisory group was implemented in 2005. Although originally a naturalization test, it was subsequently extended, in April 2007, to applicants for settlement, or “indefinite leave to remain” (ILR). Blackledge (2009) links this decision to a speech by Prime Minister Tony Blair, in December 2006, entitled “The Duty to Integrate,” which itself was a response to the terror attacks in London on July 7, 2005 (“7/7”). While undoubtedly legitimated by the discourse of integration, the extension also came in the context of the on-going overhaul of the immigration routes within the managed migration system. It was during the same period as the extension of naturalization language testing that language requirements became a part of the selective admission of economic migrants, first with the introduction of a language requirement in the Highly Skilled Migrant Program (HSMP) in 2006 and subsequently as a central feature of the PBS implemented two years later. The simultaneous opening of the routes for economic migrants and the promotion of citizenship were making the metaphorical “journey to citizenship”

²⁵ It should be noted that at the time when the research for this dissertation was conducted, it was unclear how the change in government from Labour to a Conservative/Lib-Dem coalition, and the substitution of a “Big Society” for a “Community Cohesion” agenda, would effect the content of the ESOL citizenship materials. Ultimately, the question has been mooted by the decision in 2012 to abolish the ESOL route within the naturalization testing regime. Henceforth, all applicants will be required to submit results of a language test at Entry level 3 or higher and pass the Life in the UK test.

in the title of the Life in the UK Handbook into a real “path to citizenship” in an immigration procedure where immigration and naturalization procedures are not separate tracks but different stages on the same track. It is only logical that the requirements instituted for the naturalization stage should come to be aligned with those for settlement and admission. This also entails a new approach to integration within increasingly front-loaded immigration policy, where measures for promoting integration are no longer left to the stage of naturalization or even to second and third generation settled communities, but are instituted as requirements for permanent residency and even admission.

This trend of aligning the citizenship and immigration control aspects of the immigration regimes was evident as early as the Green Paper, *Controlling Our Borders* (Home Office, 2005a). As was seen above, the main focus of the Green Paper was the proposed PBS for managed migration. However, it also reflected a revaluation of citizenship undertaken by the UK government concurrently with the development of the managed migration approach. It is here that the “promotion of citizenship” was announced as a policy aim: “The Government will strongly encourage those who have permanent status to make a commitment to the UK by accepting the full rights and responsibilities of citizenship” (Home Office, 2005a, p. 22). The effects of this promotion of citizenship within immigration and citizenship policy are a sharpening of the distinction between temporary and permanent migration, and the eventual alignment of the requirements for permanent residency with those of naturalization.

Our Common Bond

The growing alignment of citizenship policy with immigration and integration policy is evident in the review of citizenship by Lord Goldsmith, the report of which is entitled *Our*

Common Bond (UK. House of Lords, 2007/08). The reference to “common bond” in the title reflects the aim of the citizenship agenda to increase the significance of British nationality as shared sense of citizenship. Accordingly, the report proposed a number of “symbolic” measures to deepen the meaning of citizenship as a way of fostering a common sense of belonging, including instituting a national citizenship day, as well as improving naturalization ceremonies.

However, the value of English is not merely symbolic, as “our common language,” but in relation to more material aspects of integration as well:

Establishing proficiency in English for new migrants also has clear benefits for UK society, not only in terms of facilitating social intercourse but in the workplace as well. (UK. House of Lords, 2007/08, p. 111).

In a similar vein, the report recommends that delivery of ESOL must take into account “local strategic intentions relating to economic regeneration and community cohesion” (p. 113). Also, ESOL “[c]ourses should not be stand alone but delivered within learning pathways towards economic participation and active citizenship” (p. 113). These passages link the review’s proposals around English language and citizenship interdiscursively with the government agendas within immigration and integration policy, in particular with the social inclusion discourse underlying the community cohesion agenda.

More specifically, the review reflects the alignment between the immigration control and naturalization regimes in its endorsement of the idea of a points system for citizenship, bringing the citizenship regime full circle back to its origins in the system of managed migration set out in the *Secure Borders, Safe Haven* White Paper. This proposal of a points system for citizenship was elaborated in the proposals surrounding the implementation of “earned citizenship” in the Green Paper, *The Path to Citizenship*, examined below.

The Path to Citizenship

The Green Paper, *The Path to Citizenship* (Home Office, 2008, February), announces the third phase of the government's migration reform, a process of simplifying UK immigration law, which was begun in 2006, and included consultations and a government response paper in the Summer and Winter of 2007. The proposals set out in the Green Paper were to be incorporated into new immigration legislation, namely the Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act of 2009. Beyond a narrow focus on immigration law, the Green Paper recontextualizes within migration policy the government's wider citizenship agenda "to strengthen our shared values and citizenship" (p. 6), as well as the community cohesion agenda to help local areas "make the most of diversity being able to respond to the tensions it may cause" (Home Office, 2008, February, p. 12). It is linked intertextually with these other policy agendas through explicit reference to the report of the Commission on Integration and Cohesion, *Our Shared Future*, as well as the Goldsmith review of citizenship, the final report of which (*Our Common Bond*) would come out later in the following year (UK. House of Lords, 2008).

The notion of "path" or "journey" to citizenship reflects the government's ongoing goal of promotion of citizenship, that is, encouraging those who have settled in the UK to apply for and naturalize as British citizens. However, in the specific context of the Green Paper, the path to citizenship introduces an element of conditionality to the journey as well. Not only are the routes and stages in the immigration process simplified, but a crucial new stage of "probationary citizenship" is introduced, based on the premise that citizenship must be earned:

Our central proposal for reform of the journey to citizenship is that, alongside strengthening the rights of citizenship, citizenship must be earned. The unifying idea is that there is a deal for citizenship: that we welcome newcomers, but anyone who wants to

remain here long term must speak our language, obey the law and contribute to the community. (Home Office, 2008, February, p. 11)

Note how the mention of a “deal” seems to entail a contractual notion of citizenship, consistent with the discourse of rights *and* responsibilities of citizenship. A contract or deal is normally entered into freely by two equal parties, and establishes a set of mutual obligations between them. However, in this case the onus is purely on one side, namely that of the citizenship applicant who must first earn the right to benefit from the agreed upon terms. With no mention of any corresponding obligations on the part of the government, this does not seem to be much of a “deal.” Indeed the use of the term “deal” then should be seen as an (interdiscursive) reference to other kinds of deal that have been part of New Labour social policy, namely the “New Deal” welfare-to-work schemes aimed at individual responsabilization as part of the neo-liberal dismantling of the welfare state.

The inclusion of “speaking our language” as one of the conditions for progression to probationary citizenship, is legitimated in the following ways. First it is legitimated with reference to the views expressed in public consultations, which identified a “common language” as an important factor in integration:

Speaking a common language was the first and clearest value that the public identified. In every group discussion we saw, people were definite that speaking English is the crucial basis on which every other effort to create an integrated society is built. (Home Office, 2008, February, p. 15)

A subsequent use of “*our* common language” (cf. “speak our language” above) would seem to set up a dichotomy between “us” and “them,” which reinforces the exclusionary aspect of citizenship and entails a notion of integration that is conditional on “them” becoming like “us.” While this is true, the notion of integration does at least provide an opportunity for inclusion,

however, conditional. What is interesting is not the fact that integration is conditional, but rather what the conditions are. In this regard, it is notable how the proposal is legitimated in terms of the goals of the wider citizenship agenda, namely strengthening shared values:

Because we want to put British values at the heart of the immigration system we propose to strengthen the English language requirements within the journey to citizenship. We believe we should expect those with a long term future in the UK, whether as probationary citizens, permanent residents or full British citizens, to demonstrate progress in their grasp of English language and knowledge of life in the UK. (Home Office, 2008, February, p. 24)

The other conditions for progression to probationary citizenship give an indication of what these shared values might be, namely: “working hard and paying taxes,” “obeying the law,” and “demonstrating active citizenship” (p. 25, emphasis in original). The idea that the active citizens are *economically* active citizens is reinforced in the subsequent paragraph:

Evidence suggests that fluency in English increases the chance that an ethnic minority immigrant in the UK is employed by about 22 percentage points and raises their likely earnings by 18-20%. Free ESOL provision is targeted at those most in need to support our objective of maximising the economic benefits of migration to the UK. (Home Office, 2008, February, p. 25)

The reference to the “maximizing the economic benefits of migration to the UK” reminds one that this document is also part of the managed migration agenda, and that the “path to citizenship” that is being set forth brings together the selective admission agenda of the points-based system and the language-testing regime of the citizenship agenda.

Summary

This chapter has presented the final component of the analysis of the UK case study, focusing on the revaluation of the national language within UK citizenship policy. It has traced the motivation for this revaluation through the recontextualization within the domain of

naturalization policy of a discourse of active citizenship taken from the New Labour government's civil renewal agenda for citizenship education. It also showed how the implementation of the citizenship-testing regime, in the form of the Life in the UK test and ESOL for citizenship route, reflects the operationalization of the active citizenship discourse rather than a desire to restrict access to citizenship. Finally it accounted for the growing alignment between the immigration control and naturalization regimes in terms of the common function of the language policy measures in the responsabilization of immigrants/citizens, in particular through participation in the labour market and thus contributing economically to UK society. The following chapters of Part IV will compare the findings of the two case studies drawing some general conclusions regarding the revaluation of the national language in immigration, integration, and citizenship policy.

CHAPTER 10: NEO-LIBERAL GOVERNANCE OF IMMIGRATION: LANGUAGE SKILLS AND THE KNOWLEDGE BASED ECONOMY

The chapters of the previous two parts of this dissertation have presented analyses of the two case studies, identifying and explaining examples of the revaluation of the national language within the immigration and citizenship regimes of the UK and Canada. This comparison across different cases and contexts allows us to draw some conclusions as to the role of national languages within state's immigration and citizenship policies in the current era of globalization. This and the following two chapters of Part IV will present these conclusions as evidence for the finding that the revaluation of the national language in UK and Canada is related to their attempts to implement and deal with the effects of neo-liberal economic and state restructuring (see Table 2, p. 259). In these attempts, the revalued national language functions as a political technology for the governance of migration, the integration of immigrants, and of citizenship. As will be shown, these states' attempt to reassert the national language as a basis for social integration and cohesion in a post-national era is related to the adoption of neo-liberal political techniques and an advanced liberal rationality of government. This finding has implications for our understanding of the motivation behind, as well as the effects of the particular policies on language, immigration, and citizenship, which will be explored in the final chapter of this dissertation.

Extending a Model of Economic Rationality to the Immigration Domain

The revaluation of language within the immigration regimes of Canada and the UK was carried out as part of the extension to the domain of immigrant selection and immigration control of "a model of economic rationality" (Burchell, 1993). This model of economic rationality

applied to immigrant selection, in the system of managed migration in the UK and the human capital model in Canada, is one that attempted to maximize the benefits of immigration to the Canadian and UK economies. The cost benefit analysis for achieving these goals involved the use of specific “calculative practices” to sort the potentially economically valuable migrants from those who posed a risk of being a fiscal drain on the state. These practices took the form of the points systems implemented in the Canada and the UK for the selection of immigrants. However, this calculation also required a particular notion of who was an economically valuable migrant in the current political economic context. This was provided by the neo-liberal discourse of skills, which allowed for the identification of skilled and highly skilled migrants by measuring their human capital attributes. Chief among these human capital attributes is language ability. The assessment of language ability as part of calculative practices of immigrant selection was enabled by the technologization of language, which has occurred as a result of its commodification as a valuable skill in the new economy. The role of language within these regimes has been more closely associated with a particular neo-liberal macro-economic strategy, namely the construction of a knowledge-based economy. Thus debates over specific language policies in relation to immigration reflect a broader tension between approaches to managing economic migration.

In Canada, the reforms to the immigration system were aimed at aligning it more closely with economic priorities, expressed in terms of increasing the competitiveness of the Canadian economy. This was to be achieved through the selection of immigrants based on their ability to contribute to economic growth and innovation in Canada (CIC, 2002). The IRPA regulations adopted a clearly neo-liberal human capital approach to immigrant selection as part of the

consolidation of a neo-liberal immigration policy regime focused on the economic worth and self sufficiency of immigrants (Bauder, 2008, p. 291; cf. Abu-Laban, 1998; Arat-Koç, 1999). The key feature of this new approach was “upgrad[ing] skill selection for permanent immigrants, with greater emphasis on education and language knowledge than previously and less emphasis on specific occupational skills” (Reitz, 2004, p. 128). The modifications to selection criteria under IRPA, including the increased weighting of language ability, were meant to “emphasize human capital attributes and flexible skills” (Tolley, 2003, p. 1).

In the UK, the New Labour reforms to the immigration regime took a strategic view of migration as a vital source of labour contributing to the prosperity of the UK economy (Home Office, 2006, p. 5). In the international context, where global migration represents a valuable source of human capital in the form of skills and expertise with major economic benefits for receiving countries, the UK was at a competitive disadvantage to other developed countries in the number of foreign nationals it was taking in. Accordingly, the primary focus of the UK reform process was the “economic benefit to the UK” which will come from a new managed system of migration (p. 9). The previously existing immigration rules were found to be inefficient and overly complex and “not reflect[ing] the UK’s competitive position in the global economy as a destination for the brightest and best migrants” (p. 8). To remedy this, one of the key intended outcomes of the new points-based system is “better identifying and attracting of migrants who have most to contribute to the UK” (p. 1). The priority of the new system is to manage migration in such as way as to fill gaps in the UK labour market. In order to achieve this, the system will be coordinated through new governmental apparatuses in the form of a Migration Advisory Committee and Migration Impacts Forum (Home Office, 2007, p. 4). In addition, a

Skills Advisory Body (SAB) will be put in place, comprised of representatives from business, labour unions, and the public sector appointed by the Secretary of State for Education and Skills, whose role it will be “to identify shortages in skills and labour on a sector basis” (Home Office, 2006, p. 27-28).

Beyond simply filling gaps in the current market, the new system is also part of a strategy to transform the UK labour market by focusing on attracting those migrants who are highly skilled. Attracting such migrants, according to the Home Office, is one of the “high-level benefits” of the new system intended to “increase the skills and knowledge base of the UK” (Home Office, 2006, p. 9). Indeed, the statement of intent for the first Tier to be launched, Tier 1 - Highly skilled migrants, touts the new system as contributing to an increase in the knowledge base of the UK economy (Home Office, 2007, p. 4). The implementation of the points-based system reflected the influence of the economic agenda of the White paper, *Our Competitive Future*. This is especially evident in the role of language requirements within the system, where language, as form of human capital, functions as a selection criterion for the types of skilled migrants who can contribute to the goals of increasing the UK’s global competitiveness and the creation of a knowledge-based economy.

Language as Political Technology

Point systems within the immigration system of Canada and the UK function as “calculative practices” and “optimizing technologies” for the regulation of migration based on a neo-liberal governmental rationality (Walsh, 2011; cf. Ong 2000). In his analysis of the points systems in Canada and Australia, Walsh argues that “skills-based admissions policies are employed as systems of labor-supply that, by providing foreign workers rich in human...capital,

advance each country's knowledge economies...and international competitiveness" (Walsh, 2011, p. 862). As can be seen from the discussion of the selection grid above, language functions as an important means for these calculative practices within the points system. The procedures of the IRPA regulations for the awarding of points for language in the selection grid are an example of the complex "numerical technologies of evaluation" for the quantification of migrants (Walsh, 2011). Given the preponderant weight of language ability as a factor in the points system, this procedure is the primary technology for optimizing the selection of desirable immigrants according to their human capital profile and low risk assessment.

However, this analysis does not consider the specific role of language requirements in this regard closely enough (see Millar, 2009). For the function of language assessment as a calculative practice also requires the quantification of language as a form of human capital in some kind of framework of language ability. The elaboration of benchmarks of language competency and their role in the selection of skilled immigrants in the points system is an example of the "technologization of discourse" (Fairclough, 1996) which is a result of its commodification as a valuable skill in the new economy.

The implementation of points systems in Canada and the UK reflects a technologization of language in immigrant selection, allowing it to function as a calculative practice and optimizing technology for the regulation of migration based on a neo-liberal governmental rationality (Millar, 2009). In Canada, this technologization has taken the specific form of the discourse of language skills within the human capital model of immigrant selection. This discourse has been operationalized in the form of the IRPA selection grid, where the notion of language ability is referenced to the framework Canadian Language Benchmarks, whose notion

of communicative proficiency captures the levels of functional language use required for participation in society and the knowledge economy. This accounts for the role that language has come to play as the key selection criterion for economic migrants within the Canadian immigration regime.

The technologization of language within the UK immigration regime draws on two sources, one national and the other supranational. Early on in the development of the managed migration system, levels of language ability were specified in relation to the IALTS or the ESOL Skills for Life frameworks. By the time the PBS was implemented, however, the levels of language ability among the selection criteria were specified in relation to the Council of Europe's Common European Framework of Reference for Languages (CEFR) benchmarks of language proficiency. The CEFR also had its origin in relation to EU level policy agendas around the education domain aimed at aligning higher education with the needs of the economy and of developing a flexible workforce (Little, 2007). The CEFR reflects this neo-liberal educational agenda, where it was developed as a set of mutually recognized credentials associated with the creation of a European higher education domain, which was itself associated with EU level neo-liberal economic policy aims. Also, the endorsement of "learner autonomy" as a key element of the CEFR links it with the Council of Europe's broader policy objective of furthering "lifelong learning" (Little, 2005, p. 325). This focus on lifelong learning in turn is a central component of a broader strategy at the European level for constructing the knowledge-based economy (Jessop, 2008, p. 30). The process for reform of European higher education, announced in the 1999 Bologna Declaration, is an attempt to establish a level of governance at the European scale for post-secondary education following the adoption by the EU of the KBE (Fairclough, 2006). The

central objectives in the process are the mutual recognition of qualifications to foster the mobility of students, academics and researchers, and the development of lifelong learning as a way to increase competitiveness of the European labour force (p. 73). Fairclough characterizes the aims of the Bologna process as “linked to the discursive and material construction of the ‘global economy’ as ‘knowledge-based’, ... and to the competitiveness of the EU in education and other sectors” (2006, p. 73; cf. Fairclough & Wodak, 2008). Thus, the use of the CEFR within the UK immigration regime, while illustrating the technologization of language within immigrant selection, also reflects the influence of a particular neo-liberal policy agenda.

Language, Migration, and the Knowledge-Based Economy

The knowledge-based economy has become the hegemonic “economic imaginary” of globalization in its dominant neo-liberal, globalist form (Jessop, 2004, p. 166; cf. OECD, 1996). It elevates knowledge as the pre-eminent productive force, providing the basis for a transformation of capitalist economic production in response to the crises of Fordism and developmentalism in the post-war global economy (Fairclough, 2006, p. 47; Jessop, 2004, p. 166). As the adjunct to the material changes in production (liberalization and integration of markets), the KBE takes the discursive form of buzzwords such as *knowledge management*, *intellectual capital*, *human capital*, and *expert systems* that provide the model for the reorganization of the social formation (Jessop, 2004, p. 166, 169).

The salience of the language skills discourse within a human capital approach to immigration lies in the way it resonates with the concept of skills within a particular discursive construal of the global economy as a knowledge-based economy (KBE) (Jessop, 2002, 2004; Fairclough, 2006). As a *construal* of the actually existing economy, it is necessarily partial and

selective (Jessop, 2004). In the way it foregrounds the key role of knowledge as a purported ‘factor of production’ in a post-Fordist mode of production (Jessop, 2002, p. 97), the KBE has become the hegemonic ‘economic imaginary’ in response to the crisis, in the 1970s and onwards, of Fordist production and mass consumption (Jessop, 2000, 2004). It is within the horizon of this economic imaginary that the processes of neo-liberal state restructuring have occurred, as the post-war welfare state has been replaced by the “competition” or “enabling state” (Rose, 1999), wherein social reproduction is based on “the use of social policy to enhance the flexibility of labour markets and to create flexible, enterprising workers suited to a globalizing, knowledge-based economy” (Jessop, 2002, p. 168).

As has been seen, a macro-economic strategy of the KBE was implemented in Canada through the Innovation Strategy, a key component of which was a national Skills Strategy. A neo-liberal skills discourse motivated the reforms to the point system for economic immigration, giving it a distinctly human capital orientation, especially in relation to the selection criterion of language ability. The Canadian points system, which has been in existence since the late 1960s, had always incorporated a focus on skills, replacing the previous focus on country of origin, and which reflected an orientation of the immigration system to the needs of the Canadian economy. However, the new points grid which was implemented in the IRPA regulations imposed an even more human capital approach to immigrant selection through increasing the points value of such human capital attributes as education and language ability conceived as essential skills for the new economy.

The point system post-IRPA was decidedly supply-side. It is in relation to this aspect of system that language played such a central role in the IRPA selection grid. In its criticism of the

IRPA regulations, the Parliamentary Standing Committee had raised the objection that according too much weight to language might constitute an obstacle to recruiting valuable skilled workers who were needed in the Canadian economy. The government's decision, nevertheless, to implement a selection grid that rewarded high levels of language proficiency was motivated by a supply-side strategy for constructing the KBE by increasing the skills levels of the Canadian labour force, rather than simply filling labour market gaps or meeting specific employer demands.

In Canada, the selection of economic migrants with high levels of human capital was also aimed at enhancing the flexibility of labour markets, a key theme of KBE discourse. For example the *Strategic Framework* argued against the previous selection criteria's emphasis on the applicant's intended occupation, advocating that the new system emphasize "language competency and education – criteria which permit individuals to adjust rapidly to the Canadian labour market" (p. 28). Likewise, the LRAG report *Not Just Numbers* called for an emphasis on language ability within selection criteria in order to enhance immigrants' employability in the new economy where the "labour market environment requires immigrants to have the flexibility to work in several different occupations during their working life" (LRAG, 1997a, p. 56).

In the case of the UK, it is evident from the language of policy documents related to the system for managed migration that the new system attempts to fully integrate the management of migration with the approach to macro-economic policy in the White Paper, *Our Competitive Future*, which is legitimated with a globalist discourse of neo-liberalism and informed by the economic imaginary of the knowledge-based economy (Fairclough, 2006, p. 41). The KBE approach of *Our Competitive Future* was implemented, *inter alia*, through the subsequent *Skills*

for Life strategy, which incorporated the concern over a literacy deficit, documented in the IALS process, with a neo-liberal skills discourse. This focus on skills was carried over to the managed migration system, most clearly in the Points-Based System and its human capital approach to immigrant selection.

However, the role of language as a valuable form of human capital within the points-based system was always associated with a more supply side approach to immigrant selection. New Labour's opening up of routes for economic migration began with the expansion of the Work Permits system. However, language requirements for granting of work visas were only brought in with the implementation of more supply-side schemes for economic migration, beginning with the Highly Skilled Migrant Program that prefigured the PBS. During the consultations on the PBS, the debate over the role of language requirements within the new system was bound up with disagreements over whether the PBS should be more employer-driven, that is based on demand, or more supply-driven. In the final architecture of the PBS, language requirements played a more important role as selection criteria within those Tiers that recruited migrant workers without a job offer, namely the Highly Skilled and Skilled Tiers 1 and 2.

Thus, beyond simply playing a role in the calculative practices of sorting economically valuable from economically undesirable migrants, language as a selective criterion is associated with a specific set of policy options. Rather than serving to meet specific labour market demands, the selection of immigrants based on their language ability is associated with the recruitment of highly skilled migrants and the flexibilization of the labour market, both of which constitute a particular neo-liberal strategy for constructing a knowledge-based economy.

The identification of this more specific role of language within the calculative practices of immigrant selection is an important finding of the present analysis. It means that examining the specific form that language policies take, and the debates over that form, within immigration policy can illuminate the dynamics of, and contradictions within the immigration regime.

Summary

This chapter has explained the revaluation of the national language within Canadian and UK immigration policy as related to the application of a particular neo-liberal governmental rationality and the use of particular political technologies for the regulation of economic immigration. In this explanation, these political technologies, including the assessment of language ability as a calculative practice for the sorting of immigrants, are not part of restrictive policy agendas aimed at reducing the absolute number of immigrants entering the country. Rather these policies are part of expansive policy agendas for economic immigration aimed at increasing the numbers of valuable economic migrants granted entry. The particular form taken by the language policy measures in regards to immigrant selection can be explained by their association with a particular neo-liberal macro-economic strategy for constructing a KBE. Rather than simply sorting economically valuable from economically undesirable migrants, the language requirements criteria are aimed at increasing the supply of highly skilled workers in the labour force and achieving the flexibilization of the labour market.

Immigration control and the selection of economic immigrants is only one dimension of these countries' immigration regimes, nor is it the only domain in which there has been a revaluation of the national language. The next chapter will examine how the revaluation of the

national language within integration policy in the Canada and the UK has been motivated by the same neo-liberal governmental rationality.

Table 2.

Summary of Findings from the Case Studies

	Influence of Neo-liberal Discourses and Strategies of Governance on Language Policy Measures in the Domains of:		
	Immigration Policy	Integration Policy	Citizenship Policy
Canada	<i>Competitiveness</i> <i>KBE</i> <i>Human Capital</i> ‘Point System’ FSWP, IRPA Language as selection criterion CLB	<i>Skills Discourse</i> Skills Agenda Strategic Plan for Immigrant Language Training Language skills training ELT / OSLT	<i>Active citizenship</i> <i>Responsibilization</i> <i>Community</i> Formalization of naturalization language requirement CLB 4
United Kingdom	<i>Competitiveness</i> <i>KBE</i> Points Based System (PBS) Language as selection criterion CEFR	<i>Skills Discourse</i> Skills Agenda ESOL Skills for Life <i>Social In/exclusion</i> Community Cohesion & ESOL	<i>Active citizenship</i> <i>Responsibilization</i> <i>Community</i> Formalization of naturalization language requirement CEFR B1

CHAPTER 11: NEO-LIBERAL GOVERNANCE OF INTEGRATION: LANGUAGE, SOCIAL INCLUSION, AND COHESION

This chapter continues the presentation of conclusions as to the relation between the revaluation of the national language and the adoption of neo-liberal political techniques and rationality of government. It focuses on the comparison of the analyses of immigrant integration policy in the two case studies. In both Canada and the UK, the integration of new immigrants has taken the form of addressing the needs of un- or underemployed migrants for economic integration, and by extension the inclusion of economically marginalized minority ethnic populations. The preferred policy tool to achieve this goal has been language learning, with ESOL provision in both Canada and the UK taking the form of activation or active labour market policies. This reflects the extension of the skills discourse to the neo-liberal governance of immigrant integration in the form of policies aimed at up-skilling of immigrants' language skills.

Immigrant Language Training and Employability

This transformation of immigrant language training programs reflects the “subordination of social policy to economic policy” that is a feature of the shift to a “workfare” state (Jessop, 2002, p. 152). This has meant a new approach to social reproduction through “the use of social policy to enhance the flexibility of labour markets and to create flexible, enterprising workers suited to a globalizing, knowledge-based economy” (Jessop, 2002, p. 168). In relation to the workforce, these policies take the form of “active labour market policies” that reflect a shift away from a commitment to full employment to a focus on *employability*. More specific characteristics of these policies are that they “aim to enhance the flexibility of labour markets,” they “seek to enhance workers’ employability and transform them into enterprising subjects,”

and they “are increasingly oriented to the knowledge-based economy, reskilling and lifelong learning” (Jessop, 2002, p. 155-156).

The shift from newcomer language instruction to language skills training for economic immigrants reflects the transformation of education policy in the neo-liberal competition state for “promoting the globalizing, knowledge-based economy through the development of human capital” and which is linked to a “growing emphasis on the certification of transferable skills as well as specific skills in schools, post-compulsory education and on-the-job training” (Jessop, 2002, p. 164). As Jessop notes, in the competition state, education has become part of the “workfarist” agenda: “responsibility for becoming employable is devolved to individual members of the labour force, who should acquire the individual skills, competencies, flexibility, adaptability and personal dispositions to enable them to compete for jobs in national and global labour markets” (Jessop, 2002, p. 165). Thus language training programs for immigrants that are concerned with up-skilling and improving the employability of immigrants in flexible labour markets, reflect the activation policies that characterize social reproduction in the workfare state (Jessop, 2002).

In Canada the development of higher levels of and occupation specific language training programs, in the COIA and the Strategic Plan, reflects this approach. The result was the LINC 5-7 and ELT and OSLT programmes as well as the more specific alignment of the Canadian Language Benchmarks with HRSDC’s Essential Skills project. Similarly in the UK, ESOL policy received a massive impetus when it was incorporated into the Skills for Life strategy. Again, this reflected an approach to the integration of immigrants in terms of providing them

with the qualifications related to language and literacy to access higher education or the workforce.

However, there were problems with implementing this approach to immigrant language training and ESOL as a form of activation labour market policy. One was the challenge of matching supply with demand. In the UK this has taken various forms, such as excessive demand for programs, low uptake of employer provision of ESOL, and lack of provision of the programs needed, particularly lower levels, but also more specific labour market language training. In Canada, there was a concerted effort to increase the uptake of language training by new immigrants through e.g., a voucher program. In the UK, there has been a similar attempt to promote immigrant language learning, which has led to a change in policy towards translation. Also, in the UK, the accession of the A8 countries to the EU and the subsequent entry of a large number of Eastern European workers in the UK put a strain on the ESOL provision within the Skills for Life scheme, which put a strain on the Skills for Life budget and led to the introduction of fees for ESOL provision. In both cases, however the main problem and the recurring criticism from more progressive voices, has been the lack of adequate funding for and accessibility of ESOL, particularly at the lower levels of language ability. These problems also relate to the fact that application of a 'skills discourse' to the issue of language training for economic immigrants ignores the needs of other classes of migrant, namely family class immigrants as well as those members of settled communities whose language is too low to be able to benefit from the skills discourse approach.

Language, Integration, and Social Inclusion

In the UK, the increased focus on language training for new immigrants has been legitimated through a discourse of social inclusion that represents a particular framing of issues of exclusion and cohesion and is associated with the political program of the New Labour government that came to power in 1997. This program has been characterized as a “Third Way,” positioning itself in the centre of the political spectrum between the old left and the New Right (Levitas, 2005). In its particular combination of elements of social democratic and Thatcherite discourse, New Labour policy is a “reformist variant of neo-liberalism” (Heffernan, 2001, cited in Koller & Davidson, 2008).

As Norman Fairclough (2000, 2010) has shown, the politics of New Labour has resulted in a new language of political discourse. Further, he argues that this new language is not simply epiphenomenal, but is an important aspect of the New Labour project: “the political philosophy, strategy and values of New Labour are not pre-given; they have been...talked and re-talked into being in speeches by Blair and in other New Labour texts. ...[A]ttending to the shifts in the language of New Labour is analytically important in arriving at an analysis of the politics of New Labour” (Fairclough, 2010, p. 381). The political discourse of the Third Way represents incompatible opposites from the political left and right as reconciled, through the use of paratactic syntactical constructions such as “not only...but also” (Fairclough, 2010, p. 384). For example, Tony Blair defined the Third Way as: “A belief in social justice and economic dynamism, ambition and compassion, fairness and enterprise going together” (Fairclough, 2010, p. 383). Similarly, he posits the Third Way as a new form of politics, which “rejects the destructive excesses of the market and the intrusive hand of state intervention” (Fairclough,

2010, p. 383). In this way, the political discourse of the Third Way is a hybridization of elements from the political discourses of the social democratic left and the Thatcherite new right (p. 384). In addition to this general Third Way discourse, the language of New Labour is made up of a number of political discourses representing diverse fields and domains of social life (p. 382).

The Third Way project of New Labour entailed a particular approach to dealing with issues of social inequality, poverty, and unemployment. Levitas (2005) identifies three discourses for dealing with the bundle of social problems which came to be covered, in 1990s political discourse, by the term *social exclusion*. These are: “a ‘redistributionist discourse’ (RED)...whose prime concern is with poverty; a ‘moral underclass discourse’ (MUD) which centres on the moral and behavioural delinquency of the excluded themselves; and a ‘social integrationist discourse’ (SID) whose central focus is on paid work” (Levitas, 2005, p. 7). New Labour eschewed redistributionist policies for combating poverty and inequality, and instead pursued policies that combined SID and MUD. These policies were a welfare-to-work scheme, entitled the New Deal, aimed at moving people off of benefits and into employment, and a Social Exclusion Unit in government to coordinate social inclusion policy. The New Labour agenda for combating social exclusion is based on a particular understanding of inclusion, namely participation in paid work, which leads to a policy focus on employability. However, the combination of SID and MUD produces a concept of inclusion is an active obligation, where the responsibility for employability lies with the individual, while government merely provides opportunities for employment (Levitas, 2005, p. 156-157). Thus the focus on language training to promote immigrants’ economic integration is similar to the approach to other groups of

socially excluded which aims at increasing their employability as the means of their individual inclusion and of social cohesion more broadly.

From Linguistic Assimilation to Language Governmentality

As we have seen, there has been a tendency within Canadian and British integration policy to take an expanded view of the role of language not only in regard to economic integration but in relation to a broader notion of societal cohesion, captured by the notions of social inclusion and community cohesion. Within policy agendas aimed at promoting these outcomes, language is an indicator of as well as a policy instrument for addressing the various dimensions of social inclusion and cohesion. This development, with its concern for outcomes reflects the materialization of a governmental rationality, in particular through the employment of expert knowledge and political technologies for the governance of immigrant integration. In Canada the shift to a more governmental approach to immigrant integration has been legitimated by research on the multidimensional nature of integration, produced by such institutions as the Metropolis research network and implemented in the Settlement Program. In the UK, the community cohesion agenda has been based on the social scientific and policy notion of social inclusion that combines labour market participation with broader social outcomes. Within the policy agenda of building community cohesion, language is an indicator of and instrument for achieving outcomes that make for a cohesive society.

In Canada, expert knowledge produced by academic researchers shaped the ideological consensus on the view of language as the “key” to successful social, cultural, economic, and political integration of newcomers into Canadian society, and legitimized the government’s overall orientation towards settlement and integration policy. An example of this research and

the way it has contributed to a governmental approach to immigrant integration is provided by the research agenda of the Metropolis network. The perspective on integration adopted by Metropolis researchers has many similarities to what has been identified as the return of assimilationism within the migration studies literature (Brubaker, 2003). The discussion below will also show how it materializes a governmental rationality within the integration domain.

In 2007, a third phase of the Metropolis project was initiated. Unlike previous phases, the new phase included a pre-set research agenda, which focused on issues of direct relevance to policy making. The Third Phase research agenda is structured around 6 domains of research: “citizenship and social, cultural and civic integration; economic and labour market integration; family, children and youth; housing and neighbourhoods; justice, policing and security; welcoming communities” (Phase 3 MoU). Much of the Metropolis research is based on census data and other large scale data sets, for example the Longitudinal Survey of Immigrants to Canada (LSIC) (Statistics Canada, 2005). Also the key concern over integration is socio-economic, namely the declining economic outcomes of new immigrants (Brubaker, 2003, p. 52). The specific concern is the difference in employment rates and earnings between immigrants and the native born population. It also reflects the shift from homogeneous to *heterogeneous* units (p. 52). The concern is not with the incorporation of immigrants into some homogeneous native born population, but rather the approximation of the outcomes of the migrant worker population to those of the domestic labour force, which itself exhibits heterogeneity in terms of socio-economic indicators. The goal is not to eliminate immigrant poverty or unemployment, but for immigrant employment rates and average earnings to approximate those of the native born population. Finally, there is a shift from a transitive to *intransitive* understanding of assimilation,

whereby the integrating immigrant is seen as an active subject rather than an object acted upon. Accordingly research is aimed at identifying barriers to integration, which can then be addressed by specific policies to help immigrants overcome them. Thus, the new assimilationist perspective on the linguistic integration of immigrants, by applying statistical methods to establishing (dis)similarities between populations (immigrant and native born) over a series of disaggregated domains of ‘integration,’ materializes a governmental rationality for the management of integration through an array of technologies of government, not the least of which being language ability.

Summary

This chapter has compared the findings of the case study analyses of language and immigrant integration policy in Canada and the UK. In both cases, this economic orientation of the respective countries’ immigration regimes has been carried over in to the domain of immigrant settlement policy, where policy is focused on the economic integration of new immigrants. This general approach to settlement in terms of promoting participation in the labour force is reflected in the orientation to immigrant language training as a form of active labour market policy, whose aim is to improve the employability of new immigrants. This orientation has been taken furthest in Canada, where it has lead to a focus on higher levels and various kinds of occupation-specific language training. At the same time, settlement policy in both nation-states has been influenced by a broader policy agenda, which aims at providing a new basis for societal integration. In governments’ concern over social inclusion language serves as a key indicator and governmental technique for measuring and achieving both immigrant integration and community cohesion. The concern with social integration has also become expressed in a

communitarian discourse, comprising key terms such as “community cohesion,” “active citizenship,” “civil renewal” (Somerville, 2007, p. 52), and according to which the basis of social cohesion is developing social capital, the social networks that bind individuals as part of a community (Putnam, 1995). As we shall see in next chapter, the operationalization of this communitarian discourse has provided the context for the revaluation of language within Canadian and UK citizenship policy.

CHAPTER 12: NEO-LIBERAL GOVERNANCE OF CITIZENSHIP: LANGUAGE, ACTIVE CITIZENSHIP AND COMMUNITY

This chapter presents the conclusions of the final component of the analysis, namely the comparison of the revaluation of national language within citizenship policy in the two case studies. It relates the finding that this phenomenon has been motivated by the impact of neo-liberal state restructuring on citizenship regimes, where the national language is revalued as a political technology for the neo-liberal governance of citizenship. This revaluation of language is associated with a revaluation of citizenship within neo-liberal governance. The national language has been mobilized within two specific governmental strategies, namely, the *responsibilization of citizens*, and *governing through community* (Rose, 1999). The ultimate aim and effect of this, it is argued, has been the subjectivation of responsibilized, neo-liberal citizens.

Responsibilization of Citizens

A recurrent theme in the discussions surrounding the reform of the Canadian Citizenship Act is the notion of the responsibilities of citizenship. The notion of responsible citizenship i.e., the duty “to contribute to the development of the life of the country” was a key theme of a report of the parliamentary standing committee on citizenship and Immigration, *Canadian Citizenship: A sense of belonging* (House of Commons, 1994). A subsequent report a decade later, *Updating Canada’s Citizenship Laws: It’s Time* (House of Commons, 2005), proposed the addition of a preamble to a new citizenship act “in which the rights and responsibilities of citizenship are clearly addressed.” Finally, when the citizenship test was redesigned in 2009, the new study guide, *Discover Canada* (CIC, 2010[2009]), was given the subtitle “The Rights and Responsibilities of Citizenship,” and the section on rights and responsibilities of citizenship was

given greater prominence at the beginning of the study guide.²⁶ The emphasis on responsibilities of citizenship is an implicit critique of a more liberal rights-based conception of citizenship. Such a passive notion of citizenship is no longer able to serve as the basis for societal integration in an age of neo-liberal economic and state restructuring, which necessitates a more active and responsabilized citizen/subject. Hence the new discourse of active citizenship with its focus on promoting citizen participation.

Likewise, in the UK, the implementation of the citizenship testing regime was in part the outgrowth of a prior civic renewal initiative aimed at addressing youth anti-social behaviour and political apathy and which culminated in the introduction of citizenship as a compulsory subject in English schools in 2002. At the centre of this citizenship education initiative was the notion of active citizenship that emphasizes the duties of citizenship in terms of participation in civil society. This new view of citizenship was explicitly linked to the retreat of the welfare state and the responsabilization of individual citizens and “the community” for the provision of social security. This notion of active citizenship was taken over into the reform of naturalization policy and the implementation of a formal knowledge of language and society test. Announced in the 2002 White Paper, *Secure Borders, Safe Haven*, it was justified as a way to “strengthen the ability of new citizens to participate in society and to engage actively in our democracy” and “help [them] understand both their rights and their obligations as citizens of the UK” (Home Office, 2002). Finally, the report, *The New and the Old* (The Crick Report), which set forth the

²⁶ In the previous study guide, *A Look at Canada* (Canada, 2007[1995]), the section on rights and responsibilities was at the very end of the study guide, on pages 38-39 out of 47.

specifics of the Life in the UK test, reflected a civic republican model of citizenship with a focus on active citizenship.

The proposals for “earned citizenship” in the 2009 White Paper, *The Path to Citizenship*, is also the logical outcome of the critique of a passive notion of the rights of citizenship and a shift to a contractual notion of citizenship as requiring the fulfilment of certain duties, with naturalization as a reward rather than an entitlement. Both within the active citizenship discourse and in the specific proposals for earned citizenship, the responsibility and condition of citizenship and naturalization is participation and demonstrating active engagement in society.

The list of responsibilities of citizenship provided in the Canadian citizenship study guide, *Discover Canada*, reflects a move beyond a simple civic republican notion of citizen participation in the political processes of the community. The responsibilities include obeying the law, voting and serving on a jury, but also more significantly ‘taking responsibility for oneself and one’s family.’ Here the citizen is no longer seen simply as a political actor but also (or instead) as an economic one. Moreover, in terms of the benefits both to the individual and society, it is this subject position that is the most valuable:

Getting a job, taking care of one’s family and working hard in keeping with one’s abilities are important Canadian values. Work contributes to personal dignity and self-respect, and to Canada’s prosperity. (CIC, 2010[2009], p. 8)

Likewise, the notion of participation at the heart of active citizenship in the UK is also expressed, for instance in the report of the Life in the UK advisory group, as participation in the economy. This reflects the Third Way perspective on “social inclusion” as achieved through participation in paid employment, and also, in the context of citizenship policy, a view of the citizen as primarily an economic agent. However, in both Canada the UK, the citizen maintains a

social aspect, albeit as a social actor whose conduct is shaped by a reconfiguration of civil society as an arena of citizenship activity. This brings us to the third point, the “technologization of community.”

Governing through Community

Both the Canadian and UK citizenship testing regimes technologize the concept of community in the process of rendering it governmental (cf. Rose, 1999, p. 175). This is associated with a neo-liberal restructuring of civil society. “Government through community” is described by Rose as the constitution of a sector “whose vectors and forces can be mobilized, enrolled, deployed in novel programmes and techniques which encourage and harness active practices of self-management and identity construction, of personal ethics and collective allegiances” (p. 176). In particular, the importance of the third sector within a restructured civil society as the field of action for the new citizen/subject is reflected in the Canadian and UK citizenship testing regimes in the focus on practices of volunteering as a way for new citizens to participate in the community. For instance, the new Canadian citizenship study guide, *Discover Canada*, includes among the responsibilities of citizenship “helping others in the community,” which is specified as follows:

Millions of volunteers freely donate their time to help others without pay – helping people in need, assisting at your child’s school, volunteering at a food bank or other charity, or encouraging newcomers to integrate. Volunteering is an excellent way to gain useful skills and develop friends and contacts. (CIC, 2010[2009], p. 8)

This focus on volunteering in the community can be associated with a shift in the citizenship regime in Canada, as both of these features are related to the replacement of the citizen subjectivity of the “Social Canadian” with that of an “Entrepreneurial” and “Volunteer

Canadian” in what has been dubbed a “Canadian Way” discourse of citizenship (see Brodie, 2002, p. 390). In this way, citizenship education targeted at new immigrants is not much different from that targeted at the general population. As Kennelly and Llewellyn (2011) found, Canadian civics curricula are dominated by the notion of active citizenship, with the aim of inculcating a form of neo-liberal subjectivity. Nor is this feature unique to the Canadian citizenship regime, as the subjectivation of a consumer citizen is part of the broader strategy of advanced liberal government (Rose, 1999).

Language and the Neo-liberal Citizen

A Third Way discourse also accompanied the Canadian government’s transformation of economic and social policy. The “Canadian Way” was part of an attempt to “reinvent society and solidarity within the context of...the ascendance of the neo-liberal state form” (Brodie, 2002, p. 379). This includes the Third Way combination of a neo-liberal discourse of economic growth with a liberal/social democratic discourse of social justice/equality/development. For instance, the Innovation Strategy was promoted as “supporting *both* Canadian economic growth *and* social development” (HRDC, 2002, February 12; emphasis added). The concern for social integration takes the form of encouraging and promoting increased participation in the economy and labour market. At the level of the individual, the national skills agenda aims at “equipping Canadians with the skills that they need to participate fully in Canada’s workplace [sic] and in Canadian society” (HRDC, 2002, February 12). This is made most explicit in relation to immigrants’ social and economic integration: “Any improvement in the labour market integration of immigrants will also improve their social integration” (HRDC, 2002, p. 52). Societal integration is equated with economic participation. The two themes come together in the statement of the Minister of

Human Resources Development, that “Knowledge is the currency in the new economy. Knowledge is the bridge to social cohesion” (HRDC, 2002, February 12). The result of neo-liberal state restructuring in Canada has been a neo-liberal citizenship regime in which “the politics of neo-liberalism...is providing many of the terms in which citizenship is now being reconstituted” (Jenson & Phillips, 2001, p. 71). This has included the “marketization of citizenship” as well as the replacement of social citizenship rights with the “privatization of responsibility” in a number of social policy domains (Iltis, 2009).

Likewise, the notion of community deployed within the UK citizenship-testing regime is a Third Way version “infused with notions of voluntarism, of charitable works, of self-organized care, of unpaid service to one’s fellows” (Rose, 1999, p. 171). This is most evident in the content of the *Life in the UK* handbook as well as the citizenship materials for ESOL. The revised 2007 version of *A Journey to Citizenship*, the *Life in the UK* handbook, included an additional chapter on “Building better communities,” which outlined the responsibilities of citizens to contribute to the well being of their communities. Chief among the practices through which active citizens can make their communities more cohesive is volunteering. Volunteering, that is working for a good cause without payment, is said to have many benefits for the individual, in terms of acquiring social capital (meeting new people) and new job skills as well as an opportunity to practice English language skills. The chapter also expresses the government’s perspective on the benefits of the third sector of charities and not-for-profit organizations for the collective benefit of society and the economy.

The *Citizenship Materials for ESOL* were also revised in 2010, with the addition of new sections on “Volunteering” and “Getting involved in your community.” This was to align with

the government's community cohesion agenda, which reflected a shift from civic republican to more communitarian modes of participation where "the community" is the field of action of the active citizen. Just as in the *Life in the UK* handbook, this active citizenship takes the form of volunteering. In the new sections, volunteering is closely linked with active citizenship, with one vocabulary activity even defining "active citizenship" as "becoming very involved in the community by volunteering."

A novel aspect of the ESOL citizenship materials is the emphasis on inter-community volunteering, that is, forms of voluntary activity outside of one's own ethnic or cultural community. Indeed this focus on inter-community activities (including through practices of volunteering) is a key feature of the community cohesion agenda, which focuses on establishing links between communities. This is the actual content of what has been identified as a "retreat from multiculturalism" (see. e.g., Joppke, 2004; Kofman, 2005). While there has been much criticism of multiculturalism at a theoretical and philosophical level within political discourse in many western, liberal democracies, the key change to multicultural policies, that is policies targeted at minority communities, has been that they no longer aim to support the cultural reproduction of these communities, but rather to foster interaction between different communities and between minority ethnic communities and the "wider community." This is motivated by a particular version of communitarian theory of societal cohesion based on fostering "(bridging) social capital" as a way of developing a broader sense of community necessary for societal cohesion within an increasingly diverse society. The term social capital is most often associated with the political scientist Robert Putnam, who used the term to account for the perceived decline in civic engagement in many of the western democracies (Kivisto &

Faist, 2007; Putnam, 1995). Based on his empirical studies of democratic participation, he claimed that civic engagement was dependent on involvement in social networks and organizations. Participation in such mediating institutions within the public realm of civil society is what he termed “social capital” and which he argued is the basis for civic participation. Subsequently, social capital has become a key term within communitarian and republican discourses of citizenship that take a more active view of the role of the citizen. Within these discourses language is a particular form of bridging social capital, providing the means of establishing links with others outside of one’s own ethnic community and which, through such interaction, allows the imagining of a diverse society as a “community of communities.”

As the above demonstrates, the rendering of the notion of community as a technology of government accomplishes a governmentalization of civil society, which is a key feature of neo-liberal governance. While in liberal political theory, civil society is the counterweight to the state, and is seen as a realm of liberty of individual citizens, in the neo-liberal representation of the relation between the governing and the governed, civil society is mobilized as the field of action of the newly responsabilized citizen/subject. Civil society becomes an extension of the state’s governmental activity with the Third Sector, and the individual citizens as volunteers that make up that sector, providing the kinds of social welfare provisions that were once provided by the welfare state which is everywhere in retreat.

Summary

This chapter has presented the findings of the final component of the case study analyses above. The overall picture that emerges from these findings is that Canadian and UK citizenship and language testing regimes make use of a similar governmentalization of community and

participation with the ultimate goal of creating responsabilized citizen/subjects who, through the exercise of active citizenship are responsible for ensuring their own well being, as individuals and collectively, through participation in the community. On the basis of these findings, it has been argued that a communitarian notion of citizenship together with a revalued national language, as the basis of a community of communities, stands as one of the twin pillars of a new approach to social governance (cf. Brodie, 2008). In the way both of these concepts are made technical and deployed as forms of governmental intervention to promote participation and active citizenship, the language and citizenship practices of new citizen/subjects are “conducted” through a restructuring of the domain of the community, of civil society, in short, of the social.

CHAPTER 13: CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS

The Recent Past as Postscript

Before proceeding to draw out the implications of the present study, I begin this chapter by discussing recent developments in Canadian and UK immigration and citizenship policy. While they fall outside of the period of the comparative analysis presented above, these subsequent developments provide additional evidence supporting the claims as to the nature of, and motivations behind the policies discussed as well as the ongoing tensions surrounding their use.

Developments in language, migration, and citizenship in Canada

In 2013, the Canadian federal government modified the selection grid for economic migrants. These changes show continuity with previous practices, as characterized in the above analysis. Most significantly, the new grid continues the focus on the importance of language within the human capital model of immigrant selection. For instance, the maximum number of points awarded for language was increased to 28 from 24, increasing the weight of points available for language as a percentage of total available points (28%) and of the pass mark (42%). The new grid also continues the focus on higher levels of language ability and monolingual as opposed to bilingual language skills. The new selection grid instituted a minimum standard for first official language of CLB 7 (in all four skills of listening, speaking, reading and writing). For first official language, an applicant must meet minimum of CLB/NCLC 7 to get any points; also to get points for second official language, they must meet CLB/NCLC 5 (only higher level of language ability than “basic fluent proficiency” will get

points)²⁷. The changes also continue the formalization of language assessment within the immigration system by requiring that language levels for both official languages must be proved with tests result from a CIC approved language test.

However, the new grid also marks a significant change from previous practice. In placing more emphasis on demand factors, by requiring experience in an eligible occupation or an offer of arranged employment, the new grid continues the move away from the human capital model that was begun with the reintroduction of an occupations list in the 2008 Ministerial Instructions. This shift to a more employer-led system rather than one focused on the skills levels of applicants has altered the role of language within the selection grid. This has resulted in the institution of a minimum requirement of language proficiency that has to be met rather than awarding points for any level of language proficiency above no proficiency.

Finally, the changes reflect the continuing tensions between the supply-side and demand-driven aspects of the immigration system and the role of language within the respective approaches. The new selection grid has also been accompanied by the implementation of a new federal program for the admission of skilled trades people, the Federal Skilled Trades program. While applicants within this demand-driven immigration stream are not subject to the points system selection process, nevertheless, they will need to meet a minimum language requirement of CLB 5 for speaking and listening and CLB 4 for reading and writing, likewise to be demonstrated through formal results of an approved language test.

²⁷ The specific calculation of points for language is as follows: for first official language, no points are awarded for proficiency below CLB 7, 4 points for each skill at CLB 7, 5 points for each skill at CLB 8, and 6 points for each skill at CLB 9 or higher; for second official language, 4 points are awarded for meeting the minimum requirement of CLB 5, with no points for levels below CLB 5 nor any additional points for levels above.

In these most recent developments in the Canadian immigration selection regime we see the confirmation of the dynamic identified in the case study analysis above. Language ability, as a political technology, continues to play a central role within the selection of economic immigrants, where it is associated with the neo-liberal discourses of skills and the knowledge economy. Its use is most extensive within the more supply-side and highly skilled migrant programs, where it serves as the key indicator of valuable human capital. However, with the inclusion of minimum language requirements in the Federal Skilled Trades program, the use of language as political technology has spread to the more demand-driven programs for the recruitment of less skilled migrants, although legitimized with a discourse of a minimum standard of language for integration and reflects the continued symbolic value of language ability within the immigration regime.

Developments in Language, Migration, and Citizenship in the UK

In the UK, developments under the Conservative/Liberal-Democrat Coalition government that came to power in 2010 show some consistency with the previous Labour government's policies on language, immigration and citizenship. However, overall, the new government marks a significant break from the previous open immigration policy by implementing truly restrictive policies aimed at limiting the number of migrants coming into the UK.

In terms of continuity, the new government has raised the language requirement for skilled migrants (Tier 2) to B1 of CEFR (from A1) and extended language requirements (at level A1 of CEFR) to dependents of skilled migrants who settle permanently (Home Office, 2011, February; Home Office, 2011 June). This reflects a continued neo-liberal orientation to language

and immigrant selection. However, the new government has implemented sever restrictions on immigration in the form of limits to the numbers to be admitted in the various Tiers of the PBS. The Coalition's declared aim has been to reduce immigration to the tens of thousands and also to "break the link between work and permanent settlement" (Home Office, 2012, February 2). This represents a change from the previous approach, where a path to settlement was open to all skilled worker routes in the PBS. No doubt these restrictions reflect the change in economic fortunes in Europe in the current period of austerity and slow economic growth. However, it should be noted the in the drive to limit immigration, language requirements have not been the means used to restrict numbers, with the government preferring more effective means such as simply instituting quotas.

In the area of citizenship, while the new government has maintained a rhetorical commitment to the importance of knowledge of English, citizenship education under the Coalition government became focused on knowledge of British history and British Culture, as evidenced from the revised edition of the Life in the UK handbook published in 2013. In this way the civil renewal agenda of the previous government, which legitimated the focus on language ability for citizenship with its focus on active participation in civic life, has not been continued. The Coalition has also gone one step further than the previous government in the formalization of the language requirements for citizenship by scrapping the ESOL route for naturalization (Home Office, 2013, September 20). Henceforth, applicants for naturalization will no longer have the option of taking an ESOL course with citizenship content to meet the knowledge of language and life requirements, but will have to present objective proof of language ability at ESOL Entry Level 3 as well as pass the Life in the UK Test. As was seen

above, the ESOL route had been a liberal aspect of the UK testing regime, based on the educative view of citizenship testing as an extension of the civil renewal agenda. While the elimination of the ESOL route can be seen as making the previous system of naturalization testing more restrictive, it also simply continues the tendency of the alignment of citizenship requirements with entry requirements. Indeed it is in some ways a logical consequence of the “tightening” of language requirements under the PBS (e.g., with a pre-entry requirement for dependents), whereby more and more people, by dint of having been granted entry would already meet the citizenship language requirement.

All of these recent developments in UK immigration policy confirm the characterization, in the case study above, of the language testing measures adopted by the previous New Labour government. In terms of the continuities with the previous policies, the new developments continue the neo-liberal approach to language and the governance of immigration and citizenship. Furthermore, while the new Coalition government represents a shift to a severely restrictive immigration regime, the fact that it has not relied on language testing measures to achieve this restriction, and indeed that they have legitimated this shift by denouncing the previous government’s “open door” immigration policy, confirms the analysis of the case study above that the adoption of language testing measures by the New Labour government was in the context of an expansive rather than restrictive immigration policy.

Implications for the Study of Language Policies in a Post-national Era

Citizenship Language Testing

In the final section of this concluding chapter I will draw out what I see as the implications of the present study for the study of language policy in a neo-liberal, post-national

era. First, the dissertation has implications for the study of state practices of language testing for citizenship and immigration. The starting point for the present analysis has been the influence of the political economy of contemporary capitalism on immigration and citizenship policies in Canada and the UK, and specifically the role that language plays in the neo-liberal governance of migration and citizenship in these liberal, nation-states. This is in contrast to the focus on cultural politics and western nation states' reaction against forces of globalization which have brought increased cultural and linguistic diversity to their erstwhile monocultural and monolingual polities.

In this way, the study follows up with the approach recommended by Milani (2009) to supplement a governmentality approach to the study of citizenship language testing practices so as to reveal the way discourses legitimizing citizenship language testing materialize an advanced liberal political rationality. The present study has added to Milani's insight the specifics of how an advanced liberal political rationality is operationalized in cases of the successful implementation of language testing within regimes of governance for migration and citizenship. The neo-liberal governmentality framework also confirms the analysis in some of the citizenship studies literature that identified affinities between the civic integration paradigm and welfarist policies, adding to this an analysis of the role of language within these neo-liberal policies of social regulation.

Language Policy and Planning

The present study has theoretical and methodological implications for the study of language policy measures in a neo-liberal, post-national era. The finding that the revaluation of national language was motivated by political economic factors challenges the view of language

as primarily a marker of national identity. Language policies in the contemporary period, especially those of nation-states, are often understood and critiqued in terms of this function of language, as is the case with the critique of citizenship language testing as a vain attempt at maintaining a national language regime in a post-national era. The findings of the current study show the value of a framework that considers the *instrumental* value of language(s) under Late Capitalism for understanding contemporary language policies.

More specifically, the governmentality framework of the present study also contributes an additional insight into this instrumental value of language in the current period. Much recent research has drawn out the instrumental value of language as linguistic capital in new symbolic markets within the global new economy, that is, its value in terms of “profit” as opposed to “pride” (Heller & Duchêne, 2012). The findings of the present study revealing the role of language as a political technology add another aspect to the instrumental value of language in relation to strategies of governance under neo-liberalism. While the analysis of transformations in the value of language in relation to the new economy has focused on minority languages and the promotion of multilingualism, the case studies above show that these transformations also apply to majority languages and can also motivate the revaluation of monolingual skills in a national language.

Finally, the governmentality approach, with its attention to processes of subjectivation within governmental strategies allows for a more complex understanding of the identity value of language beyond its role as a marker of a pre-existing national, ethnic identity. As the case studies above have shown, the revaluation of the national language within immigration and

citizenship policy in the UK has been aimed at creating neo-liberal citizen-subjects suited to the social conditions of a global era of neo-liberal economic and state restructuring.

In sum, Language Policy and Planning (LPP) as a field has traditionally defined its object of study as policies regarding language-related issues, or in a more interdisciplinary fashion, as social problems in which language plays a significant role. The framework of the present study helps expand the object of study for LPP in the contemporary period to domains of social action within which the recontextualization and operationalization of neo-liberal economic and social discourses discursively constructs issues of language as a significant aspect of the constitution of social problems, and of their resolution through strategies of neo-liberal governance.

From Post-national Critique to Critique of Neo-liberalism

Finally, there are also practical implications of the findings of the present study for those seeking to critique language-testing measures for citizenship and immigration. Putting practices of language testing for purposes of immigration and citizenship in the context of neo-liberal governance of immigration and citizenship allows us to re-evaluate the idea that these practices are motivated by exclusionary ideologies of language and national belonging to show how, while they may have certain limited exclusionary and racializing effects, these are by-products of the neo-liberal logic of the policies adopted. Rather than simply denouncing the purportedly racist motivation and small-scale exclusionary effects of these policies, a more thorough critique will point out the mistaken assumptions of the neo-liberal logic and the resulting contradictions inherent in the implementation of the policies. Such an understanding of the nature of the policies will allow for the formulation of alternative approaches to language issues related to immigration, integration, and citizenship.

For years, ESOL practitioners have complained that governments do not pay enough attention to the language learning needs of migrants, pointing to the lack of adequate provision and funding for ESOL courses. Much of the critical research on ESOL during the 1980s and 1990s characterized government ESL/ESOL policies as only providing enough language training to lock new immigrants into low skilled jobs while denying them the language needed to participate more fully in society. The recent increased focus on ESOL and language learning, the result of the revaluation of the national language in immigration and integration policy, has been an example of the adage ‘be careful what you wish for.’ The response from ESOL researchers and practitioners has been to condemn the coercive nature of language testing practices for integration and citizenship and argue for more accessible provision of language training for new immigrants. While this critique does propose a more liberal policy alternative, it is situated within the same discourse on the central importance of language for the successful integration of new immigrants as the more illiberal policy options being adopted by governments. A more thoroughgoing critique would point out that policies regarding language, immigration, and citizenship must be accompanied by policies to make for a more equal society, rather than as a substitute for it. Critiques of discourses and policies of language and integration need to point out that immigrants will ‘assimilate’ into an already unequal society and that the issue of integration must also be one of social justice not just “social inclusion” (cf. Alund, 1999, cited in Kofman, 2005; Ratcliff, 2011). This in turn leads to the recognition that language cannot create cohesion in an unequal society, only reducing inequality will lead to linguistic assimilation. So long as language is promoted as the basis of cohesion, but society is still unequal, the disadvantaged in society will not acquire an advanced level of literacy in the standard language. Demanding this

from them, through formalized language testing will only reinforce a “blame the victim mentality” and a “culturalization” of poverty and inequality (Fairclough, 2010; Levitas, 2005).

Thus there is the need for criticism of citizenship language testing to be embedded within a more systematic critique of neo-liberalism in order to challenge the specific exclusions they lead to, but also to improve the economic outcomes of new immigrants as well as to challenge anti-immigrant sentiment which does exist and is undoubtedly growing in many parts of Europe (and which very likely is a, if not the motivating factor behind citizenship language testing in other national contexts). This involves a counter-hegemonic strategy to challenge the particular neo-liberal form of the focus on language and immigrant integration in terms of language skills within a flexible labour market that responsabilizes individuals for their own employability, and proposes “cohesion” and “community” as a substitute for social solidarity in a post-welfare state society. While the analysis in this dissertation has been limited to identifying the neo-liberal motivation behind language and immigration policies, it suggests future research into the ways that these policies are contested and resisted by local policy actors through bottom-up processes of policy appropriation. For example, identifying how ESOL and language-testing practitioners can provide an alternative vision for ESOL as part of a broader strategy for reducing material inequality and creating a more economically just society would contribute to overcoming the suspicion and scape-goating surrounding immigrants that underlies much more widespread anti-immigrant sentiment that extends beyond simple support for measures of language testing for citizenship.

Summary

The increased salience of issues of language, for example in the revaluation of national language, is an important aspect of the contemporary period. Accordingly, Language Policy and Planning (LPP) as a field of study has a potential to play a significant role in how we understand our current world and also how we respond to particular ways language is made use of by social agents, in particular nation-states and other economically and politically powerful actors. To do so LPP must incorporate a fuller understanding of the transformations in language under late modern capitalism and its relation to strategies of social and economic regulation and modes of governance in our neo-liberal, post-national era. It is hoped that the readers of this dissertation receive it as an attempt to contribute in a small way to this goal.

REFERENCES

- Abu-Laban, Y. (1998). Welcome/STAY OUT: The contradictions of Canadian integration and immigration policies at the millennium. *Canadian Ethnic Studies*, 30(3), 191-211.
- Ager, D. (1996). Language policy in Britain and France: The processes of policy. London: Multilingual Matters.
- Anderson, B. (1981). *Imagined communities*. London: Verso.
- Arat-Koç, S. (1999). Neo-liberalism, state restructuring and immigration: Changes in Canadian policies in the 1990s. *Journal of Canadian Studies*, 34(2), 31-56.
- Bauböck, R., & Joppke, C. (Eds.) (2010). *How liberal are citizenship tests?* EUI Working Paper RSCAS 2010/41. Florence: European University Institute.
- Bauder, H. (2008). Immigration debate in Canada: How newspapers reported, 1996- 2004. *Journal of International Migration and Integration*, 9(3), 289-310.
- Bauder, H. (2012). *Immigration dialectic: Imagining community, economy, and nation*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
- Bauman, R., & Briggs, C. (2003). *Voices of modernity*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Bieling, H-J. (2003). European employment policy between neo-liberal rationalism and communitarianism. In A. Cafruny, & M. Ryner (eds.), *A ruined fortress? Neo-liberal hegemony and transformation in Europe*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Blackledge, A. (2005). *Discourse and power in a multilingual world*. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.
- Blackledge, A. (2009a). "As a country we do expect:" The further extension of language testing regimes in the United Kingdom. *Language Assessment Quarterly*, 6(1), 6-16.

- Blackledge, A. (2009b). Being English, speaking English: Extension to English language testing legislation and the future of multicultural Britain. In G. Hogan-Brun, C. Mar-Molinero, & P. Stevenson (Eds.), *Discourses on language and integration: Critical perspectives on language testing regimes in Europe* (pp. 83-107). Philadelphia: John Benjamins.
- Blackledge, A. (2009c). Inventing English as convenient fiction: Language testing regimes in the United Kingdom. In G. Extra, M. Spotti, & P. Van Avermaet, (2009). *Language testing, migration and citizenship* (pp. 66-86). London: Continuum.
- Blair, T. (2006, December 8). *Duty to integrate*. Retrieved from: <https://www.number10.gov.uk>
- Blommaert, J. (2006). Language policy and national identity. In T. Ricento (Ed.), *An introduction to language policy: Theory and method* (pp. 238-254). Oxford: Blackwell.
- Blum, A., Goldstein, H., & Guerin-Pace, F. (2001). International Adult Literacy Survey (IALS): An analysis of international comparisons of adult literacy. *Assessment in Education*, 8(2), 225-246.
- Blunkett, D. (2003, June 11). *Civil renewal: A new agenda*. London: Home Office.
- Boswell, C. (2009). *The political uses of expert knowledge: Immigration policy and social research*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Bourdieu, P. (1991). *Language and symbolic domination*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Brodie, J. (2002). Citizenship and solidarity: Reflections on the Canadian way. *Citizenship Studies*, 6(4), 377-394.
- Brodie, J. (2008). The social in social citizenship. In E. F. Isin (Ed.), *Recasting the social in citizenship* (pp. 20-43). Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

- Brubaker, R. (2003). The return of assimilation? In C. Joppke & E. Morawska (Eds.), *Towards assimilation and citizenship: Immigrants in liberal nation-states*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Burchell, G. (1993). Liberal government and techniques of the self. *Economy and Society*, 22(3), 267-282.
- Burnaby, B. (1992). Official language training for adult immigrants in Canada: Features and issues. In B. Burnaby & A. Cumming (Eds.), *Socio-political aspects of ESL* (pp. 3-34). Toronto: OISE Press.
- Burnaby, B. (2002). Reflection on language policies in Canada: Three examples. In J. W. Tollefson (Ed.), *Language policies in education: Critical issues* (pp. 65-79). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.
- Cameron, D. (2000). *Good to talk?: Living and working in a communication culture*. London: Sage.
- Cameron, D. (2002). Globalization and the teaching of “communication.” In D. Block & D. Cameron (Eds.), *Globalization and language teaching* (pp. 67-82). London: Routledge.
- Cameron, D. (2002b). Language: It’s just not cricket. *Critical Quarterly*, 44(2), 69-72.
- Cameron, D. (2005). Communication and commodification: Global economic change in sociolinguistic perspective. In G. Erreygers & G. Jacobs (Eds.), *Language, communication and the economy* (pp. 9-23). Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins.
- Cantle, T. (2005). *Community cohesion: A new framework for race and diversity*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

- Carens, J. (2010). The most liberal citizenship test is none at all. In R. Bauböck, & C. Joppke (Eds.), *How liberal are citizenship tests?* (pp. 19-20). EUI Working Paper RSCAS 2010/41. Florence: European University Institute.
- Centre for Canadian Language Benchmarks. (2005). *Relating Canadian Language Benchmarks to Essential Skills: A comparative framework*. Ottawa: Centre for Canadian Language Benchmarks [CCLB].
- Centre for Canadian Language Benchmarks. (2005b). *Occupational language analysis: Overview of the methodology*. Ottawa: CCLB. Retrieved from:
http://www.itsessential.ca/itsessential/display_page.asp?page_id=322
- Chiswick, B. R., & Miller, P.W. (2003). The complementarity of language and other human capital: Immigrant earnings in Canada. *Economics of Education Review*, 22, 469-480.
- Citizenship and Immigration Canada. (1994a). *Immigration consultations report*. Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada.
- Citizenship and Immigration Canada. (1994b). *Into the 21st century: A strategy for immigration and citizenship*. Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada.
- Citizenship and Immigration Canada. (1994c). *A broader vision: Immigration and citizenship plan 1995-2000*. Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada.
- Citizenship and Immigration Canada. (1998). *Building on a strong foundation for the 21st century: New directions for immigration and refugee policy and legislation*. Ottawa: Minister of Public Works and Government Services Canada.

Citizenship and Immigration Canada. (2002). *Backgrounder: Changes to regulations under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act*. Ottawa: Citizenship and Immigration Canada

[CIC] Retrieved from: <http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/press/o20218-pre.html>

Citizenship and Immigration Canada. (2002, June 11). *News release: Canada's new Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations finalized*. Ottawa: CIC. Retrieved from:

<http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/press/o20218-pre.html>

Citizenship and Immigration Canada. (2004). *Evaluation of the Language Instruction for Newcomers to Canada (LINC) program*. Ottawa: CIC. Retrieved from:

<http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/resources/evaluation/linc/2004/index.asp>

Citizenship and Immigration Canada. (2005). *Canada-Ontario immigration agreement*. Ottawa:

CIC. Retrieved from: [http://www.cic.gc.ca/enGLISH/departement/laws-](http://www.cic.gc.ca/enGLISH/departement/laws-policy/agreements/ontario/ont-2005-agree.asp)

[policy/agreements/ontario/ont-2005-agree.asp](http://www.cic.gc.ca/enGLISH/departement/laws-policy/agreements/ontario/ont-2005-agree.asp)

Citizenship and Immigration Canada. (2005[1995]). *A look at Canada*. Ottawa: Public Works and Government Services.

Citizenship and Immigration Canada. (2006a). *Consultations on the settlement and language training services needs of newcomers*. Ottawa: CIC. Retrieved from:

http://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2007/cic/Ci51-199-1-2006-1E.pdf

Citizenship and Immigration Canada. (2006b). *Strategic plan for settlement and language training*. Ottawa: CIC.

Citizenship and Immigration Canada. (2008). *Backgrounder: Legislative amendments to the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act*. Ottawa: CIC. Retrieved from:

<http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/departement/media/backgrounders/2008/2008-07-03.asp>

- Citizenship and Immigration Canada. (2008, April 8). *News release: Immigration instructions to be governed by fairness, consultation*. Ottawa: CIC. Retrieved from:
<http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/department/media/releases/2008/2008-04-08.asp>
- Citizenship and Immigration Canada. (2009, March 18). Speaking notes for the Honourable Jason Kenney, P.C., M.P. Minister of Citizenship, Immigration and Multiculturalism “Good Citizenship: The Duty to Integrate” at Huron University College’s Canadian Leaders Speakers’ Series. Ottawa: CIC. Retrieved February 14, 2011, from:
<http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/department/media/speeches/2009/2009-03-18.asp>
- Citizenship and Immigration Canada. (2009, March 20). *Speaking notes for the Honourable Jason Kenney, P.C., M.P. Minister of Citizenship, Immigration and Multiculturalism, at the Eleventh National Metropolis Conference*. Ottawa: CIC. Retrieved February 14, 2011, from: <http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/department/media/speeches/2009/2009-03-20.asp>
- Citizenship and Immigration Canada. (2009, October 16). *News release: “Language training vouchers” to help newcomers succeed*. Ottawa: CIC. Retrieved from:
<http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/department/media/releases/2009/2009-10-16.asp>
- Citizenship and Immigration Canada. (2010[2009]). *Discover Canada: The rights and responsibilities of citizenship*. Ottawa: Public Works and Government Services.
- Citizenship and Immigration Canada. (2010, March). *Evaluation of the Language Instruction for Newcomers to Canada (LINC) program*. Ottawa: CIC, Evaluation Division.
- Citizenship and Immigration Canada. (2010, June 26). *Backgrounder: Changes to proof of language requirements will help better position newcomers to adapt to Canada’s labour*

market. Ottawa: CIC. Retrieved on July 26, 2010, from:

<http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/department/media/backgrounders/2010/2010-06-26a.asp>

Citizenship and Immigration Canada. (2011, September). *Evaluation of the Provincial Nominee Program*. Ottawa: CIC.

Citizenship and Immigration Canada. (2011, October 15). *CIC proposes changes to improve citizenship program*. Ottawa: CIC. Retrieved February 18, 2012 from:

<http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/department/media/releases/2011/2011-10-15.asp>

Citizenship and Immigration Canada. (2012, March 1). *Speaking notes for the Honourable Jason Kenney, P.C., M.P. Minister of Citizenship, Immigration and Multiculturalism at the National Metropolis Conference*. Ottawa: CIC. Retrieved from:

<http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/department/media/speeches/2012/2012-03-01.asp>

Citizenship and Immigration Canada. (2012, April 11). *Backgrounder: New minimum language requirements for immigrants under the Provincial Nominee Program*. Ottawa: CIC.

Retrieved from:

<http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/department/media/backgrounders/2012/2012-04-11.asp>

Citizenship and Immigration Canada. (2012, September 28). *News Release: Minister Kenney announces new language rules for citizenship applicants*. Ottawa: CIC. Retrieved from:

<http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/department/media/releases/2012/2012-09-28.asp>

Colleges Ontario. (2007). *Language skills for the workplace*. Ottawa: CIC/CO.

Commission on Integration and Cohesion. (2007). *Our shared future*. London: Commission on Integration and Cohesion [CIC].

Commission on Integration and Cohesion. (2007, February). *Our interim statement*. Wetherby: CIC.

Cooke, M. (2009). Barrier or entitlement? The language and citizenship agenda in the United Kingdom. *Language Assessment Quarterly*, 6, 71-77. doi: 10.1080/15434300802606580

Council of Europe. (2001a). *Common European framework of reference for languages: Learning, teaching, assessment*. Brussels: Council of Europe [COE]. Retrieved May 28, 2008 from: http://www.coe.int/t/dg4/linguistic/Source/Framework_en.pdf

Council of Europe. (2001b). *Common European framework of reference for languages: Learning, teaching, assessment. Structured overview of all CEFR scales*. Brussels: COE. Retrieved May 28, 2008 from: http://www.coe.int/t/dg4/education/elp/elp-reg/Source/Key_reference/Overview_CEFRscales_EN.pdf

Council of the European Union. (2004, November 19). *Document 14615/04*. Brussels: COE.

Da Silva, E., & Heller, M. (2009). From protector to producer: The role of the state in the discursive shift from minority rights to economic development. *Language Policy*, 8(1), 95-116. doi:10.1007/s10993-009-9127-x

Department for Communities and Local Government. (2007, December). *Guidance for local authorities on translation of publications*. Wetherby: Communities and Local Government Publications.

Department for Communities and Local Government. (2009, January). *Cohesion delivery framework: Overview*. London: Department for Communities and Local Government [DCLG].

Department for Education and Employment. (1998). *Education for citizenship and the teaching of democracy in schools: Final report of the Advisory Group on Citizenship*. London: Qualifications and Curriculum Authority.

Department for Education and Employment. (1999). *A fresh start: Improving literacy and numeracy*. London: Basic Skills Agency [BSA]. Retrieved from:
<http://www.lifelonglearning.co.uk/mosergroup/index.htm>

Department for Education and Employment. (2001). *Breaking the language barriers: Report of the working group on English for speakers of other languages (ESOL)*. London: Her Majesty's Stationary Office [HMSO].

Department for Education and Employment. (2001b). *Skills for life: The national strategy for improving adult literacy and numeracy skills*. London: HMSO.

Department for Education and Skills. (2001). *Adult ESOL core curriculum*. London: BSA.

Department for Innovation, Universities and Skills. (2008, January). *Focusing English for speakers of other languages (ESOL) on community cohesion*. London: Department for Innovation, Universities and Skills [DIUS].

Department for Innovation, Universities and Skills. (2009, March). *Skills for life: Changing lives*. London: HMSO.

Department for Innovation, Universities and Skills. (2009, May). *Focusing English for speakers of other languages (ESOL) on community cohesion: Consultation report*. London: DIUS.

Department for Innovation, Universities and Skills. (2009, May). *A new approach to English for speakers of other languages (ESOL)*. London: DIUS.

- Department for Trade and Industry. (1998). *Our competitive future: Building the knowledge driven economy*. London: HMSO.
- Derwing, T. (1992). Instilling a passive voice: Citizenship instruction in Canada. In B. Burnaby & A. Cumming (Eds.), *Socio-political aspects of ESL*. Toronto: OISE Press.
- Derwing, T. W., & Thomson, R. I. (2005). Citizenship concepts in LINC classrooms. *TESL Canada Journal*, 23(1), 44-62.
- DeVoretz, D. J. (Ed.). (1995). *Diminishing returns: The economics of Canada's recent immigration policy*. Toronto: C. D. Howe Institute.
- Entzinger, H. (2003). The rise and fall of multiculturalism: The case of the Netherlands. In C. Joppke & E. Morawska (Eds.), *Toward assimilation and citizenship: Immigrants in liberal nation-states* (pp. 59-86). Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Etzioni, A. (2007). Citizenship tests: A comparative communitarian perspective. *The Political Quarterly*, 78(3), 353-363.
- Extra, G., Spotti, M., & Van Avermaet, P. (2009). *Language testing, migration and citizenship*. London: Continuum.
- Fagnan, S. (1995). Canadian immigrant earnings, 1971-1986. In D. J. DeVoretz (Ed.), *Diminishing returns: The economics of Canada's recent immigration policy* (pp. 166-208). Toronto: C.D. Howe Institute.
- Fairclough, N. (1992). *Discourse and social change*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Fairclough, N. (1996). Technologization of discourse. In C. R. Caldas-Coulthard, & M. Coulthard (Eds.), *Texts and practices: Readings in critical discourse analysis*. London: Routledge.

- Fairclough, N. (2000). *New Labour, new language?* London: Routledge.
- Fairclough, N. (2002). Language in new capitalism. *Discourse & Society*, 13(2), 163-166.
- Fairclough, N. (2003). *Analysing discourse: Textual analysis for social research*. London: Routledge.
- Fairclough, N. (2005). Critical discourse analysis. *Marges Linguistiques*, 9, 76-94.
- Fairclough, N. (2006). *Language and globalization*. London: Routledge.
- Fairclough, N. (2009). A dialectical-relational approach to critical discourse analysis in social research. In R. Wodak & M. Meyer (Eds.), *Methods of critical discourse analysis* (2nd ed.) (pp. 162-186). London: SAGE Publications.
- Fairclough, N. (2010). *Critical discourse analysis: The critical study of language* (2nd ed.). London: Longman.
- Fairclough, N., & Wodak, R. (1997). Critical discourse analysis. In T. A. van Dijk (Ed.), *Discourse as social interaction* (pp. 258-284). London: Sage.
- Fairclough, N., & Wodak, R. (2008). The Bologna process and the knowledge-based economy: A critical discourse analysis approach. In B. Jessop, N. Fairclough, & R. Wodak (Eds.), *Education and the knowledge-based economy in Europe* (pp. 109-126). Rotterdam: Sense Publishers.
- Ferguson, J., & Gupta, A. (2002). Spatializing states: Toward an ethnography of neo-liberal governmentality. *American Ethnologist*, 29(4), 981-1002.
- Fleming, D. (2007). Adult immigrant ESL programs in Canada: Emerging trends in the contexts of history, economics, and identity. In J. Cummins & C. Davison (Eds.), *International handbook of English language teaching* (pp. 185-198). New York: Springer.

- Fleming, D. (2010). Becoming citizens: Racialized conceptions of ESL learners and the Canadian Language Benchmarks. *Canadian Journal of Education*, 33(3), 588-616.
- Flynn, D. (2005). New borders, new management: The dilemmas of modern immigration policies. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 28(3), 463-490.
- Foucault, M. (1982). The subject and power. In H. L. Dreyfus, & P. Rabinow (Eds.), *Michel Foucault: Beyond structuralism and hermeneutics* (pp. 208-226). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Foucault, M. (1991). Governmentality. In G. Burchell, C. Gordon, & P. Miller (Eds.), *The Foucault effect: Studies in governmentality* (pp. 87-104). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Foucault, M. (1994). "Omnes et singulatim:" Toward a critique of political reason. In Faubion, J. D. (Ed.), *Power: The essential works of Michel Foucault, Vol. 3*. New York: New Press.
- Foucault, M. (2009). *Security, territory, population: Lectures at the College de France 1977-1978*. New York: Picador.
- Fox, J., & Courchène, R. (2005). The Canadian language benchmarks (CLB): A critical appraisal. *Contact*, 31(2), 7-28.
- Frenette, M., & Morissette, R. (2003). Will they ever converge? Earnings of immigrant and Canadian-born workers over the last two decades. *Analytical Studies Research Paper Series, No. 215*. Statistics Canada: Ottawa.
- Fuller, C. (2011). Measuring performance in community cohesion. In P. Ratcliffe, & I. Newman (Eds.), *Promoting social cohesion: Implications for policy and evaluation* (pp. 61-79). Bristol, UK: The Policy Press.

- Gal, S. (2012). Sociolinguistic regimes and the management of diversity. In M. Heller & A. Duchêne (Eds.), *Language in late capitalism: Pride and profit* (pp. 22-42). New York/London: Routledge.
- Garcea, J. (2006). The third phase of the Canadian citizenship project: Reform objectives and obstacles. In H. J. Michelmann, D. E. Smith, & C. De Clercy (Eds.), *Continuity and change in Canadian politics: Essays in honour of David E. Smith* (pp. 195-224). Toronto: UTP.
- Gellner, E. (1983). *Nations and nationalism*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Gibb, T. L. (2008). Bridging Canadian adult second language education and Essential Skills policies: Approach with caution. *Adult Education Quarterly*, 58(4), 318-334.
doi:10.1177/0741713608318893
- Gordon, C. (1991). Governmental rationality: An introduction. In G. Burchell, C. Gordon, & P. Miller (Eds.), *The Foucault effect: Studies in governmentality* (pp. 1-51). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Groenendijk, K., & Van Oers, R. (2010). How liberal tests are does not merely depend on their content, but also their effects. In R. Bauböck, & C. Joppke (Eds.), *How liberal are citizenship tests?* (pp. 9-10). EUI Working Paper RSCAS 2010/41. Florence: European University Institute.
- Guild, E., Groenendijk, K., & Carrera, S. (Eds.). (2009). *Illiberal liberal states: Immigration, citizenship and integration in the EU*. Farnham, UK: Ashgate.
- Hager, S. B. (2007). *The Lisbon agenda and 'neo-liberal communitarian' citizenship*. Prague: Multicultural Center. Retrieved from: <https://www.migrationonline.cz>.

- Hansen, R. (2000). *Citizenship and immigration in post-war Britain*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Hansen, R. (2010). Citizenship tests: An unapologetic defense. In R. Bauböck, & C. Joppke (Eds.), *How liberal are citizenship tests?* (pp. 25-27). EUI Working Paper RSCAS 2010/41. Florence: European University Institute.
- Haque, E. (2010). Canadian federal policies on bilingualism, multiculturalism, and immigrant language training: Comparisons and interaction. In M. A. Morris (Ed.), *Canadian language policies in comparative perspective* (pp. 267-296). Montreal/Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press.
- Haque, E., & Cray, E. (2006). Putting them in their place: Language policies and newcomers to Canada. In N. Amin & G. J. S. Dei (Eds.), *Poetics of anti-racism* (pp. 73-84). Halifax: Fernwood Publishing.
- Harvey, D. (2005). *A brief history of neoliberalism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Held, D., McGrew, A., Goldblatt, D., & Perraton, J. (1999). *Global transformations*. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Heller, M. (2003). Globalization, the new economy, and the commodification of language and identity. *Journal of Sociolinguistics*, 7(4), 473-492.
- Heller, M. (2007). Bilingualism as ideology and practice. In M. Heller (Ed.), *Bilingualism: A social approach* (pp. 1-22). Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Heller, M. (2010). Language as resource in the globalized new economy. In N. Coupland (Ed.), *The handbook of language and globalization* (pp. 349-365). Oxford: Blackwell.

- Heller, M., & Duchêne, A. (2012). Pride and profit: Changing discourses of language, capital and nation-state. In M. Heller & A. Duchêne (Eds.), *Language in late capitalism: Pride and profit* (pp. 1-21). New York/London: Routledge.
- Hobsbawm, E. (1990). *Nations and nationalism since 1780*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Hogan-Brun, G., Mar-Molinero, C., & Stevenson, P. (Eds.). (2009). *Discourses on Language and Integration: Critical perspectives on language testing regimes in Europe*. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing Company.
- Home Office. (1998). *Fairer, faster and firmer: A modern approach to immigration and asylum*. London: HMSO.
- Home Office. (2001a). *Community cohesion: A report of the Community Cohesion Review Team*. HMSO.
- Home Office. (2001b). *Building cohesive communities: A report of the Ministerial Group on Public Order and Community Cohesion*. London: HMSO.
- Home Office. (2002). *Secure borders, safe haven: Integration with diversity in modern Britain*. London: HMSO.
- Home Office. (2003). *Building a picture of community cohesion*. London: Community Cohesion Unit.
- Home Office. (2003b). *The new and the old. The report of the 'Life in the United Kingdom' Advisory Group*. London: Home Office Communications Directorate.
- Home Office. (2004, July). *The end of parallel lives? The report of the Community Cohesion Panel*. London: HMSO.

Home Office. (2005a). *Controlling our borders: Making migration work for Britain. Five year strategy for asylum and immigration*. London: HMSO.

Home Office. (2005b). *Selective admission: Making migration work for Britain*. London: HMSO.

Home Office. (2006, March). *A points-based system: Making migration work for Britain*. London: HMSO.

Home Office. (2007[2004]). *Life in the UK: A journey to citizenship*. London: HMSO.

Home Office. (2012, February 2). Damian Green's speech on making immigration work for Britain. Retrieved from: <https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/damian-greens-speech-on-making-immigration-work-for-britain>

Home Office. Border & Immigration Agency. (2007, December). *Highly skilled workers under the points based system - (Tier 1): Statement of intent*. London: Border & Immigration Agency Communications Directorate.

Home Office. Border & Immigration Agency. (2008, February). *The path to citizenship: Next steps in reforming the immigration system*. London: Border & Immigration Agency Communications Directorate.

Home Office. UK Border Agency. (2008, May). *Skilled workers under the points based system - (Tier 2): Statement of intent*. London: UK Border Agency Communications Directorate.

Home Office. UK Border Agency. (2008, May). *Temporary workers and youth mobility under the points based system - (Tier 5): Statement of intent*. London: UK Border Agency Communications Directorate.

Home Office. UK Border Agency. (2008, July). *Students under the points based system - (Tier 4): Statement of intent*. London: UK Border Agency.

Home Office. UK Border Agency. (2011, February). *Tier 2 of the points based system: Statement of intent, transitional, measures and indefinite leave to remain*. London: HMSO.

Home Office. UK Border Agency. (2011, June). *Employment-related settlement, tier 5 and overseas domestic workers. A consultation*. London: HMSO.

Home Office. UK Border Agency. (2013, September 20). *Changes to the knowledge of language and life in the UK requirement for settlement and naturalisation*. Retrieved from:
<http://www.ukba.homeoffice.gov.uk/sitecontent/documents/britishcitizenship/kol-uk>

Hornberger, N. (2006). Frameworks and models in language policy and planning. In T. Ricento (Ed.), *An introduction to language policy: Theory and method* (pp. 24-41). Malden, MA: Blackwell.

Hornberger, N., & Johnson, D. C. (2007). Slicing the onion ethnographically: Layers and spaces in multilingual language education policy and practice. *TESOL Quarterly*, 41(3), 509-532.

House of Commons. Canada. (1994). *Canadian citizenship: A sense of belonging. Report of the Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration*. Ottawa: Public Works and Government Services.

House of Commons. Canada. (2002). *Building a nation: The regulations of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act. Report of the Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration*. Ottawa: Public Works and Government Services.

House of Commons. Canada. (2003). Settlement and Integration: A Sense of Belonging “Feeling at Home.” Report of the Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration. Ottawa: Public Works and Government Services.

House of Commons. Canada. (2005). *Updating Canada’s citizenship laws: It’s time. Report of the Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration*. Ottawa: Public Works and Government Services.

Human Resources Development Canada. (n.d.). *Backgrounder: More information on Knowledge Matters*. Ottawa: Human Resources Development Canada [HRDC]. Retrieved July 26, 2010, from http://www.hrsdc.gc.ca/eng/hip/hrp/corporate/knowledgematters/km_background.shtml

Hum, D., & Simpson, W. (2004). Economic integration of immigrants to Canada: A short survey. *Canadian Journal of Urban Research*, 13(1), 46-61.

Human Resources Development Canada. (2002, February 12). Remarks by The Honourable Jane Stewart, Minister of Human Resources Development Canada for News Conference to Announce Knowledge Matters: Skills and Learning for Canadians at Toromont Caterpillar Ltd., Kanata, Ontario. Ottawa: HRDC. Retrieved July 26, 2010, from http://www.hrsdc.gc.ca/eng/cs/comm/speeches/hrdc/2002/020212_e.shtml

Human Resources Development Canada. (2002). *Knowledge matters: Skills and learning for Canadians*. Ottawa: HRDC.

Human Resources and Skills Development Canada. (n.d.a.). *Understanding Essential skills*. Ottawa: Human Resources and Skills Development Canada [HRDSC] Retrieved July 26, 2010, from

http://www.hrsdc.gc.ca/eng/workplaceskills/essential_skills/general/understanding_es.shtml

Human Resources and Skills Development Canada. (n.d.b.). *Background: Essential Skills Research Project*. Ottawa: HRDSC. Retrieved July 26, 2010, from

http://www.hrsdc.gc.ca/eng/workplaceskills/essential_skills/general/esrp.shtml

Human Resources and Skills Development Canada. (n.d.c.). *Essential Skills profiles*. Ottawa: HRDSC. Retrieved July 26, 2010, from

http://www10.hrsdc.gc.ca/es/english/ES_Profiles.aspx

Human Resources and Skills Development Canada. (n.d.d.). *Levels of complexity*. Ottawa: HRDSC. Retrieved July 26, 2010, from

http://www.hrsdc.gc.ca/eng/workplaceskills/essential_skills/general/complexity.shtml

Iltan, S. (2009). Privatizing responsibility: Public sector reform under neo-liberal government. *Canadian Review of Sociology*, 46(3), 207-234.

Immigration Legislative Review Advisory Group. (1997a). *Not just numbers: A Canadian framework for future immigration*. Ottawa: Minister of Public Works and Government Services Canada.

Immigration Legislative Review Advisory Group. (1997b). *Not just numbers: A Canadian framework for future immigration. Executive summary*. Ottawa: Minister of Public Works and Government Services Canada.

Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA). Revised Statutes of Canada (2001, c. 27).

Retrieved from: <http://laws.justice.gc.ca/en/i-2.5/index.html>

Immigration and Refugee Protection Act Regulations. (SOR/2002-227). Retrieved from:

<http://laws.justice.gc.ca/eng/SOR-2002-227/index.html>

Industry Canada. (2002, February 12). *Speaking Notes for Allan Rock, Minister of Industry at the Canadian Chamber of Commerce: Canada's Innovation Strategy Achieving Excellence, Toronto, Ontario*. Ottawa: Industry Canada. Retrieved July 26, 2010 from:

<http://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/ic1.nsf/eng/01622.html>.

Institute for Public Policy Research. (2005). *Selecting wisely: Making managed migration work for Britain*. London: Institute for Public Policy Research [IPPR].

Jenson, J., & Phillips, S. D. (1996). Regime shift: New citizenship practices in Canada.

International Journal of Canadian Studies, 14, 111-135.

Jenson, J., & Phillips, S. D. (2001). Redesigning the Canadian citizenship regime: Remaking the institutions of representation. In C. Crouch, K. Eder, & D. Tambini (Eds.), *Citizenship, markets, and the state* (pp. 69-89). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Jessop, B. (1993). Towards a Schumpeterian workfare state? Preliminary remarks on Post-Fordist political economy. *Studies in Political Economy*, 40, 7-39.

Jessop, B. (2000). The crisis of the national spatio-temporal fix and the tendential ecological dominance of globalizing capitalism. *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, 24(2), 323-360.

Jessop, B. (2002). *The future of the capitalist state*. Cambridge: Polity.

Jessop, B. (2004). Critical semiotic analysis and cultural political economy. *Critical Discourse Studies*, 1(2), 159-174.

Jessop, B. (2008). *State power: A strategic-relational approach*. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.

- Johnson, D. C. (2009). Ethnography of language policy. *Language Policy*, 8(2), 139-159.
- Johnson, D. C. (2011). Critical discourse analysis and the ethnography of language policy. *Critical Discourse Studies*, 8(4), 267-279.
- Johnson, D. C. (2013). *Language Policy*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Joppke, C. (1999). *Immigration and the nation-state: The United States, Germany, and Great Britain*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Joppke, C. (2004). The retreat of multiculturalism in the liberal state: Theory and policy. *British Journal of Sociology*, 55(2), 237-257.
- Joppke, C. (2007). Beyond national models: Civic integration policies for immigrants in Western Europe. *West European Politics*, 30(1), 1-22.
- Joppke, C. (2008). Immigration and the identity of citizenship: The paradox of universalism. *Citizenship Studies*, 12(6), 533-546.
- Joppke, C. (2010). *Citizenship and immigration*. Cambridge: Polity.
- Joppke, C., & Morawska, E. (2003). Integrating immigrants in liberal nation states. In C. Joppke, & E. Morawska (Eds.), *Towards assimilation and citizenship: Immigrants in liberal nation states* (pp. 1-36). Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Joppke, C., & Morawska, E. (Eds.). (2003). *Towards assimilation and citizenship: Immigrants in liberal nation states*. Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Kennelly, J., & Llewellyn, K. R. (2011). Educating for active compliance: Discursive constructions in citizenship education. *Citizenship Studies*, 15(6-7), 897-914.
- Kivisto, P. & Faist, T. (2007). *Citizenship: Discourse, theory and transnational prospects*. London: Blackwell.

- Kofman, E. (2005). Citizenship, migration and the reasserting of national identity. *Citizenship Studies*, 9(5), 453-467.
- Koller, V., & Davidson, P. (2008). Social exclusion as conceptual and grammatical metaphor: A cross-genre study of British policy-making. *Discourse & Society*, 19(3), 307-331.
- Layton-Henry, Z. (2004). Britain: From immigration control to migration management. In W. A. Cornelius, T. Tsuda, P. L. Martin, & J. F. Hollifield (Eds.), *Controlling immigration: A global perspective* (2nd ed.) (pp. 297-333). Redwood City, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Levitas, R. (2005). *The inclusive society? Social exclusion and New Labour* (2nd ed.). Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Little, D. (2005). The Common European Framework and the European Language Portfolios: Involving learners and their judgments in the assessment process. *Language Testing*, 22(3), 321-336.
- Little, D. (2007). The Common European Framework of Reference for Languages: Perspectives on the making of supra-national language education policy. *Modern Language Journal*, 91(4), 645-655.
- Local Government Association. (2002). *Guidance on community cohesion*. London: LGA Publications.
- Mackey, W. F. (2010). History and origins of language policies in Canada. In M. A. Morris (Ed.), *Canadian language policies in comparative perspective* (pp. 18-66). Montreal/Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press.
- McNamara, T., & Roever, C. (2006). *Language testing: The social dimension*. Malden, MA: Blackwell.

- McNamara, T., & Shohamy, E. (2008) Language tests and human rights. *International Journal of Applied Linguistics*, 18(1), 89-95.
- McRea, K. (1998). Official bilingualism: From the 1960s to the 1990s. In J. Edwards (Ed.), *Language in Canada* (pp. 61-83). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Michalowski, I. (2010). Integration tests in Germany: A communitarian approach? In R. Van Oers, E. Ersboll, & D. Kostakopoulou (Eds.), *A re-definition of belonging? Language and integration tests in Europe* (pp. 185-210). Leiden/Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.
- Milani, T. M. (2009). At the intersection between power and knowledge: An analysis of a Swedish policy document on language testing for citizenship. *Journal of Language and Politics*, 8(2), 287-304.
- Millar, J. (2009). *Language in immigration policy: Neo-liberal governmentality and the regulation of transnational migration flows*. Paper presented at the Canadian Sociological Association (CSAA) Annual Meeting, Ottawa, Canada.
- Millar, J. (2013). An interdiscursive analysis of language and immigrant integration policy discourse in Canada. *Critical Discourse Studies*, 10(1), 18-31.
doi:10.1080/17405904.2012.736696
- Morris, M. A. (2010). Introduction: Comparing perspectives on Canadian language policies. In M. A. Morris (Ed.), *Canadian language policies in comparative perspective* (pp. 3-14). Montreal/Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press.

National Institute for Adult Continuing Education. (2006, October). *More than a Language:*

Executive Summary. Leicester: National Institute for Adult Continuing Education [NIACE].

National Institute for Adult Continuing Education. (2010[2006]). *ESOL materials for citizenship*.

Home Office/NIACE.

Niesson, J., & Huddleston, T. (2009). *Handbook on integration for policy-makers and practitioners*. Brussels: European Commission.

Nygren-Junkin (2009). Canada: A multicultural mosaic. In G. Extra, M. Spotti, & P. Van Avermaet (Eds.), *Language testing, migration and citizenship* (pp. 211-223). London: Continuum.

Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. (1995). *Literacy, economy and society*. Paris: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development [OECD]/Statistics Canada.

Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. (1996). *The Knowledge-Based Economy*. Paris: OECD.

Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. (1997). *Literacy skills for the knowledge society: Further results from the IALS*. Paris: OECD/Statistics Canada.

Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. (2000). *Literacy in the information age: Final report of the International Adult Literacy Survey*. Paris: OECD/Statistics Canada. Retrieved from: <http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/89-588-x/4152886-eng.htm>

Office for National Statistics. (2013). *Migration statistics quarterly report, November 2013*. London: HMSO.

- O'Grady, S. (2013, May 17). Labour's open door policy let in more immigrants in a decade than in the previous 40 years. *The Daily Express*. Retrieved from <http://www.express.co.uk>
- Ong, A. (2006). *Neo-liberalism as exception: Mutations in citizenship and sovereignty*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- Overbeek, H. (2002). *Globalisation and governance: Contradictions of neo-liberal migration management*. Hamburg: Hamburg Institute for International Economics.
- Paquet, M. (2012). Beyond appearances: Citizenship tests in Canada and the UK. *Journal of International Migration and Integration*, 13, 243-260.
- Parliament of Canada. (2002). Government response to the report of the standing committee on citizenship and immigration "Building a nation: The regulations under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act." Ottawa: House of Commons Publications. Retrieved from: <http://www.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?DocId=464935&Language=E&Mode=1&Parl=37&Ses=1>
- Parliament of Canada. (2002b). Bill C-18: The Citizenship of Canada Act. Legislative summary. Ottawa: Law and Government Division. Retrieved from: http://www.parl.gc.ca/About/Parliament/LegislativeSummaries/Bills_ls.asp?ls=c18&Parl=37&Ses=2#bpurposetx
- Parliament of Canada. (2008). Bill C-37: An Act to Amend the Citizenship Act. Legislative Summary. Ottawa: Law and Government Division. Retrieved from: http://www.parl.gc.ca/About/Parliament/LegislativeSummaries/bills_ls.asp?lang=E&ls=c37&Parl=39&Ses=2&source=library_prb

- Pawlikowska-Smith, G. (2000). Canadian Language Benchmarks 2000: English as a second language for adults. Ottawa: CCLB.
- Pawlikowska-Smith, G. (2002). Canadian Language Benchmarks 2000: Theoretical framework. Ottawa: CCLB.
- Picot, G. (2004). The deteriorating economic welfare of Canadian immigrants. *Canadian Journal of Urban Research*, 13, 25-45.
- Piller, I. (2001). Naturalization language testing and its basis in ideologies of national identity and citizenship. *International Journal of Bilingualism*, 5(3), 259-277.
- Pinet, R. (2006). The contestation of citizenship education at three stages of the LINC 4 & 5 curriculum guidelines: Production, reception and implementation. *TESL Canada Journal*, 24(1), 1-20.
- Pujolar, J. (2007) Bilingualism and the nation-state in the post-national era. In M. Heller (Ed.), *Bilingualism: A social approach* (pp. 71-95). Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Putnam, R. (1995). Bowling alone: America's declining social capital. *Journal of Democracy*, 6(1), 65-78.
- Ratcliffe, P. (2011). From community to social cohesion: Interrogating a policy paradigm. In P. Ratcliffe, & I. Newman (Eds.), *Promoting social cohesion: Implications for policy and evaluation* (pp. 15-39). Bristol, UK: The Policy Press.
- Reisigl, M., & Wodak, R. (2009). The discourse-historical approach. In R. Wodak & M. Meyer (Eds.), *Methods of critical discourse analysis* (2nd ed.) (pp. 87-121). London: SAGE Publications.

- Reitz, J. G. (2001a). Immigrant skill utilization in the Canadian labour market: Implications of human capital research. *Journal of International Migration and Integration*, 2(3), 347-378.
- Reitz, J. G. (2001b). Immigrant success in the knowledge economy: Institutional change and the immigrant experience in Canada, 1970-1995. *Journal of Social Issues*, 57(3), 579-613.
- Reitz, J. G. (2004). Canada: Immigration and nation-building in the transition to a knowledge economy. In W. A. Cornelius, T. Tsuda, P. L. Martin, & J. F. Hollifield (Eds.), *Controlling immigration: A global perspective* (2nd ed.) (pp. 97-133). Redwood City, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Reitz, J. G. (2005). Tapping immigrants' skills: New directions for Canadian immigration policy in the knowledge economy. *IRPP Choices*, 11(1), 1-15.
- Rose, N. (1996). Governing "advanced liberal" democracies. In A. Barry, T. Osborne, & N. Rose (Eds.), *Foucault and political reason: Liberalism, neo-liberalism and rationalities of government* (pp. 37-64). London: University College London Press.
- Rose, N. (1999). *Powers of freedom: Reframing political thought*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Ryan, B. (2009). The integration agenda in British migration law. In E. Guild, K. Groenendijk, & S. Carrera (Eds.), *Illiberal liberal states: Immigration, citizenship and integration in the EU* (pp. 277-298). Farnham, UK: Ashgate.
- Schieffelin, B. B., Woolard, K. A., & Kroskrity, P. V. (Eds.). (1998). *Language ideologies: Practice and theory*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

- Schinkel, W., & Van Houdt, F. (2010). The double helix of cultural assimilationism and neo-liberalism: Citizenship in contemporary governmentality. *British Journal of Sociology*, 61(4), 696-715.
- Shohamy, E. (2001). *The power of tests: A critical perspective on the uses of language tests*. London: Pearson.
- Shohamy, E. (2006). *Language policy: Hidden agendas and new approaches*. London: Routledge.
- Shohamy, E. (2009). Language tests for immigrants: Why language? Why tests? Why citizenship? In G. Hogan-Brun, C. Mar-Molinero, & P. Stevenson (Eds.), *Discourses on Language and Integration: Critical perspectives on language testing regimes in Europe*. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins.
- Shohamy, E., & MacNamara, T. (2009). Language tests for citizenship, immigration, and asylum. *Language Assessment Quarterly*, 6(1), 1-5.
- Smit, P., & Turcot, P. (2010). *National consultation on the Canadian Language Benchmarks 2000 and Niveaux de compétence linguistique canadiens 2006. Final report*. Ottawa: CCLB.
- Smith, A. (2010). CIC's modernized approach to settlement programming: A brief description. *INSCAN*, 23(3), 1-4.
- Somerville, W. (2007). *Immigration under New Labour*. Bristol: Policy Press.
- Soysal, Y. (1994). *Limits of citizenship*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Spolsky, B. (2004). *Language Policy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- Steger, M. (2013). *Globalization: A very short introduction* (3rd ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Stewart, G., Geraci, K., & Nagy, P. (2004). *Essential Skills and Canadian Language Benchmarks: Considerations in comparing conceptual frameworks*. Ottawa: CCLB.
- Street, B. (1996). Literacy, economy society. *Language Across the Curriculum*, 12, 8-15.
- Tipton, R. (2012). Public service interpreting and the politics of entitlement for new entrants to the United Kingdom. *Journal of Language and Politics*, 11(2), 185-206.
- Tolley, E. (2003). *The skilled worker class: Selection criteria in the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act. Policy Brief*. Ottawa: Metropolis.
- UK Border Agency. (2008). *HSMP caseworker guidance: English language*. London: UK Border Agency [UKBA]. Retrieved June 18, 2013 from:
<http://www.bia.homeoffice.gov.uk/sitecontent/documents/policyandlaw/ecis/hsmpcaseworkerguidance/>
- United Kingdom. HM Treasury. (2006, December). *Prosperity for all in the global economy: world class skills. Leitch review of skills final report*. London: HMSO.
- United Kingdom. (2007). *PSA delivery agreement 21: Build more cohesive, empowered and active communities*. London: HMSO.
- United Kingdom. House of Lords. (2008). *Citizenship: Our common bond. Lord Goldsmith, QC, citizenship review*. London: HMSO.
- Urciuoli, B. (2008). Skills and selves in the new workplace. *American Ethnologist*, 35(2), 211-228.

- Van Avermaet, P. (2009). Fortress Europe? Language policy regimes for immigration and citizenship. In G. Hogan-Brun, C. Mar-Molinero, & P. Stevenson (Eds.), *Discourses on language and integration: Critical perspectives on language testing regimes in Europe* (pp. 15-43). Philadelphia: John Benjamins.
- Van Houdt, F., Suvarierol, S., & Schinkel, W. (2011). Neo-liberal communitarian citizenship: Current trends towards 'earned citizenship' in the United Kingdom, France and the Netherlands. *International Sociology*, 26(3), 408-432.
- Van Oers, R. (2009). From liberal to restrictive citizenship policies: The case of the Netherlands. *International Journal of Multicultural Societies*, 10(1), 40-59.
- Van Oers, R. (2009). Justifying citizenship tests in the Netherlands and the UK. In E. Guild, K. Groenendijk, & S. Carrera (Eds.), *Illiberal liberal states: Immigration, citizenship and integration in the EU* (pp. 113-130). Farnham, UK: Ashgate.
- Van Oers, R. (2010). Citizenship tests in the Netherlands, Germany and the UK. In Van Oers, E. Ersbøll, & D. Kostakopoulou (Eds.), *A re-definition of belonging? Language and integration tests in Europe* (pp. 51-105). Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.
- Wallace Goodman, S. (2010). Integration requirements for integration's sake? Identifying, categorising and comparing civic integration policies. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 36(5), 753-772.
- Walsh, J. P. (2011). Quantifying citizens: Neo-liberal restructuring and immigrant selection in Canada and Australia. *Citizenship Studies*, 15(6-7), 861-879.

- Wodak, R. & Fairclough, N. (2010). Recontextualizing European higher education policies: The cases of Austria and Romania. *Critical Discourse Studies*, 7(1), 19-40.
doi:10.1080/17405900903453922
- Wright, S. (2004). *Language policy and language planning: From nationalism to globalization*. Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Wright, S. (2008). Citizenship tests in Europe: Editorial introduction. *International Journal of Multicultural Societies*, 10(1), 1-9.
- Wright, S. (2012). Language policy, the nation and nationalism. In B. Spolsky (Ed.), *The Cambridge handbook of language policy* (pp. 59-78). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

APPENDIX A: LIST OF ACRONYMS

CCLB	Centre for Canadian Language Benchmarks
CEFR	Common European Framework of Reference for Languages
CIC	Citizenship and Immigration Canada (Canada); Commission on Integration and Cohesion (UK)
CLB	Canadian Language Benchmarks
CLBA	Canadian Language Benchmarks Assessment
COE	Council of Europe
COIA	Canada-Ontario Immigration Agreement
DCLG	Department for Communities and Local Government
DfEE	Department for Education and Employment
DfES	Department for Education and Skills
DIUS	Department for Innovation, Universities and Skills
DTI	Department for Trade and Industry
EC	European Commission
ELT	Enhanced Language Training
ES	Essential Skills
ESOL	English for Speakers of Other Languages
ESP	Essential Skills Profiles
ESRP	Essential Skills Research Project
FSWP	Federal Skilled Worker Program

HRDC	Human Resources Development Canada
HRSDC	Human Resources and Skills Development Canada
HSMP	Highly Skilled Migrant Program
IALS	International Adult Literacy Survey
IELTS	International English Language Testing System
ILR	Indefinite Leave to Remain
IPPR	Institute for Public Policy Research
IRPA	Immigration and Refugee Protection Act
KBE	Knowledge-Based Economy
LGA	Local Government Association
LINC	Language Instruction for Newcomers to Canada
LRAG	Legislative Review Advisory Group
NIACE	National Institute for Adult Continuing Education
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
OLA	Occupational Language Analysis
OSLT	Occupation Specific Language Training
PBLA	Portfolio-Based Language Assessment
PBS	Points-Based System
PNP	Provincial Nominee Program
TOEFL	Test of English as a Foreign Language

APPENDIX B: LIST OF TERMS

Jus soli and **jus sanguinis**: competing principles for citizenship acquisition based on birth in a territory or naturalization (jus soli = right of soil) versus bonds of kinship or descent (jus sanguinis = right of blood).

Liberal Citizenship: procedural notion of citizenship as legal status with attendant civil, political, and social rights, and to which long term residents have access by right (see Van Oers, 2010).

Republican Citizenship: active notion of citizenship as participation in a political community, access to which is conditional on acquisition of the knowledge required for active participation (see Van Oers, 2010).

Communitarian Citizenship: concept of citizenship as membership in a national community, access to which is dependent on possessing the shared values and identity of that community (see Van Oers, 2010).

Commodification, Technologization, Skillification: terms for capturing the transformation of language under the conditions of contemporary capitalism whereby language has been made into an economically valuable commodity that can be exchanged, managed and cultivated as ‘communication skills’ (see Fairclough, 1996; Cameron, 2000; Urciuoli, 2008; Heller, 2010).

Neo-liberalism: a political economic theory that proposes that human well-being can best be advanced through free markets and individual entrepreneurialism; a dominant economic policy agenda of deregulation, privatization, withdrawal of the state from many areas of social provision (Harvey, 2005).

Globalization: the contemporary phenomenon of unprecedented space-time compression, the result of a set of processes (economic, political, cultural, etc.) that reflect the emergence of networks and systems of interaction and exchange at a global scale (Held, McGrew, Goldblatt, & Perraton, 1999).

Globalist Discourse: a hegemonic discourse of economic globalization that sees it as an inevitable and irreversible process culminating in the liberalization and global integration of markets for the benefit of all (see Steger, 2013; Fairclough, 2006).

Knowledge-Based Economy (KBE): a particular representation of the new economy that puts a premium on knowledge as a factor of production, and which has become the dominant rationale for neo-liberal economic globalization (see OECD, 1996; Jessop, 2002).

Post-National Thesis: the claim that the status of national citizenship has been eclipsed by rights claims based on a notion of universal personhood and international human rights norms (see Soysal, 1994).

APPENDIX C: LIST OF POLICY DOCUMENTS ANALYZED

Canadian Immigration Policy Documents

Immigration Consultations Report. (CIC, 1994a)
 Into the 21st Century: A Strategy for Immigration and Citizenship. (CIC, 1994b)
 A Broader Vision: Immigration and Citizenship Plan 1995-2000. (CIC, 1994c)
 Not Just Numbers: A Canadian Framework for Future Immigration. (LRAG, 1997a)
 Building on a Strong Foundation for the 21st Century: New Directions for Immigration and Refugee Policy and Legislation. (CIC, 1998)
 Immigration and Refugee Protection Act. (2001)
 Immigration and Refugee Protection Act Regulations. (2002)
 Building a Nation: The Regulations of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act. Report of the Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration. (House of Commons, 2002)
 Government Response to the Report of the Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration Building a Nation: The regulations Under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act. (Parliament of Canada, 2002)

Canadian Economic Policy Documents

Knowledge Matters: Skills and Learning for Canadians. (HRDC, 2002)

OECD Economic Policy Documents

Literacy, Economy and Society. (OECD, 1995)
 The Knowledge-Based Economy. (OECD, 1996)
 Literacy Skills for the Knowledge Society: Further Results from the IALS. (OECD, 1997)
 Literacy in the Information Age: Final Report of the International Adult Literacy Survey. (OECD, 2000)

Canadian Integration and Settlement Policy Documents

Settlement and Integration: A Sense of Belonging: “Feeling at Home.” Report of the Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration. (House of Commons, 2003).
 Evaluation of the Language Instruction for Newcomers (LINC) program. (CIC, 2004)
 Canada-Ontario Immigration Agreement (COIA). (CIC, 2005)
 Consultations on the Settlement and Language Training Services Needs of Newcomers. (CIC, 2006)
 Strategic Plan for Settlement and Language Training. (CIC, 2006)

Canadian Language Benchmarks Documents

Canadian Language Benchmarks 2000: English as a Second Language for Adults. (CCLB, 2000)

Canadian Language Benchmarks 2000: Theoretical Framework. (CCLB, 2002)
 Essential Skills and Canadian Language Benchmarks: Considerations in comparing conceptual frameworks. (CCLB, 2004)
 Relating Canadian Language Benchmarks to Essential Skills: A comparative framework. (CCLB, 2005)
 Occupational Language Analysis: Overview of the methodology. (CCLB, 2005)
 National Consultation on the Canadian Language Benchmarks 2000 and Niveaux de Compétence Linguistique Canadiens 2006. Final Report. (CCLB, 2010)

Canadian Citizenship Policy Documents

Canadian Citizenship: A Sense of Belonging. Report of the Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration. (House of Commons, 1994)
 Into the 21st Century: A Strategy for Immigration and Citizenship. (CIC, 1994)
 A Broader Vision: Immigration and Citizenship Plan 1995-2000. (CIC, 1994)
 Not Just Numbers: A Canadian Framework for Future Immigration. (LRAG, 1997)
 Updating Canada's Citizenship Laws: It's Time. Report of the Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration. (House of Commons, 2005)
 Bill C-18: The Citizenship of Canada Act. (2002)
 Bill C-37: An Act to Amend the Citizenship Act. (2008)
 A Look at Canada. (CIC, 2005[1995])
 Discover Canada: The Rights and Responsibilities of Citizenship. (CIC, 2010[2009])

United Kingdom Immigration Policy Documents

Fairer, Faster and Firmer: A Modern Approach to Immigration and Asylum. (Home Office, 1998)
 Secure Borders, Safe Haven: Integration with Diversity in Modern Britain. (Home Office, 2002)
 Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act (NIA). (2002).
 Controlling Our Borders: Making Migration Work for Britain. Five Year Strategy for Asylum and Immigration. (Home Office, 2005)
 Selective Admission: Making Migration Work for Britain. (Home Office, 2005)
 Selecting Wisely: Making Managed Migration Work for Britain. (IPPR, 2005)
 A Points-Based System: Making Migration Work for Britain. (Home Office, 2006)
 Highly Skilled Workers Under the Points Based System - (Tier 1): Statement of Intent. (Home Office, 2007)
 Skilled Workers Under the Points Based System - (Tier 2): Statement of Intent. (Home Office, 2008)
 Students Under the Points Based System - (Tier 4): Statement of Intent. (Home Office, 2008)
 Temporary Workers and Youth Mobility Under the Points Based System - (Tier 5): Statement of Intent. Home Office, 2008)

United Kingdom Integration Policy Documents

Community Cohesion: A Report of the Community Cohesion Review Team. (Cantle Report). (Home Office, 2001)

Building Cohesive Communities: A Report of the Ministerial Group on Public Order and Community Cohesion (Denham Report). (Home Office, 2001)

Guidance on Community Cohesion. (LGA, 2002)

Building a Picture of Community Cohesion. (Home Office, 2003)

The End of Parallel Lives? The Report of the Community Cohesion Panel. (Home Office, 2004)

Commission on Integration and Cohesion: Our Interim Statement. (CIC, 2007)

Our Shared Future: Final Report of the Commission on Integration and Cohesion. (CIC, 2007)

Guidance for Local Authorities on Translation of Publications. (DCLG, 2007).

Cohesion Delivery Framework: Overview. (DCLG, 2009)

United Kingdom Economic Policy Documents

Our Competitive Future: Building the Knowledge Driven Economy. (DTI, 1998)

A Fresh Start: Improving Literacy and Numeracy. (Moser Report) (DfEE, 1999)

Skills for Life: The National Strategy for Improving Adult Literacy and Numeracy Skills. (DfEE, 2001)

Prosperity for All in the Global Economy: World Class Skills. Leitch Review of Skills Final Report. (Leitch Review). (2006)

Skills for Life: Changing Lives. (DIUS, 2009)

United Kingdom ESOL Policy Documents

Breaking the Language Barriers: Report of the Working Group on English for Speakers of Other Languages (ESOL). (DfEE, 2001)

Adult ESOL Core Curriculum. (DfES, 2001)

More than a Language: Executive Summary. (NIACE, 2006)

Focusing English for Speakers of Other Language (ESOL) on Community Cohesion. (DIUS, 2008)

Focusing English for Speakers of Other Language (ESOL) on Community Cohesion – Consultation Report. (DIUS, 2009)

New Approach to English for Speakers of Other Language (ESOL). (DIUS, 2009)

United Kingdom Citizenship Policy Documents

Education for Citizenship and the Teaching of Democracy in Schools: Final Report of the Advisory Group on Citizenship. (DfEE, 1998)

The New and the Old. The Report of the Life in the United Kingdom Advisory Group (Crick Report). (Home Office, 2003)

Life in the UK: A Journey to Citizenship. (Home Office, 2007[2004])

ESOL Materials for Citizenship. (NIACE, 2010[2006])

The Path to Citizenship: Next Steps in Reforming the Immigration System. (Home Office, 2008)

Citizenship: Our Common Bond. Lord Goldsmith, QC Citizenship Review. (UK. House of Lords, 2008).

Council of Europe and European Commission Documents

Common European Framework of Reference for Languages: Learning, Teaching, Assessment. (COE, 2001)

Common European Framework of Reference for Languages: Learning, Teaching, Assessment. Structured Overview of all CEFR Scales. (COE, 2001)

Common Basic Principles for Immigrant Integration Policy in the European Union. (EC, 2004)

Handbook on Integration for Policy-Makers and Practitioners. (COE, 2009)